

POL

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BIAFRA - NIGERIA

5-1-68

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

Retain class'n Change/classify to _____

Declassify with concurrence of _____

EO 12958, 25X

FPC/HDR by Date: 2/18/96

Withdrawal No. _____

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE C.F. 1967-1969 PUL
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 51-1


DATE: 5/31/68 MSG NO.: 9570 TYPE: TE
FROM: Lages TO: Stet.
SUBJECT: British Hiscomer Instructed See Gowan
DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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SEARCH/ACTION

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TR XMB AIR 5
ARMY CIA NAVY 3 20 5
OSD USIA NSA 34 10 3
HEN NSC 7 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

SAC 7 NIGERIA
SAC POL 3 NIGERIA
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A-110

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REF ID: A7B127B127-Niger

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : KADUNA, LAGOS

JUN 8 1968

FROM : Amconsul, Ibadan

DATE: May 31, 1968

SUBJECT: WESTERN NIGERIA: Assemblies of God Missionary Visits Enugu

REF : Ibadan's A-108

SUMMARY

On May 29 the reporting officer spoke with Mr. Gerald L. Falley, (Amcit, protect), of the Assemblies of God Mission. Mr. and Mrs. Durham, Baptist Missionaries, accompanied Mr. Falley in his Peugeot 404 when he went to Enugu May 16 and 17 (Ibadan's A-108). The following remarks constitute Mr. Falley's impressions of conditions in the East Central State gained as a result of his visit to the area.

PRELIMINARIES: Falley said that before the trip the Durhams spent about 15 minutes with Asika, Administrator of Enugu and Liberated Sections of the East Central State. Asika encouraged the Durhams to go to Enugu and asked them to stop by his office while they were there.

The three missionaries went via Makurdi where they saw Colonel Danjuma in order to obtain a letter enabling them to go to Enugu. Falley was very impressed with Danjuma. Danjuma told them that Enugu had been looted; some looting had been by Biafrans before the FMG arrived and later the Federal Troops had also done some looting. However, he assured them that the FMG now had things under control. Danjuma said that there were many Ibos living in the bush but they were afraid to come out of hiding. Danjuma cited the example of a whole village north of Nsukka which had taken to the bush and was living on bark. The people had been found by the Red Cross (Lagos 9188). Danjuma said that these people would rather eat bark than harvest their crops which were rotting in the fields. Danjuma told them that he considered Abakaliki much safer as the people in that town were really not Ibos and they had cooperated with the FMG. He encouraged them to return to their missions

FORM 4-62 DS-373
MAY 1962

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
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In Out

Drafted by: WGMithoefer, Jr:gor 5/31/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:
EMB: POL: AB Wellons

Clearances:



Ibadan A-110

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in the East Central State and said that it would reassure the Ibos that it was safe for them to come back to their homes.

While in Makurdi the group spoke with a Sudan United Missionary by the name of De Gote. Supposedly De Gote had remained at his station in Makurdi during all of the fighting. He told them that he had the impression that in the battle for Enugu more federal troops lost their lives while looting than while fighting. He explained this statement by saying that when they first liberated Enugu the FMG soldiers slung the guns on their backs in order to carry things from the houses. They were then picked off by "Biafran" snipers.

IMPRESSIONS ON THE TRIP DOWN: On the trip south the letter given them by Danjuma was shown at Otukpo. They were waved through every other check point, and there were many, without even having to stop. They were very impressed with the cooperation given them by the army. Falley cited as example, an instance where he had trouble with his fuel pump. An army mechanic fixed it and they were able to continue their trip with no difficulty. Falley had the impression that Danjuma had radioed at least to Enugu and perhaps several points along the route and told the army units to ease their passage. He said that they were not afraid of the federal troops, but were concerned that they might meet a "Biafran" ambush.

There was evidence of people living in the area between the border and Nsukka, for they saw some cultivated fields, and about five farmers. However, except for up to a dozen women selling fruit in the market in Ukehe, they saw no one in the area south of the Nsukka crossroads and north of Enugu Ngwo (three miles north of "Nine Mile Corner").

In Nsukka itself, there is a great deal of destruction in the center of the town with evidence of a battle having been fought and of some fire damage. The university and outlying buildings appeared to be in good condition. As far as civilians were concerned, they only say one young boy in all of Nsukka. The looting had been heavier in Nsukka than in Enugu.

At Enugu Ngwo, they found about 300 people living in the village. There was a small market and he had the impression that the people were feeding themselves. He talked to two old men who were members of the Assemblies of God church. They told him that there were about 30 of the 700 congregation members from the Enugu area remaining in the village. They estimated that 500 had moved south when the federal troops came in and the other 170 were in the bush. The men indicated that they knew where the people were hiding in the bush. They reported that as far as was known only two children had been killed during the "liberation" and this only happened because they


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POL 27 BIBERA-NIGERIA
TR BG 20 ENUGU
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 09541 301515Z

49
ACTION L: 03

INFO AF 09, AID 28, IGA 02, O 02, FBO 01, OPR 02, OC 06, CCO 00, CIAE 00,
DODE 00, INR 07, NSAEC 00, P 04, RSC 01, USIA 12, SY 03, RSR 01, 081 W

R 301503Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 824D

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REF: STAE: 170379 AND 170568 *B Y 20 May*

1. EMBASSY PLANNING FLY TEAM TELECOM TECHNICIANS AND EMBASSY OFFICERS ENUGU JUNE 7 BY PAN AFRICAN AIRWAYS CHARTER CARGO DC-4 AND BEECHCRAFT FOR PERIOD FIVE DAYS FOR PURPOSE DISMANTLING AND PACKING TELECOM EQUIPMENT AND MAKING DETAILED SURVEY OFFICIAL PROPERTY. PLANES SCHEDULED RETURN FOR TEAM JUNE 11. OWING UNCERTAIN SECURITY CONDITIONS RELUCTANT PLAN TRUCK CONVOY VIA MAKURDI TO ENUGU AT THIS TIME. THEREFORE PRIME OBJECTIVE THIS TRIP TO EVACUATE TELECOM EQUIPMENT, ALL REMAINING OFFICIAL FILES AND DOCUMENTS AND OTHER VALUABLES TRANSPORTABLE BY PLANE. ALSO PLAN MAKE AS THOROUGH SURVEY AS POSSIBLE OF OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR DEPARTMENT'S INFORMATION IN PROCESSING CLAIMS. SIMILAR TRIP TO PORT HARCOURT WILL BE SCHEDULED AS SOON AS CONDITIONS PERMIT.

2. DETAILS REQUESTED PARA 3 REFTEL 170568 WILL BE SUBJECT SEPTEL AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

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TK DEF 19-8 (UK) NIGERIA
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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 08725 011514Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16, AID 28, RSR 01, /153 W

R 301330Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 391
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMDSSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE QQEE
USMISSION USUN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFA
DIA
STATE GRNC

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

PAGE 2 RUTALS 8725CC C O N F I D E N T I A L - LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUBJ: BRITISHBOMBS NOT USED AGAINST "BIAFRA"

1. COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ISSUED DENIAL APRIL 28 TO
LONDON TIMES RE SENSATIONAL PRESS REPORTS THAT BRITISH-
MADE BOMBS BEING USED BY NIGERIANS TO KILL WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN "BIAFRA." TIMES PRINTED FOLLOWING: "A

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 08725 011514Z

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT BRITAIN HAD NEITHER SUPPLIED NOR PERMITTED THE EXPORT OF AERIAL BOMBS OF ANY SORT TO NIGERIA. REFERRING TO PHOTOGRAPHS OF BOMBS IN THE TIMES ON SATURDAY, HE SAID A STUDY OF THESE BY TECHNICAL EXPERTS CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE NOT BRITISH. "HE ADDED WE HAVE NOT YET COMPLETED AN EXAMINATION OF THE ACCOMPANYING PICTURES OF AN ANTI-TANK GRENADE, TWO MORTAR BOMBS, AND AN AMMUNITION CASE, BUT THESE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE OF BRITISH MANUFACTURE. IN ANY CASE, GRENADES AND MORTARS ARE INFANTRY WEAPONS. REPORTS FROM BIAFRA

PAGE 3 RUTALS 8725CC C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
THAT BRITAIN HAS SUPPLIED NAPALM AND POISON GAS TO THE NIGERIA FEDERAL GOVT ARE COMPLETELY UNTRUE, THE SPOKESMAN ADDED."

2. CO MESSAGE TO HC LAGOS APRIL 29 ALSO SAID:
" FURTHER AMPLIFICATION OF THIS DENIAL IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS WILL BE USED AS NECESSARY. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAVE NOW CHECKED THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF BOMBS ALLEGED TO BE BRITISH AND USED BY THE FEDERAL GOVT OF NIGERIA AND REPORT AS FOLLOWS:

A) 6THE BIG BOMB SHOWN ON THE ATTACHED PHOTOGRAPH MARKED 1 IS A SOVIET FRAGMENTATION WW 2 AERIAL BOMB OF 100 KG (220 LB) SAB YP. THIS IS A HIGH EXPLOSIVE FRAGMENTATION BOMB.

B) "THE WEAPON MARKED W IS AN ENERGA GRENADE MANUFACTURED IN BELGIUM.

C)(G "THE WEAPON CASE MARKED IS AN 81 MM BOMB CASE DEFINITELY OF BRITISH MANUFACTURE. THE PETTERS P-QT

PAGE R RUTALS 8725CC C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
A3 ARE ONLY USED BY US, AND THEREFORE THIS WEAPON COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED OTHER THAN IN BRITAIN. IT

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IS HOWEVER AN INFANTRY WEAPON AND NOT AN AERIAL BOMB.

D) 6THE WEAPON CASE SHOWN MARKED 4 IS A TEN BOMB
CASE DEFINITELY MANUFACTURED IN BELGIUM AS IDENTIFIED
BY THE LETTERS PRB AND THE WORD EXPLOSIF."

DECON APR 30 1969.

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 08725 010433Z

22
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16, AID 28, PC 04, RSR 01, / 157 W

R 301330Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 391
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION USUN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEA/AFSA
DIA
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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SUBJ: BRITISHBOMBS NOT USED AGAINST "BIAFRA"

1. COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ISSUED DENIAL APRIL 28 TO LONDON TIMES RE SENSATIONAL PRESS REPORTS THAT BRITISH-MADE BOMBS BEING USED BY NIGERIANS TO KILL WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN "BIAFRA." TIMES PRINTED FOLLOWING: "A COMMONWEALTH OFFICE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT BRITAIN HAD NEITHER SUPPLIED NOR PERMITTED THE EXPORT OF AERIAL BOMBS OF ANY SORT TO NIGERIA. REFERRING TO PHOTOGRAPHS OF BOMBS IN THE TIMES ON SATURDAY, HE SAID A STUDY OF THESE BY TECHNICAL EXPERTS CONFIRMED THAT

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By MMAR Date 05/05



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PAGE 02 LAGOS 08725 010433Z

THEY WERE CDT BRITISH. HE ADDED WE HAVE NOT YET COMPLETED UN EXAMINATION OF THE ACCOMPANYING PICTURES OF AN ANTI-TANK GRENADE, TWO MORTAR BOMBS, AND AN AMMUNITION CASE, BUT THESE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE OF BRITISH MANUFACTURE. IN ANY CASE, GRENADES AND MORTARS ARE INFANTRY WEAPONS. REPORTS FROM BIAFRA

THAT BRITAIN HAS SUPPLIED NAPALM AND POISON GAS TO THE NIGERIA FEDERAL GOVT ARE COMPLETELY UNTRUE, THE SPOKESMAN ADDED. (#) MESSAGE TO HC LAGOS APRIL 29 ALSO SAID:

FURTHER AMPLIFICATION OF THIS DENIAL IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS WILL BE USED AS NECESSARY. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAVE NOW CHECKED THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF BOMBS ALLEGED TO BE BRITISH AND USED BY THE FEDERAL GOVT OF NIGERIA AND REPORT AS FOLLOWS:

A) THE BIG BOMB SHOWN ON THE ATTACHED PHOTOGRAPH MARKED 1 IS A SOVIET FRAGMENTATION WW 2 AERIAL BOMB OF 100 KG (220 LB) SAB 60. THIS IS A HIGH EXPLOSIVE FRAGMENTATION BOMB.

B) "THE WEAPON MARKED 2 IS AN ENERGY GRENADE MANUFACTURED IN BELGIUM.

C) "THE WEAPON CASE MARKED 3 IS AN 81 MM BOMB CASE DEFINITELY OF BRITISH MANUFACTURE. THE PETTERS Ø 15

A3 ARE ONLY USED BY US, AND THEREFORE THIS WEAPON COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED OTHER THAN IN BRITAIN. IT IS HOWEVER AN INFANTRY WEAPON AND NOT AN AERIAL BOMB.

D) "THE WEAPON CASE SHOWN MARKED 4 IS A TEN BOMB CASE DEFINITELY MANUFACTURED IN BELGIUM AS IDENTIFIED BY THE LETTERS PRB AND THE WORD EXXOSIF."

DECON APR 30, 1969.

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NOTE: (#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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TELEGRAM

London 8/2/81
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SECRET 042

PAGE 01 LONDON 09438 292153Z

89
ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 001/070 W

R 292045Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3889
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

SECRET LONDON 9438

LIMDIS/NORFORN

SUBJ: UK-CANADIAN TALKS ON COMMONWEALTH FORCE FOR NIGERIA

1. COMMONWEALTH OFFICE'S ERIC NORRIS (ASS'T UNDER SECT'Y) TELLS US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT CANADIAN TEAM OF SENIOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS HAS JUST COMPLETED TALKS WITH BRITISH IN LONDON, MAY 27-28, ON CW PEACE FORCE FOR NIGERIA.

2. TALKS WERE HELD AND WERE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN PUTTING TOGETHER CW FORCE IF THIS SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY EXPLORATORY AND DID NOT COMMIT EITHER BRITISH OR CANADIANS TO ANYTHING SPECIFIC. HENAND CO'S SIR LESLIE MONSON (DEPUTY UNDER SECT'Y) CHAIRED MEETING. CANADIAN TEAM WAS LED BY SHENSTONE OF EXTAFF AND INCLUDED HEAD OF AFRACAN DEPT. AND SENIOR CANADIAN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE.

3. ACCORDING NORRIS, CANADIANS WERE NOT AT ALL ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PARTICIPATING IN FORCE, ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT REJECT IDEA. BRITISH HAD ARGUED THAT CANADIAN PARTICIPATION LIKELY TO BE INDISPENSABLE. CANADIANS HAD WIDE EXPERIENCE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND, EQUALY IMPORTANT, HAD RIGHT IMAGE IN AFRICA. FMG HAD EARLIER RULED OUT PARTICIPATION BY TROOPS OF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. THIS MEANT FORCE MIGHT BE COMPOSED OF UNITS FROM CANADA, BRITAIN AND ONE NON-WHITE NON-AFRICAN CW COUNTRY. BRITISH AND CANADIANS AGREED LATTER WAS ESSENTIAL. THEY ALSO AGREED THERE WAS DANGER USE OF BRITISH TROOPS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO BIAFRANS, NECESSITAT-

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ING SEARCH FOR OTHER CONTRIBUTORS. AS TO SIZE OF FORCE,
CANADIANS THOUGHT BRITISH ESTIMATE OF 3-4 BATTALIONS WAS
ON LOW SIDE.

4. NORRIS STATES THAT BRITISH HAVE NO NEW INFO ON WHETHER
CW PEACEKEEPING FORCE WILL ACTUALLY BE NEEDED. MEETING WITH
CANADIANS WAS PURELY FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES AND WAS NOT
RESPONSIVE TO ANY REQUEST ARISING FROM KAMPALA PEACE TALKS.
NORRIS NOTES, HOWEVER, THAT FMG STATEMENT ON CONDITIONS
FOR CEASE-FIRE INCLUDES PRESENCE OF "OBSERVERS" IN COMBAT
ZONE. MOREOVER IF FORMAL REQUEST FOR PEACEKEEPING FORCE
WERE MADE IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ACTED ON QUICKLY. OPERATION
WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE SMOOTHER IF PRELIMINARY PLANNING HAD
BEEN DONE IN ADVANCE.

5. NORRIS BELIEVES CANADIANS INTEND TO INFORM DEPARTMENT
OF MEETING THROUGH THEIR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. HE REQUESTED
THAT WE NOT RPT NOT INDICATE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE. ENTIRE SUBJECT
IS APPARENTLY SENSITIVE IN OTTAWA AND WHILE CANADIANS
AGREED THAT WE SHOULD BE ADVISED OF TALKS IT WAS LEFT THAT
THEY WOULD DO THE ADVISING.
BRUCE

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TOP SECRET

L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

Screener

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Summary
Task Force

Principals
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S
U
M2
G
SIG
S/AH3
S/AL
S/C
S/CP
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P
S/R
S/FW
S/PM
M/WP
G/PM
G/DP

Geographic
AF5 X
ARA9
EA11
EUR9
NEA7

Functional
CU
E2
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IGA
INR6
IO4
L2
O3
OPR
OC
SY
WLG
P2
SCA
SCS
SCI

OTHER AGENCIES
WH10
CIA
DOD
USIA4
NSA

Other
ACDA5
AID/EXSEG3
AA/AFR2
AA/VN2
AA/EA2
AA/NESA2

PC
VP
AEC3
AGR3
COM2
EXIM
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PAGE 01 LAGOS 09512 291850Z

83
ACTION AF 15.

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, SAH 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, AID 28,

ACDA 16, RSR 01, /164 W

R 291625Z MAY 68.
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 808
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
V/USMISSION GENEVA 174

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 9512
SUBJECT: FMG REJECTS ICRC PROTEST RE BOMBING

1. LAGOS PAPERS AND RADIO TODAY CARRY STORY THAT
FMG HAS REJECTED ICRC PROTEST OF ALLEGED BOMBING
OF CIVILIAN TARGETS IN REBEL-HELD AREAS. PROTEST
REPORTEDLY LODGED BY ICRC REP IN LETTER DATED
MAY 21, ADDRESSED TO HEAD OF STATE GOWON. FMG
SAID TO HAVE BOMBED CIVILIAN POPULATION, HOSPITALS,
AND FIRST AID STATIONS IN DISREGARD OF RED CROSS
EMBLEM AND VARIOUS ARTICLES GENEVA CONVENTIONS.

2. ICRC LETTER ATTACHED TWO COPIES OF PROTEST
LETTERS SENT TO GENEVA BY BIAFRAN RED CROSS.
BOTH LETTERS DATED APRIL 25, 1968 AND BORE ENUGU RETURN
ADDRESS.

3. IN REJECTING ICRC PROTEST, FMG MADE FOLLOWING
POINTS:

A. LETTERS SIGNED BY PERSON NOT RPT NOT
REPRESENTATIVE OF INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS;
B. BECAUSE LETTERS BEAR ENUGU ADDRESS, THEY ARE SPRUIOUS, AS THERE
CAN BE NO ADDRESS OR BRANCH OF REBEL RED CROSS SOCIETY IN ENUGU,
WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER FEDERAL CONTROL SINCE
OCTOBER 1967.

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 09512 291850Z

4. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOWON (HAMZAT AHMADU) LAST NIGHT IN COMMENTS TO POLI COUNSELOR WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL ICRC TACTICS THIS MATTER. HE SAID THINGS ABOUT WHICH RC COMPLAINING ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED IN APRIL OR EARLIER, BUT COMPLAINTS NOT MADE PUBLIC UNTIL MAY 21 OR LATER. JUST WHEN KAMPALA PEACE TALKS STARTING. HE CONCLUDED, SOMEWHAT BITTERLY, THAT ICRC, WITTINGLY OR NOT, IS HELPING REBELS PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST FMG.

GP3 OLSON

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5-28-68

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 09443 281519Z

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ACTION AF: 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 28, RSR 01, /140 W

P R 281200Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 765
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS UBABA ROU
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN
CINCUHRIKE/CINCMEA/AFSA
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SUBJECT: NIGERIAN-BIAFRAN ATROCITY STORIES

16. INTERNATIONAL NEWS MEDIA HAVE BEEN CARRYING NUMBER STORIES OF ATROCITIES ON BOTH SIDES DURING FMG CAPTURE KEY CITY OF PORT HARCOURT. MOST STORIES ARISE FROM FMG-SPONSORED VISIT TO PORT HARCOURT BY LAGOS-BAYPD PRESS CORPS MAY 23-25.

2. MAIN CHARGE AGAINST FMG TROOPS IS THAT THEY KILLED BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE HUNDRED "BIAFRANS" IN PH HOSPITAL. FROM JOURNALISTS BACK FROM PH AND OTHER SOURCES, WE UNDERSTAND THAT FEDERAL BATTALION COMPOSED LARGELY OF RIVERS PEOPLE GOT BADLY CHEWED UP IN PREMATURE DRIVE FOR PH

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TELEGRAM

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FROM YOUTH WHILE MAIN ATTACK COMING FROM NORTHEAST. IN THIS ATTACK COMMANDING OFFICER (ISAAC BORO) WAS KILLED AND RETREATING BIAFRANS ALLEGEDLY KILLED MANY NON-IBO CIVILIANS AS WELL. UPON FINALLY ENTERING CITY, THESE "RIVERS" STATE TROOPS REPORTEDLY SHOT ANY "BIAFRAN" SUPPORTERS THEY COULD FIND, IN RETALIATION FOR IBO KILLING OF RIVERS PEOPLE. FIGURE FIVE HUNDRED ALMOST CERTAINLY AN EXAGGERATION; AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT WAS TOLD MAXIMUM CAPACITY TWO MAIN HOSPITALS WAS THREE HUNDRED, AND EVEN ALLOWING FOR OVERCROWDING IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN FIVE HUNDRED PERSONS REMAINING IN HOSPITALS WHEN, ACCORDING RELIABLE LOCAL SOURCE IN PH, ABOUT 90 PER CENT OF PRO-BIAFRAN POPULATION LEFT BEFORE CITY FELL. EMBASSY INCLINED ACCEPT THAT SOME PERSONS SHOT IN HOSPITAL, BUT NUMBER MUST REMAIN CONJECTURAL. WE DO KNOW YORUBA COLONEL AT PH TOLD US JOURNALIST HE HAVING ONE FMG SOLDIER OF RIVERS ORIGIN SHOT FOR "EXCESSES" AND ANOTHER FOR LOOTING. HE ALSO RECOMMENDED "RIVERS BATTALION" BE BROKEN UP AS THEY VENGEFUL AND HARD TO DISCIPLINE WITHOUT BORO.

3. AMERICAN AND BRITISH JOURNALISTS ALSO TELL US THERE QUITE WELL-DOCUMENTED STORIES OF "BIAFRAN" KILLING OF MINORITIES PEOPLE (PARTICULARLY FROM RIVERS STATE) OVER PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, INCLUDING BOMBING OF VILLAGES BY REBEL AIR FORCE WHEN IT WAS OPERATIVE. FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL EASTERN REGION GRAHAM DOUGLAS (RIVERS MAN WHO STAYED BEHIND IN PH AND TALKED WITH JOURNALISTS) CLAIMS SEVERAL THOUSAND PERSONS ARE IN DETENTION IN "BIAFRA," MOST OF THEM NON-IBOS WHOSE FATE HE THINKS IS "UNCERTAIN AT BEST."

4. WHILE EMBASSY BELIEVES BOTH SIDES PROBABLY GUILTY SHOOTING CIVILIANS, IT HARD APPORTION RELATIVE BLAME OR DETERMINE EXACT NUMBERS INVOLVED. CERTAINLY "BIAFRA" CASE NOT HELPED BY REBEL INFO MINISTRY STATEMENT BROADCAST MAY 27 THAT "THERE NO TRUTH WHATSOEVER IN BBC CLAIM THAT BIAFRAN SOLDIERS KILLED BIAFRAN CIVILIANS (READ NON-IBOS) IN PH AND NIGERIAN TROOPS KILLED

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BIAFRAN SOLDIERS THERE...NIGERIAN TROOPS AND INFILTRATORS DID NOT ENTER PH AND THEREFORE COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED ANY ATROCITY IN THE CITY." STATEMENT EVEN SAYS "BIAFRAN ARMY HALTED ENEMY ADVANCE" BUT EVACUATED CIVILIANS, AND "FIRST TO BE EVACUATED WERE PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS." IN LIGHT TWO-DAY VISIT BY JOURNALISTS EMBASSY MUST CONCLUDE THAT CREDIBILITY CHASM EXISTS SO FAR AS THIS REBEL CLAIM CONCERNED.

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FROM : Amembassy DAR ES SALAAM DATE: May 28, 1968

SUBJECT : Interview with "Biafran" Leader Okpara

REF :

Transmitted as an enclosure to this airgram
is an interview article clipped from the May 23
issue of the Nationalist. The interview is with
Dr. Michael Okpara, Chief Political Advisor to
Lt. Col. Ojukwu. Okpara sets out the secessionists'
case in the current Nigerian crisis.

Okpara says that "Biafra" did not secede but was
"pushed out" of the Nigerian Federation. He hopes
for cooperation between an independent "Biafra" and
Nigeria, discounts Federal territorial control in the
former Eastern Region, and says, "We are never
going to surrender." He praises the diplomatic
recognition granted by countries such as Tanzania
and says there is no minority dissension in "Biafra."
Okpara claims there is a smoothly functioning joint
military-civilian democratic government in the
secessionist area, comments disparagingly on the
current Yoruba position in Nigeria, and says that
no matter what happens, "We are not going back to
Nigeria." He denounces outside aid to the Federal
Government ("an international conspiracy against
Biafra's survival") and closes by saying the secessionists
will never "renounce our sovereignty."

Enclosure:
As stated

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Talks between representatives of the Republic of Biafra and the Nigerian Federal Government begin today in Kampala, capital of the Republic of Uganda. Below we print a recent interview accorded to Nationalist News, Editor Ferdinand Ruhinda, by Dr. Michael Okpara, who is Chief Political Adviser to Biafra's Head of State Col. Ojukwu. In the interview, Dr. Okpara sets out Biafra's case in the present Biafra/Nigeria confrontation to which the two parties are now seeking a solution.

Q. Dr. Okpara, as a strong supporter of African Unity, and the solidarity of the African people, how do you explain the Biafran case of seceding from the Nigerian Federation?

A. Well, I think there has been some misunderstanding about what people call secession. We did not secede; we were pushed out of the Nigerian Federation. They murdered well over 30,000 people of our kith and kin and drove us out of our homes from the various places we had lived for well over three or four generations. We were forced to go back home. We therefore had no choice but to start to organise an institution that would protect our people and avoid them being massacred. I am still in favour of African Unity but this unity must be one of consent. It must not be forced with the gun.

Q. Well, still as an advocate of African Unity, how do you envisage future co-operation between Biafra and the Nigerian Federation?

A. I hope that when the bitterness dies out, it should be possible to co-operate with them in the social, educational and communication levels. It might be possible even to expand co-operation for there is scope for greater co-operation along the lines of the East African Community.

Q. As regards the military situation, Nigeria claims to be holding two thirds of Biafra's territory. Would you care to comment on this?

A. That is perfectly rubbish. They do not hold two thirds of Biafra. It is true they have gone along certain roads and have surrounded a few towns and besides, this is not the first time they have been claiming to win. For over 10 months now they have been claiming the war is over! And yet we are fighting. They do not hold two thirds of our territory at all. It is true they are in Enugu in very small numbers. We know that given time and material these people will run. And in any case WE ARE NEVER GOING TO SURRENDER.

Q. And now that Tanzania and two other African countries have accorded political recognition to Biafra, has this in any way changed the course of the war?

A. Oh, a tremendous lot. For the first time there are countries in Africa which recognise the justness of our cause. This is a matter of great satisfaction to us. We were a bit worried at one time that African leaders had been deceived into turning a blind eye to the genocide that was going on against Biafra. There are countries today who have seen that what was going on was morally indefensible and are taking a firm stand against it. We are looking forward to other countries according us recognition.

Q. There are claims that the Ibos are holding minority tribes in Biafra against their will. How far is this correct?

A. No, this is perfectly false. The minority tribes in Biafra were killed just as much as the Ibos were killed in Northern Nigeria, Western Nigeria and in Lagos. They have suffered just as much as the Ibos.

Moreover, they were in the various committees and meetings that agreed to establish this home in Biafra, for the oppressed peoples of Biafra. They took part in all the deliberations and voluntarily agreed to be in Biafra. There is no coercion whatsoever and it is very unfair to say that there are people in Biafra being held against their will. Biafra is for all Biafrans irrespective of their tribal origin.

Q. Could you elaborate on the participation of the minority tribes in Biafran affairs?

A. Well, taking for example the case of Dr. Oko Arikpo, who is now said to be the Foreign Commissioner for the Lagos Government. He comes from Biafra. HE IN FACT WAS THE CHAIRMAN/SECRETARY OF THE COMMITTEE THAT LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BIAFRA. We have the Chairman of the Public Service Commission right now a man from these so-called minority tribes. The head of the Army, Major-General Eleong, is from the so-called minority tribes. There are of course a few people from these areas who for reasons of their own run away and are in Lagos, and these are the people who are propagating this idea of minority dissent which does not exist.

Enclosure
A-426
DAR-ES-SALAM

Biafra will never surrender

Q. Dr. Okpara, can you tell me how the military in Biafra is co-operating with the civilians in the actual administration of the country. How is it for example that you a non-military man is sent out to represent Biafra when in fact Biafra is supposed to be under military rule?

A. As a matter of fact, what we have in Biafra now, is a very smooth amalgam between the army and the civilians. Everybody is involved in the war - military people and the civilians. It is a unified effort so that it is difficult at the moment to draw the line what the military does and what the civilians do. And the cabinet itself is a mixture; in fact it is largely made up of civilians. We only have in fact the Governor himself and the Major General; the rest are civilians.

Well, it is only in Biafra that civilians are actually taking part, an active part, in the role of government during this emergency. You don't find that in what was the Nigerian Federation. I should have mentioned that we have the consultative assembly which comprises of representatives of all the peoples of Biafra selected by the people themselves. It is in fact a Parliament and no major action has been taken in the course of the war or the existence of Biafra without their knowledge and consent. They are in fact the people who have indicated the guidelines.

Q. Would you seriously describe this consultative assembly as a democratic body?

A. That is a democratic body. It was elected by the people from all walks of life and it's quite democratic in its proceedings too. It is this Consultative Assembly which gave Lt. Col. Ojukwu the mandate to declare Biafra a sovereign independent state.

Q. At the beginning of the troubles there were indications in Western Nigeria that should Biafra quit the Federation, Western Nigeria too would secede, but it now looks as if the Yorubas in the west are the strongest supporters of the Federation. How would you explain the reversal of attitudes in the West?

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A. There are basically two reasons for this change. First the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy in the North threatened to come down on the Yorubas like a ton of bricks and out of fear they refrained from taking the steps they had publicly announced to the world.

Secondly, Chief Awolowo was promised by clever politicians from the North that he would be Prime Minister of the Federation. We have evidence to prove this. Furthermore it must be borne in mind that Yorubaland was occupied by the Hausas since the second coup in July 1966 and you can see that they are not in a position really to say their mind.

Q. Would you say that if a civilian government was returned to both parts, that is Nigeria and Biafra, it would change the situation and create room for more understanding between the two sides?

A. We are not going back to Nigeria. Whether it is the military people who are in power or it is a civilian government, Biafra is there to stay. It is however possible that a civilian administration in Nigeria may see the futility of fighting us and call off the war.

Q. Just to return to the military situation, how much are foreign powers involved in the Nigeria-Biafra conflict?

A. Well, Britain is the major country supplying Nigeria with arms and personnel and credit. In fact, only recently they gave them about £14 million in sterling. We have killed quite a number of British officers fighting with Nigerians. The next country is Russia which has given them Migs and is also supplying them with vast quantities of arms. There is also Egypt which has sent Egyptian pilots and helping Nigeria in very many other ways, too. We also have the Sudan which gave Nigeria two planes and there is Chad helping Nigeria in the war. So that it can look like an international conspiracy against Biafra's survival.

Q. There is another point. You say you are prepared to negotiate without pre-conditions, in other words without conditions at all. If Nigeria agreed to this, and started negotiations wouldn't the Nigerians talk you to a point of renouncing Biafra's sovereignty?

A. I would not like to say anything that might jeopardise future talks that might take place between us and Nigeria. But it would be living in fool's paradise for anyone to think ever that we can renounce our sovereignty. We shall never do that, because if we do that we are back to square one and the pogroms will start all over again.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: UPDATE CURRENT FMG/EASTERN MIL SITUATION. DIA FOR
DIACO & CINCSTRIKE FOR STRU2-C: DA FOR ACSI.

1. INFO AVAIL AS OF 28 MAY FROM WELL PLACED/USUALLY RELIABLE
SOURCES: SUPREME AND ARMY HQ AS FOLLOWS:

A. THIRD DIV/PORT HARCOURT AREA: PATTERN ESTABLISHED NSUKKA,
ENUGU, BONNY, CALABAR, ONITSHA BEING REPEATED HARCOURT AREA. FED
DIV CONSOLIDATING AND REORGANIZING FOR PLANNED FOLLOW UP OPS.
WHILE REBEL UNITS HARRASS, SNIPE AND MORTAR FROM PERIPHERY FED
POSITIONS. SERIES "MODERATELY HEAVY" REBEL ATKS AT FED POSITIONS

AIR
FIELD AND ROAD NET WORK TO EAST HAVE BEEN REPULSED. SOURCES
SAY "USUALLY MAULING MATCH UNDER WAY BUT NO REAL THREAT" FED POSITIONS
HARCOURT PROPER AT PRESENT. FED FIFTEENTH BRIGADE RESPONSIBLE FOR
DEFENSE HARCOURT AND IMMEDIATE AREA HAS MOVED FWD HQ TO HARCOURT
PROPER. SOURCES SAY DIV SHOULD BE "ALL SET GO AGAIN NEAR FUTURE".
(OBSERVATIONS LAGOS AREA INDICATES HEAVY REINFORCEMENTS: TROOPS,
AMMO, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT: VIA SEA AND AIR) CONTINUE FLOW TO
THIRD DIV. BOTH NAVAL CHARTER VESSELS "OPUSO" AND NAVY LCT
"LOKOJA" SAILED LAGOS TO BONNY 27 MAY; BOTH WELL LOADED TROOPS IN
ADDITION OTHER ITEMS. SOURCES VAGUE ON DETAILS, BUT INDICATIONS
ARE: PRELIMINARY PATROLLING AND RECON ACTION BY FED FORCES ALREADY
UNDER WAY CREEK AREAS: BRASS, DEGEMA, YENAGOA.

B. FIRST DIV SECTOR: DIV UNITS CONTINUE PROBES IN FORCE SOUTH
AND SOUTHEAST FROM ENUGU. DIV UNITS HAVE NOT YET SUCCEEDED
RELIEVING THIRD DIV UNITS: AFIKPO AREA, HOLD UP INVOLVED STIFF

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REBEL RESISTANCE FROM "WELL PREPARED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS" ON MAIN ABAKALIKI/AFIKPO HIGHWAY EAST VILLAGE OKPOHA (0558N 0756E) WHERE FEDS HOLD BRIDGE SITE OVER ABOINE/ASU RIVER.

C. SECOND DIV/ONITSHA-MIDWEST: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE.

D. SOURCES SAY REBEL "HARRASSING AND GUERRILLA TYPE ACTIONS" CONTINUE ALL THROUGH FIRST AND SECOND DIV AREAS TO INCLUDE MIDWESTERN AREAS IN GENERAL VICINITY ASABA. SOURCES SAY REBEL ACTIVITIES CENTERED ON MAIN COMMO AND SUPPLY LINES AND OBVIOUSLY AIMED TIEING UP MAX POSSIBLE NUMBER FED TROOPS IN REAR AREA SECURITY DUTIES.

E. SOURCES RELUCTANTLY ADMIT THEIR SUBSTANCE TO CLAIMS FED KILLINGS HOSPITALIZED REBEL TROOPS IN HARcourt AFTER FEDS MOVED INTO TOWN. SOURCES (TO INCLUDE SENIOR OFFICERS FROM RIVERS AREA) SAY, HOWEVER, KILLINGS CARRIED OUT BY UNITS "ISAAC BORO'S BATTALION RIVERS TROOPS". ACCORDING SOURCES, BORO AND "MANY OTHERS" KILLED VICINITY OKRIKA 16 MAY; ON 18 MAY RIVERS TROOPS ENTERED HARcourt. SOURCES BELIEVE IT LIKELY COMBINATION DESIRE AVENGE BORO PLUS "UNMISTAKEABLE EVIDENCE MANY RIVERS PEOPLE SLAUGHTERED BY IBO BEFORE LEAVING" SET TROOPS OFF ON KILLINGS. FACTS SURROUNDING AFFAIR BEING INVESTIGATED AT PRESENT. ALREADY, HOWEVER, BORO'S BN HAS BEEN "SPLIT UP" AMONG OTHER BRIGADES THIRD DIV WITH "COMPANY GROUPS GOING EACH BRIGADE"; OBJECTIVE IS BETTER CONTROL BORO'S FORMER UNIT WHICH HAS OPERATED VIRTUALLY ON OWN "COMMANDO STYLE" TILL PRESENT.

2. RELIABLE SOURCE SAYS RUSSIAN EMBASSY LAGOS NOW HAS "ARMY COLONEL ATTACHED THERETO". SOURCE SAYS "COLONEL NOT ACCREDITED AS MILITARY ATTACHE BUT HAS JOB COORDINATING VARIOUS RUSS MIL INTERESTS IN COUNTRY (MIGGS, PATROL BOATS, ETC)". IN THIS RESPECT, NIGERIAN NAVY SOURCE SAID RUSS DETACHMENT THERE, FOR PATROL BOATS, NOW DOWN TO SEVEN FROM ORIGINAL THIRTEEN (MY 0474 NOV 67). SOURCE ALSO SAID NIGERIAN NAVY "VERY DISAPPOINTED THESE BOATS AS THEY JUST NOT SUITED TO NEEDS THIS SITUATION. GP3

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REF: STATE 170843 (NOT SENT LONDON)

1. DATT AND OTHER MEMBER C.T. DIRECTLY CONCERNED
AGREE WITH ME THIS WOULD BE INOPPORTUNE TIME TO PRESS
GOWON DIRECTLY ON POINTS RAISED REFTEL. GOWON'S
MUSINGS WITH DATT (DAO 0222 MAY 68) WERE VERY PERSONAL,
A QUESTION OF THINKING OUT LOUD WITH A CLOSE FRIEND
TRUSTED FRIEND. EVEN HAD OTHER DEVELOPMENTS NOT REFTEL
NOT HAVE OCCURRED, I DOUBT SERIOUSLY THAT IT WOULD
HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO HAVE HAD PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION
WITH HIM RE ISSUE REFTEL. EVENTS OF WEEKEND--REPORTS
OF ATROCITIES BY FMG TROOPS IN P.H., DISAPPEARANCE
MEMBER FMG DELEGATION KAMPALA WITH SECRET PAPERS
WITH DAMAGING EFFECT ON OUTLOOK FOR NEGOTIATIONS.
ICRC'S LATEST BIAFRAN-SLANTED APPEAL-- HAVE CONVINCED
ME ANY PRESSURE ON GOWON BY U.S. AT THIS TIME WOULD
BE LIKELY MEET UNFRIENDLY, EVEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE RECEPTION.

2. I WAS ABLE, HOWEVER, WHILE DINNER GUEST AT
ARIKPO'S HOUSE LAST EVENING TO DISCUSS IN FRIENDLY
ATMOSPHERE POINTS RAISED IN REFTEL WITH BOTH
ARIKPO AND EDW. ENAHORO. I EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER
DETERIORATING FMG INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AND GROWING
WAVE OF SYMPATHY FOR BIAFRA. SUGGESTED NECESSITY
FMG MAKE SOME DRAMATIC GESTURE TO DEMONSTRATE
BASIC GOOD INTENTIONS TO WORLD. PRESS REPORTS ON
BOMBING OF CIVILIANS HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY DAMAGING

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TO FMG. WHILE I RECOGNIZED THAT GEN. GOWON HAD SEVERAL TIMES EMPHASIZED TO NAF COMMANDERS TO AVOID CIVILIAN TARGETS AND WITHIN LAST WEEK HAD ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO BOMB ONLY AIRPORTS AND MILITARY TARGETS AVOIDING AT ALL COSTS CIVILIANS, IT SEEMED TO ME IF MILITARY SITUATION WOULD PERMIT, AN FMG ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HENCEFORTH AIRPORTS WOULD BE ONLY TARGETS FMG BOMBERS WOULD LIKELY GAIN IMMENSE GOOD WILL FOR NIGERIA. THIS SUGGESTION WAS WELL RECEIVED BY BOTH ARIKPO AND ENAHORO WHO SAID THEY WOULD INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY WITH MILITARY. (I LEARNED TODAY THAT UKHICOM OFFICER HAD DAY BEFORE MY TALK SUGGESTED BASICALLY SAME THING TO ENAHORO WHO HAD REACTED STRONGLY ADVERSELY.)

3. WE THEN DISCUSSED LATEST ICRC APPEAL (GENEVA 3509). NEITHER THEY NOR LOCAL ICRC REP. HAD RECEIVED TEXT WHICH I SUPPLIED. AS INDICATED ABOVE THEY WERE UNHAPPY WITH GENERAL TONE. I SUGGESTED PUBLIC RELATIONS VALUE POSSIBILITY FMG DECLARING WILLINGNESS TO LIFT BLOCKADE PORT HARcourt FOR RELIEF SHIPMENTS BUT POINTING OUT THAT CHANNEL BLOCKED AND MINED BY BIAFRANS REQUIRING SOME MONTHS TO CLEAR. I EXPRESSED HOPE THAT P.H. AIRPORT COULD BE OPENED EARLIEST FOR ICRC SHIPMENTS AS WELL AS AIRPORTS AT ENUGU AND CALABAR. THEY REPLIED THERE NO PROBLEM AT ENUGU AND CALABAR BUT THAT SECURITY IN AREA P.H. AIRPORT STILL UNCERTAIN. I ADVANCED IDEA OF PLACING A MILE OR TWO OF HIGHWAY BETWEEN OPPOSING FORCES EITHER IN PORT HARcourt OR ENUGU AREA UNDER ICRC CONTROL TO PERMIT ICRC SHIPMENTS MOVE INTO BIAFRA, AN INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD GAIN FURTHER GOOD WILL FOR FMG. THEY SEEMED TO THINK THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN ENUGU AREA BUT DIDN'T SEEM TOO OPTIMISTIC OVER PROSPECTS FOR SUCH ARRANGEMENT IN P.H. AREA. ALTHOUGH THEY DIDN'T SAY SO IMPRESSION GAINED WAS THAT MILITARY OBJECTIVES P.H. AREA NOT YET OBTAINED AND UNLIKELY NEUTRALIZED AREA POSSIBLE ESTABLISH THERE UNTIL THIS STAGE REACHED.

4. TALKS WERE FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT AND I WAS LEFT WITH IMPRESSION IDEAS ADVANCED WERE WELL RECEIVED AND THAT THEY WOULD SERIOUSLY LOOK INTO POSSIBILITIES WITH

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
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INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

CONFIDENTIAL KIGALI 1593
REF: KIGALI 1560 - POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

1) BIAFRAN REPS NVUGURU AND UJURI ARRIVED KIGALI FROM LONDON VIA BRUSSELS MAY 24; WERE RECEIVED BY FONMIN BAGARAGAZA, AND DEPARTED FOR BUJUMBURA MAY 25.

2) NVUGURU INFORMED EMBOFF THAT FONMIN CORDIAL AND SYMPATHETIC TO IBU PROBLEM BUT THAT ANY READJUSTMENT OF RWANDAN POSITION RE BIAFRA WOULD ONLY FOLLOW SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION KAMPALA TALKS.

3) SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION CONFIRMED BY ASSISTANT PROTOCOL CHIEF.

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Authority NND 950503
By MNARA Date 01/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State XR TELEGRAM

POL 16 BIAFRA⁴

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, IO 13, AID 28, PC 04, SR 01

ORM 03, ACDA 16, NIC 01, RSR 0, SCS 04, SCA 02, /171 W

R 271700Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2464
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CINCMEAFA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU UNN
AMEMBASSY LOME UNN
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
ZEN/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU UNN

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION ONE OF TWO ABIDJAN 3233

SUBJ: NIGERIA AND BIAFRA

REFS: STATE 164142, 166161, 172126: ABIDJAN 317⁴

SUMMARY: MADE COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OUR POSITION ON NIGERIA TO HOUPHOUET. HE WAS IN BETTER MOOD TO LISTEN, AND NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT ICRC PLANES GETTING RELIEF TO BIAFRAN REFUGEES. SEEMS UNLIKELY HE WILL STOP CAMPAIGN AGAINST BRITISH ARMS SUPPLY, BUT HIS COMMENTS SHOWED OUR POSITIONS LESS FAR APART THAN MAY HAVE SEEMED.

1. SAW HOUPHOUET FORTY MINUTES TODAY. THOUGH HE TALKED MUCH

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OF THE TIME, I WAS ABLE TO STATE MAIN FEATURES OF US POSITION ON NIGERIA AS FOLLOWS:

A. WE AGREE IN DEPLORING BLOODSHED, SEEKING PEACEFUL POLITICAL SOLUTION. KEY QUESTION IS REALISTIC MEANS OF ACHIEVING THIS END. PROBLEM PRIMARILY AFRICAN. WE HAVE BEEN CONTINUALLY IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH, ASSUME THEY COMMUNICATING THEIR VIEWS DIRECTLY. OUR OWN VIEW IS THAT CRITICAL OPPORTUNITY RE ARMS SUPPLY WAS MISSED LAST SUMMER, WHEN WE MADE DECLARATION DEPLORING SOVIET ARMS SUPPLY BUT NO RPT NO AFRICAN STATE SPOKE UP. FMG TURNED TO SOVS AFTER BOTH WE AND BRITISH REFUSED SUPPLY JET PLANES. SINCE THEN VARIOUS SOURCES HAVE SUPPLIED BOTH SIDES WHILE WE HAVE DENIED ARMS TO BOTH. THUS WE NOT RPT NOT IN POSITION TO BARGAIN EFFECTIVELY WITH SUPPLIERS. MOREOVER MILITARY SITUATION AFTER FALL OF PORT HARCOURT SHOWS FMG HAS VIRTUALLY ACHIEVED AIM OF ENCIRCLING IBOS IN INTERIOR. MINORITY TRIBES COOPERATING WITH FMG. THUS EVEN IF ARMS SUPPLY CUT OFF, FMG CAN COMPLETE OCCUPATION OF BIAFRA IF WANTS TO. HENCE SOLE HOPE OF STOPPING CARNAGE LIES IN NEGOTIATIONS. IF BRITISH CUT OFF ARMS SUPPLY, WE FEAR THIS WOULD ONLY HARDEN FMG POSITION, IMPAIR NEGOTIATIONS PROSPECTS.

B. SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS SEEM VALID ON POLITICAL SIDE. WE DO NOT RPT NOT INTEND RECOGNIZE BIAFRA, AS HOPE BIAFRANS CAN STILL BE HONORABLY REINTEGRATED INTO NIGERIAN LIFE. ALSO DOUBT WHETHER FURTHER RECOGNITIONS BY OTHER STATES MIGHT NOT RPT NOT HARDEN BIAFRAN POSITION, MAKING THEM LESS WILLING ACCEPT REASONABLE COMPROMISE. BELIEVE BEST HELP FELLOW AFRICANS CAN GIVE IS REASSURE BIAFRANS THEY NOT RPT NOT ISOLATED IN AFRICAN COMMUNITY, AFRICANS WILL HOLD FMG MORALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HONORABLE REINTEGRATION.

C. ON HUMANITARIAN SIDE, US PRIVATE SOURCES AND AID ALREADY PROVIDING FOOD, MEDICINE AND CLOTHING WORTH ABOUT DOLS 3 MILLION, FOR REFUGEES, AME WITH HELP OF ICRC ADN TACT APPROVAL VFMG PLANES ARE GETTING SUCH RELIEF TO BIAFRANS AS WELL AS OTHERS.

2. HOUPHOUET COMMENTED FREQUENTLY, MAINLY RESTATING FAMILIAR VIEWS, BUT FOLLOWING ITEMS OF INTEREST:

A. HE CITED WITH INREDULITY BRITISH JUSTIFICATION THAT THEY MERELY CONTINUING "NORMAL" ARMS SUPPLY TO FMG, BELIEVED THEY

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IN FACT MUCH INCREASED DURING CIVIL WAR. SAID HE HATED CRITIZE BRITISH FOR WHOM HAD GREAT ADMIRATION, BUT THEIR ARMS IMPLICATE THEM IN MASSIVE AFRICAN BLOODSHED. FACT THAT OTHER AFRICANS HAVE NOT RPT NOT SPOKEN OUT AGAINST HIM ON THIS POINT SHOWS THEY SECRETLY AGREE.

B. AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES MUST COMPROMISE TO FIND VIABLE SOLUTION; THAT IS NORMAL AFRICAN METHOD. YET FEARED THAT IF IBOS SIMPLY REINTEGRATED NOW INTO NIGERIA FIGHTING WILL SOON BREA OUT AGAIN, BECAUSE PEOPLE DEEPLY AROUSED. INDICATED HOWEMER THAT LONG-TERM WESTERN INTEREST LIES IN STRONG AND PROSPEROUS NIGERIA. MASSIVE BLOODSHED PLAYS MERELY INTO COMMUNISTS HANDS BY WORKING AGAINST THIS WESTERN INTERES. THEY WHY SOVIETS FURNISH ARMS.

C. ON RECOGNITION XYAFRA, SAID HE HAD NOT RPT NOT ASKED ANY OTHER AFRICAN LEADER--NOT RPT NOT EVEN BONGO--TO FOLLOW HIS EXAMPLE, AND WAS NOT RPT NOT ASKING US TO. HIS ACT HAD HUMANITARIAN, NOT RPT NOT LEGAL PURPOSE. EVENTUAL PATTERN OF RELATIONS UP TO NIGERIANS, ESSENTIALLY THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIR. HIS RECOGNITION BIAFRA INTENDED AS PROTEST AGAINST INTOLERABLE BLOODSHED--A MATTER OF THE HEART, NOT RPT NOT THE HEAD. HENCE HE HAD NOT RPT NOT CONVOKED ENTENTE OF OCAM TO THRESH OUT COMMON POLICY. HE AND DIORI HAD AGREED TO DISAGREE, BUT THIS DID NOT RPT NOT IMPAIR THEIR BASIC TIES. FACT THAT ICRC PLANS NOW ALLOWED INTO BIAFRA PROBABLY INDICATES HIS PROTEST ALREADY HAD SOME EFFECT.

D. SAID AFRICANS HAD NOT RPT NOT FOCUSSSED ON ARMS PROBLEM LAST SUMMER BEVAUSE ASSURED FMG UNDERTAKING ONLY "POLICE ACTION." ONLY RECENTLY REALIZED HOW GREAT BLOODSHED IS. HOUPHOUET DECIDED ENTIRELY ON HIS OWN TO TAKE PUBLIC STAND. WHAT MOVED HIM WAS STATISTICS OF 200,000 OR MORE DEAD. THESE STATISTICS SUPPLIED BY BIAFRAN REPRESENTATIVES, NOTABLY AZIKIWE.

3. COMMENT:

A. I TRIED MAKE CLEAR THAT WE NOT CRITICIZING HOUPHOUET, MERELY EXPLAINING OUR POINT OF VIEW. HE SEEMED TAKE IT REASONABLY WELL, AND EXPLICITLY NOTED POINT ABOUT RED CROSS PLANES TO BIAFRA. BELIEVE HE AT LEAST REGISTERED OUR POSITION, AS HE WAS IN BETTER MOOD TO LISTEN THAN AT OUR LAST MEETING. DO NOT RPT NOT

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SUPPOSE HE WILL STOP HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST BRITISH ARMS SUPPLY,
BUT HE IS AT LEAST AWARE WE THINK SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY, AND MAY
BE MORE COGNIZANT OF COMPLEXITIES INVOLVED. IN ANY CASE
HAS BEEN GIVEN AMPLE AND REASONED RESPONSE, ACC IS AWARE OF
MUCH THAT OUR POSITIONS HAVE IN COMMON. I AM MOST GREATFUL
TO DEPT FOR MAKING THIS POSSIBLE.

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 ABIDJA 03233 280903Z

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ACTION: AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, IO 13, AID 28, PC 04, SR 01,
ORM 03, ACDA 16, NIC 01, RSR 01, SCS 04, SCA 02, /171 W

R 271700Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2465
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
ANRMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 090
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CINCMEAFA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU UNN
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE UNN
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LOME UNN
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
ZENCHAMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU UNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION TWO OF TWO ABIDJAN 3233

SUBJ: NIGERIA AND BIAFRA

B. HOUPHOUET'S EXPLANATION OF HOW HE CAME TO BIAFRA DECISION RINGS TRUE TO ME. WHATEVER FRENCH VIEW MAY BE, DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE HOUPHOUET WANTS NIGERIA PERMANENTLY DIVIDED AND WEAKENED (STATE 166161, PARA 4). HIS DESCRIPTION OF LONG-TERM WESTERN INTEREST IN STRONG, PROSPEROUS NIGERIA FITS WAY HE HAS ALWAYS TALED

TO ME ABOUT NIGERIA AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN WEST AFRICA. WHERE HE DOES DIFFER FROM US IS IN BELIEVING THAT SEPARATION OF ANGRY COMBATTANTS IS BEST WAY OF GETTING THEM BACK TOGETHER

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IN LONG RUN. TO MY REMARK THAT FMG NOW IN POSITION TO COMPLETE OCCUPATION OF BIAFRA HE COMMENTED THAT GUERRILLA WAR WOULD CONTINUE INDEFINITELY UNLESS FIGHTING IS STOPPED.

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By NARA Date 10/5/05

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS IMMEDIATE

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LONDON ROUTINE
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 " GENEVA "

~~JOINT STATE/AID MESSAGE~~
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JOINT STATE/AID MESSAGE
 170495
 REF: A. State 3509; B. Geneva 3509; C. Lagos 9395

Appreciate your decision earliest reftel A.

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MICROFILMED BY R.S.R.

Drafted by: *dja* Tel. Ext. *2946* Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *R.W.M.*
AF/AFW:AMHardy:ncc:5/25/68 *AFW - Roy M. Melbourne*
 Clearance: *4*

AID/AFR/CWA - Mr. Fisher

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FORM DS-322
 8-65

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 Authority *VND 950503*
 By *MNARA Date 10/5/03*



POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
TR SOC 3 RED CROSS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SCS 04, SCA 02, SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28, IGA 02, CIAE 00,

DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,

SS 20, USIA 12, AGR 20, HEW 07, ACDA 16, RSR 01, SAH 03, /195 W

R 251300Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 751
USMISSION GENEVA
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2330
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 9416

REF: GENEVA 3509

SUBJECT: ICRC AND NIGERIA

1. EMBASSY WELCOMES GENERAL THRUST ICRC SUPPLEMENTAL APPEAL FOR RELIEF ASSISTANCE IN NIGERIAN CRISIS AND USG DECISION MAKE AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR TRANSPORT RELIEF MATERIAL TO NIGERIA.

2. WE NOTE FROM PARA 4 REFTEL THAT ICRC READY SEND TEAMS AS SOON AS BOTH SIDES AGREE AND BLOCKADE PORT HARCOURT LIFTED. WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE PORT HARCOURT, SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT FORTY MILE CHANNEL BLOCKED AND MINED BY REBELS, AND SERIOUS SILTING HAS OCCURRED. INFORMED SOURCES HERE DOUBT PORT CAN BE USED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THIS DOES NOT RULE OUT POTENTIAL USE CALABAR WITH FERRY TO ORON NECESSARY IF GOODS TO MOVE NORTHWEST TOWARD REBEL HELD AREA. THIS IS PRINCIPAL MILITARY SUPPLY LINE FOR FMG AND UNLIKELY THAT ONLY FERRY WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR NON-MILITARY USES.

3. IT ALSO FEASIBLE MOVE SIZEABLE QUANTITIES SUPPLIES BY AIR IF FMG CONTINUES HOLD PORT HARCOURT AIRFIELD SECURELY. PH FIELD CAN TAKE LARGER AIRCRAFT THAN ENUGU, ALTHOUGH THIS ALSO

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POSSIBLE ROUTE GETTING MATERIAL TO AFFLICTED AREA.

4. FURTHER QUESTION OF MOVING RELIEF SUPPLIES INTO REBEL-HELD AREAS WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT ARRANGEMENTS ICRC MIGHT BE ABLE WORK OUT BETWEEN TWO SIDES. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE DESIGNATION OF AN "EXCHANGE ROAD" WITH NEUTRALIZED EXCHANGE POINT SUPERVISED BY ICRC OR OTHER NEUTRAL PERSONNEL.

5. WHILE MEDICAL AND FOOD NEEDS INSIDE DENSELY POPULATED EAST CENTRAL STATE ADMITTEDLY SERIOUS, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT "SOS BIAFRA" APPEAL TO ICRC (REFTEL PARA 2) IS ALSO MAJOR PROPAGANDA EFFORT BY "BIAFRANS". IT IS TIMED COINCIDE WITH KAMPALA PEACE TALKS IN WHICH ONE OF FIRST POINTS PRESENTED BY "BIAFRAN" REPRESENTATIVE MBANEFO WAS DEMAND FOR LIFTING OF BLOCKADE. SINCE ECONOMIC AND NAVAL BLOCKADE HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE FMG WEAPON AGAINST REBELS, IT NOT LIKELY FMG WOULD LIFT ENTIRE BLOCKADE UNTIL HOSTILITIES ENDED. BUT FMG MIGHT LIFT IT TEMPORARILY AND IN SPECIFIC LOCATION FOR ICRC.

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
 TR BG 20 ENUGU
 170379

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AT
 24 MAY 68 20 02z

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

STATE _____

JOINT STATE/AID/USIA MESSAGE

SUBJECT: USG Employees Personal Effects in East

POL 27 Biafra Nigeria
 REF: Lagos 8623 and 9349 TR BG 20 Enugu

1. To limit hardship for USG personnel formerly located Enugu and since security situation that city has improved, Dept and AID wish move quickly to (a) recover any personal effects remaining East; and (b) settle claims for effects irrevocably lost.
2. Appreciate Embassy's efforts per reflets. Despite likelihood most items of value left Enugu have either been stolen or damaged irreparably, believe it advisable that Embassy send personnel to confirm no items of value belonging individuals or USG remain. AID/W suggests possibility drawing on AID Mission staff ~~for~~ assistance this chore. Unless security situation still does not permit or FMG refuses cooperate, attempt should be made evacuate, by air if necessary, all personal effects and those USG items for which unit value would exceed evacuation costs. This could be done in conjunction with inspection USG properties and establishing basis for US claim against FMG as outlined septel.

DRAFTED BY USAID

Drafted by: *AMH* AF/AFW: DSmith: AMHardy: 11 5/23/68 Tel. Ext. 7574 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF/AFW: RM Melbourne *Rm*
 Clearances: AFR/GS: MGray (info) AFT/MGT: F Hahn (sub) *alt*
 OPR: GMMCkeever (info) AFR/GARR Fisher (info) AFR/PER: HGoss (info) draft
 AF/EX: BGMoore (info) AID/GC: EDR: JON (info) USIA: Miss Bondhus *alt* (info) draft
 Mr. Howze *alt* (info) draft
 Mr. Emmerick *alt* (info) draft

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 By *MVN* NARA Date *05/05*

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3. To extent that Embassy and AF determine that effects USIA, USAID (excluding contract), and State personnel irrevocably lost USG can settle claims. At present, those presenting claims have only been paid seventy-five per cent of their anticipated total losses. Therefore, Embassy is requested submit list USG personnel who left effects in East stating (a) whether items are presumed irrevocably lost and (b), if possible, where effects last known to be. Dept/AID intend withhold final settlement claims of persons having effects in Port Harcourt until situation there is clarified. However, in absence other information, to settle claims of individuals who have no effects in Port Harcourt, will accept claimants' assurances re location their effects at outbreak of war.

4. Before final settlement any claims, it must also be established whether there is any reasonable hope for recovery damages for personal effects from FMG. Request Embassy's opinion.

5. In unlikely event that recovery occurs after payment of loss to claimant he required reimburse USG in amount recovered.

END


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POC 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION IO 15

INFO AF 09, EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, SCS 04, SCA 02
SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28, AGR 20, RSR 01, SA 01, /167 W

P R 241733Z MAY 68
FM USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7662
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 3509

SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENTARY ICRC NIGERIAN APPEAL AND REQUEST USG
ASSISTANCE.

1. HEAD ICRC AFRICA DIVISION DE HELLER AND RELIEF OFFICER AMMANN
CALLED AT MISSION TODAY WITH URGENT REQUEST SUPPLEMENTING (NOT
SUPPLANTING) EARLIER REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE.

2. OFFICIALS PASSED TWO DOCUMENTS TO MISSION. ONE TITLED SOS
BIAFRA IS TEXT APPEAL SENT MAY 23 TO 30 RC SOCIETIES INCLUDING
ARC. THIS WILL BE RELEASED TO PRESS 11AM LOCAL MAY 27. TEXT
FOLLOWS: QUOTE. SOS BIAFRA. AS A RESULT OF THE CAPTURE OF
PORT HARCOURT, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS HAS
JUST RECEIVED A DRAMATIC RADIO APPEAL FROM ITS DELEGATION IN
BIAFRA. IN THIS APPEAL IT IS STATED THAT THOUSANDS OF WOMEN,
CHILDREN, AND OLD PEOPLE, STARVING AND ON THE VERGE OF EXHAUSTION
ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE CENTER OF THE TERRITORY, FLEEING COMBAT
ZONES. THE NUMBER OF THESE REFUGEES IS AT PRESENT ESTIMATED AT
ABOUT SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PERSONS CROWDED UP IN SEVERAL HUNDRED
CAMPS AND SCHOOLS. THESE PERSONS ARE TERRIFIED BY THE WAR AND
REFUSE TO GO BACK TO THEIR VILLAGE FOR FEAR OF LOSING THEIR LIFE.
ALREADY ICRC DELEGATES HAVE REPORTED THAT THEY HAVE SEEN MANY
DEAD ON THE ROADSIDE. TO SAVE THOSE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS HUMAN
BEINGS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DISPATCH A MINIMUM OF 200 TONS

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OF FOOD STUFFS A DAY. THE MEANS AT PRESENT AVAILABLE TO THE ICRC ARE TOTALLY INADEQUATE TO FACE THIS SITUATION, AND THE COMMITTEE IS READY TO ORGANIZE A LARGE SCALE RELIEF OPERATION FOR THIS PURPOSE IT MUST OBTAIN THE NECESSARY FOODSTUFFS, MEANS OF TRANSPORT (AIRPLANES AND THEN SHIPS) AND FIRST AND FOREMOST THE LIFTING OF THE BLOCKADE.

WITH THIS OBJECT IN VIEW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE HAS JUST SENT TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF NIGERIA AND BIAFRA NOW MEETING TO NEGOTIATE IN KAMPALA, A PRESSING APPEAL TO LIFT THE BLOCKADE NOW ENFORCED AGAINST BIAFRA, FOR SENDING FOOD AND MEDICINES EXCLUSIVELY INTENDED FOR CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.)

ALL SUPPORT OFFERED FOR THIS ENDEAVOUR WILL BE APPRECIATED BY THE ICRC. YOU ARE ALSO REQUESTED TO ASK THE ASSISTANCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN RELIEF AND TRANSPORT. AS SOON AS YOUR REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED THE ICRC WILL GIVE YOU ALL NECESSARY INDICATIONS FOR THE DISPATCHING OF GOODS.

TIME IS GETTING SHORT AND THE RED CROSS CANNOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO SUCH HUMAN MISERY. THE ICRC WILL VERY SHORTLY TO APPEAL TO THE WORLD PRESS. UNQUOTE.

3. OTHER DOCUMENT IS ICRC PRESS RELEASE(TO BE ISSUED MAY 27) INCLUDING TEXT REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 SOS BIAFRA, URGENT APPEAL TO NIGERIAN AND BIAFRAN NEGOTIATORS MEETING IN KAMPALA. APPEAL HAS BEEN CARRIED TO KAMPALA BY ICRC REP HOFFMAN. THE PRESS RELEASE FOLLOWS: QUOTE. NIGERIAN. AN URGENT APPEAL BY THE ICRC. WE PUBLISH THE FOLLOWING APPEAL ADDRESSED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS TO THE NIGERIAN AND BIAFRAN NEGOTIATORS ON THE OCCASION OF THE OPENING TALKS IN KAMPALA ON 23 MAY 1968 IN VIEW OF THE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES.

AS WILL BE SEEN, THE ICRC IS URGING BOTH PARTIES IN THE CONFLICT TO ACCEPT FORTHWITH A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL MEASURES OF HUMANITARIAN CHARACTER. THE ICRC HOPES THAT THIS APPEAL WILL BE HEARD.

APPEAL BY THE ICRC NOW THAT IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS ARE STARTING IN KAMPALA BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF NIGERIA AND THE SECESSIONIST BIAFRA REGION WITH A VIEW TO THE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE REDCROSS WHICH,

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SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT, HAS ATTEMPTED TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF PRISONERS AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, NOW ADDRESSES A MOST PRESSING APPEAL TO THE TWO PARTIES INCONFLICT SO THAT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF URGENT HUMANITARIAN MEASURES BE ADOPTED.

ANXIOUS IN FACT TO STRENGTHEN ITS WORK ON RELIEF, THE ICRC REQUEST THE NEGOTIATORS IN KAMPALA TO CONSIDER THE IMMEDIATE ADOPTION OF THE THREE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS.

1) PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND PRISONERS, BASING ITSELF ON THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND THE SPIRIT OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS REQUEST THE BELLIGERENTS TO TAKE ALL THE NECESSARY MEASURES IN PARTICULAR, BY GIVING VERY PRECISE AND STRICT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ARMED FORCES OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER, AS LONG AS HOSTILITIES HAVE NOT CEASED, WITH A VIEW TO SPARING THE INNOCENT CIVILIAN POPULATION FROM AIR ATTACKS OR FROM OTHER ACTS AGAINST THEIR SAFETY, WHETHER THESE ARE OR ARE NOT IN THE FORM OF REPRISALS. WOUNDED OR SHIPWRECKED MILITARY PERSONNEL AS WELL AS PRISONERS ARE EQUALLY PROTECTED.)

THE ICRC IS PREPARED TO GIVE ITS SUPPORT TO THE REALIZATION OF ALL APPROPRIATE PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.)

2) RELIEF TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. AS THE ICRC STRESSED IN THE URGENT APPEAL IT ADDRESSED IN MID-PARIS TO RED CROSS SOCIETIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND TO ALL AID ORGANIZATIONS, URGENT ACTION IS REQUIRED TO BE UNDERTAKEN TO ASSIST AND SUPPLY INNOCENT CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, SUFFERING AS A RESULT OF THE HOSTILITIES.

THANKS TO THE HELP IT HAS ALREADY RECEIVED, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS IS TAKING ALL THE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR MEDICINES AND FOOD OF WHICH THERE IS URGENT NEED TO REACH WITHOUT ENDURANCE ALL THE AREAS AFFLICTED BY THE WAR. IN SO FAR AS BIAFRA IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, FACILITIES MUST BE ACCORDED IT BY THE TWO PARTIES OPPOSING EACH OTHER TO ENABLE TRANSPORTS WHICH WILL BE ORGANIZED BY THE ICRC TO ARRIVE RAPIDLY AND WITH SECURITY ON THE SITE. IT THEREFORE REQUEST IN A PRESSING MANNER, THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, EVERY FACILITY BE GRANTED IT TO HAVE AN EXTENSIVE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 04 GENEVA 03509 241917Z

LIFTING OF THE BLOCKADE ENABLING THE PASSAGE THROUGH RELIEF SUPPLIES.)

3) EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR. AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS HELD ON EITHER SIDE COULD VERY SHORTLY TAKE PLACE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE ICRC, ON NEUTRAL TERRITORY, IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD. ACCORDING TO CUSTOM, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS WOULD WILLINGLY UNDERTAKE TO ORGANIZE SUCH AN EXCHANGE, WITH THE HELP OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO PARTIES IN CONFLICT.

IN NOW FORMALLY REQUESTING THE NEGOTIATORS IN KAMPALA TO ADOPT THE ABOVE MEASURES WITHOUT DELAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS IS NOT ONLY CONSCIOUS OF SERVING THE CAUSE OF SUFFERING HUMANITY BUT ALSO, IF THESE PROPOSALS ARE ADOPTED, OR RE-ESTABLISHING PEACE IN MENS MINDS AND HEARTS.
SIGNED GONARD, PRESIDENT ICRC. UNQUOTE.

4. ICRC HAS INSTRUCTED HOFFMAN STAY KAMPALA AND DO ALL POSSIBLE GET TWO SIDES AGREE TO APPEAL. ICRC IS READY SEND ITEMS AS SOON GREEN LIGHT GIVEN BY TWO SIDES AND BLOCKADE PART HAROURT LIFTED.

5. AMMANN AND DE HELLER STRESSED NEED GET CONCENTRATED HIGH-PROTEIN FOODS IN BY AIR IMMEDIATELY, WITH SHIPS TO FOLLOW. RAISED QUESTION OF WHETHER U.S. FOOD STOCKS IN AFRICA MIGHT BE TAPPED FOR USE IN THIS EMERGENCY.

6. MISSION OFFICERS INDICATED ICRC PRESENTATION WOULD BE PASSED DEPARTMENT, IMMEDIATELY WITH REQUEST FOR URGENT CONSIDERATION.) TUBBY

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By MNARA Date 01/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Classification

24 MAY 68 14 46 2

Origin	ACTION: Amembassy ABIDJAN PRIORITY
Info:	INFO : Amembassy ACCRA
	" ADDIS ABABA
	" DAKAR
	" DAR ES SALAAM
	" KAMPALA
	" KINSHASA
	" LAGOS
	" LUSAKA
	" LONDON
	" PARIS
	CINCMEAFA SA
	" COTONOU
	LOME
	" NIAMEY
	" OUAGADOUGOU

Ref: Abidjan 3170 - fil 27 Biafra-Nigerian

1. Department fully concurs in approach taken with Usher reported reftel and agrees that amplification suggested your para 4a would be helpful. Re para 4b, Houphouet might be reminded that it was Biafran purchase of foreign aircraft and initial bombing of Lagos which pressed FMG into aircraft purchases. Believe USG in no repeat no position to assure Houphouet that Nigerian QTE massive bombing of civilians UNQTE has ceased. You may, however, tell Houphouet we have no evidence FMG using napalm against Biafran villages.

2. You might also indicate to Houphouet that (A) UK is normal supplier of arms to Nigeria in much same way France is for Ivory Coast and (B) that UK and US turned down FMG request to furnish jet aircraft which then provided

Drafting AF: AFW:WESchaefer	AFCW:WESchaefer	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and
AF:AFW:RPSmith:ba	5/23/68	6402	classification approved by: AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd

Clearances:

AFCW:WESchaefer

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Form 8-65 DS-322

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 Authority NND 950503
 By MMNARA Date 10/5/03

Page 2 of telegram to ABIDJAN

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
by USSR. Believe latter point has some importance in view emphasis which
GOIC and others place on QTE massive bombing of civilians UNQTE.

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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Pal 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 027

PAGE: 01 231723Z

49
ACTION AF: 15

INFO SS 20, GPM 04, SP 01, INR 07, RSR 01, FILE 01, /049: W

P R 231530Z MAXW68
FM USDAO/LAGOS, NIGERIA
TO DIA PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC
CINCSTRIKE
CINCLANT
INFO CIA
DA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCCNSUL KADUNA
DA GRNC

C O N F I D E N T I A L 0223 MAY 68. SGD HALLIGAN. COUNTRY: NIGERIA.
SUBJECT: UPDATE CURRENT FMG/EASTERN MIL SITUATION. DIA FOR
DIACO; CINCSTRIKE FOR STRJ2-C; DA FOR ASI.

1. KNOWLEDGEABLE AND USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCES: ARMY HQ SAY REBEL ACTIVITY PORT HARCOURT VERY LIGHT. THIRD DIV HAS ONE BRIGADE TASK FORCE HOLDING AND DEFENDING PORT HARCOURT AND KEY SURROUNDING AREAS. TWO OTHER BRIGADE TASK FORCES CONTINUING OPERATIONS: ON MOVING NORTHEAST DIRECTION ABA; OTHER MOVING NORTHWEST DIRECTION AHOADA AND/OR OWERRI. NIGERIAN AIR FORCE MAKING OPERATIONAL USE PORT HARCOURT AIRFIELD; ONLY LIGHT DAMAGE RUNWAYS AND CONTROL TOWER BACK IN USE.

2. INFO AVAIL FROM USUALLY RELIABLE AND KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCE INDICATES COLONEL MURITALLE MUHAMMED BACK IN LAGOS SINCE 21 MAY HAVING ALLEGEDLY ARRIVED VIA LOCAL FLIGHT FROM GHANA. MUHAMMED NOT AT NORMALLY ASSIGNED QUARTERS BUT LOCATED LAGOS SUBURBS. SOURCES DODAN BARRACKS NOT CERTAIN WHAT FUTURE HOLDS FOR HIM. ALTHOUGH MUHAMMED STILL OFFICIALLY ON RECORD AS COMMANDER SECOND DIV, LTC JALO HAS BEEN ACTING DIV COMMANDER HIS ABSENCE AND DIV CURRENTLY IN PROCESS LIMITED OPERATIONS ONITSHA TO NNEWI.

3. BRIGADIER KATSINA ASSUMED DUTIES C/S 21 MAY AND HELD CONFERENCE SAME DATE WITH DIV COMMANDERS (JALO FOR TWO DIV) WHO HERE IN CONNECTION SMC MEETING. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE WERE AIR

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 231723Z

FORCE COMMANDER ALAO, AND NAVY REP. COMMANDER JOE. CONFEREES DISCUSSED FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS IN REPORTEDLY STORMY SESSION IN WHICH ADEKUNLE BLASTED ALL AND SUNDRY FOR LACK OF SUPPORT, INACTION, ETC. AIR EVENTUALLY CLEARED; HOWEVER, AND FIRST AND SECOND DIVS ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES AWGU AND NNEWI, RESPECTIVELY, ON ASAP BASIS. ALL DIV COMMANDERS SCHEDULED RETURN DIVS 23 MAY.

4. ON 22 MAY, ADEKUNLE ATTENDED MEETING NAVY BASE APAPA CALLED BY ADMIRAL WEY. ALSO PRESENT WERE KEY FIGURES (HARBOR MASTER) NIGERIA PORTS AUTHORITY AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS CONCERNED. SUBJECT WAS INITIATION ACTION REOPEN BONNY CHANNEL TO PORT HARCOURT. INITIAL ACTION WILL BE JOINT SURVEY BY NAVAL, PORTS AUTHORITY AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN ATTEMPT DETERMINE NATURE AND SCOPE ACTIONS REQUIRED. SURVEY TO BE INITIATED AS SOON NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL CAN BE ASSEMBLED. (CHIEF HARBOR MASTER, NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY, TOLD DATT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE THREE MONTHS AT BEST, IF ALL WENT OFF WITHOUT HITCH, BEFORE CHANNEL ALL THE WAY TO HARCOURT OPEN; "AND COULD BE LONGER IF DELAYS, WHICH MUST BE ANTICIPATED, ENCOUNTERED". SOURCE SAID ONE OF MAJOR PROBLEMS WILL BE QUALIFIED PILOTS TO HANDLE SHIPPING IN VERY LONG CHANNEL. AS OF NOW, "NONE AVAILABLE".

5. MISCELLANEOUS:

A. RELIABLE EX-BAT OBSERVER SAID AS OF 20 MAY EXTENSION NORTHERN END MAIN RUNWAY CALABAR AIRFIELD HAD PROCEEDED TO GRADING STAGE AND PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY TO BLACKTOP. ESTIMATE WAS APPROX. TWO THOUSAND FEET BEING ADDED CURRENT FIFTY ONE HUNDRED FEET.

B. FUNERAL HELD LAGO 22 MAY FOR MAJOR ISAAC BORO KILLED VICINITY OKRIKA LATE WEEK 12 MAY.

C. C/S KATSINA "TO: NORTH" APPROX. ONE WEEK COMMENCING 22 MAY.

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 YAOUNDÉ 00866 231832Z

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ACTION: AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, IO 13, CIAEI 00, DODEI 00, UPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAEL 00,

NSCI 10, PI 04, RSCI 01, SPI 02, SSI 20, USIA 12, AID 28, PCN 04, RSR 01,

UCF 05, / 135 W

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R 231058Z MAY 69
FM: AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3258
INFO: AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L YAOUNDE 866

IN DISCUSSION OF NIGERIAN SITUATION WITH AMB PAYTON,
PRES AHIDUO MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. HE IS UNAWARE ANY NEW INITIATIVES OF OAU CONCOM TO RESOLVE
NIGERIAN SITUATION.

2. HE DOES NOT EXPECT OJUKWU TO CHANGE HIS POSITION, THE PROSPECTS
FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT REMAIN DIM.

3. OJUKWU IS HOLDING HIS STAFF AND ADVISERS TOGETHER BY
FORCE AND THE THREAT OF HARM TO THEIR FAMILIES WHO ARE MORE OR
LESS HOSTAGES. MORALE, HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.
PAYTON

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By MNARA Date 05/05



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Sect-G
Sect-B
Sect-A

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 09349 231828Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO PER 02, ST 01, CIAE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00, RSC 01, RSR 01/027 W

R 231630Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 718.

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 9349:

REF: LAGOS 9264 POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA

SUBJ: USG EMPLOYEES' PERSONAL EFFECTS: PORT HARCOURT

1. DATT (DURING COURSE OF MAY 22 VISIT TO GEN. GOWON) DELIVERED COPY OF EMBASSY NOTE TO EXTAFF PON PROTECTION USG EMPLOYEES. EFFECTS WAREHOUSED IN PORT HARCOURT. GOWON WAS INFORMED EMB HAD GOOD REASONS TO BELIEVE EFFECTS INTACT AS OF MAY 18 AND WAS ASKED TO INFORM AREA COMMANDER COL. ADEKUNLE TO PROVIDE PROTECTION UNTIL PROPERTY COULD BE EVACUATED. GEN. GOWON READILY AGREED TO DO THIS. MATTER WAS ALSO DISCUSSED WITH BRIG. EXPO, C/S SUPREME HQS.

2. EMB WILL ATTEMPT ARRANGE EVACUATION PROPERTY AS SOON AS PERMISSION CAN BE OBTAINED FROM MILITARY AUTHORITIES. ANY EARLY EVACUATION WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE BY AIR CHARTER. WHILE WE NOW HAVE SOME NEW HOPE THAT PROPERTY MIGHT BE RECOVERABLE, EMB NOT OVERLY OPTIMISTIC LOOTING SOLDIERS WILL NOT GET TO IT FIRST. ALSO MAY BE SOME TIME BEFORE AIR EVACUATION POSSIBLE SINCE PH AIRPORT NOW USED AS NAFI OPERATIONAL BASE.

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By MMNARA Date 10/5/05



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Department of State

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PAGE 01 231757Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO GPM 04, INR 07 RSR 01, FILE 01, EUR 08, /036 W

P R 231530Z MAY 68 ZEL
FM USDAO/LAGOS NIGERIA
TO DIA PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC
CINCSTRIKE
CINCLANT
INFO CIA
DA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
DA GRNC

C O N F I D E N T I A L 0223 MAY 68. SGD HALLIGAN. COUNTRY: NIGERIA.
SUBJECT: UPDATE CURRENT FMG/EASTERN MIL SITUATION. DIA FOR
DIACO; CINCSTRIKE FOR STRJ2-C; DA FOR ACSI.

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Defense Dept.
5/3/68

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Authority VND 959503
By MMNARA Date 05/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 231757Z

FORCE COMMANDER ALAO, AND NAVY REP. COMMANDER JOE, CONFEREES DISCUSSED FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS IN REPORTEDLY STORMY SESSION IN WHICH ADEKUNLE BLASTED ALL AND SUNDRY FOR LACK SUPPORT, INACTION, ETC. ARE EVENTUALLY CLEARED, HOWEVER, AND FIRST AND SECOND DIVS ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES AWGU AND NNEWI, RESPECTIVELY, ON ASAP BASIS. ALL DIV COMMANDERS SCHEDULED RETURN DIVS 23 MAY.

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B. FUNERAL HELD LAGOS 22 MAY FOR MAJOR ISAAC BORDI KILLED VICINITY OKRIKA LATE WEEK 12 MAY.

C. C/S KATSINA "TO NORTH" APPROX ONE WEEK COMMENCING 22 MAY.

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03

ORIGIN/ACTION

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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY 5
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R.P.Smith
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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: Amembassies ACCRA, LONDON, ADDIS ABABA; Amconsuls IBADAN, KADUNA; CINCSTRIKE/CINCMCMEAFA, DIA

TRANSMISSION BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

DATE: May 23, 1968

SUBJECT: Letter of Col. Murtala Mohammed, November 1967, re Tribalism in Mid-West

REF :

Enclosed is the text of a letter allegedly written by then-Lieutenant-Colonel Murtala R. Mohammed, "General Officer Commanding, 2 Division", to Major-General Gowon. The letter was written in early November, according to a member of the Mid-West Reconciliation Committee, and copies were distributed to everyone on the Committee on November 25, 1967.

In the letter, Col. Mohammed mentions the problem of resettling the "innocent civilians who are victims of this unfortunate war" and says that: "The problem in the Mid-West State is greater than Ojukwu's Rebellion". The letter claims that there is a general lack of confidence among all the ethnic groups and "unwarranted accusation and counter-accusation of collaborating" with the secessionists during their occupation of the State. Mohammed apparently believes that civilians all over the State collaborated with the "Biafrans" in one way or another but "this notwithstanding, other ethnic groups have made the Ika and the Asabas their scapegoat. The lives of these victims of unfortunate circumstances from Ika and Asaba areas are being made very difficult. They almost lost their sense of belonging as members of the Mid-West State."

Col. Mohammed's letter reported that the Ibo-speaking people of the Ika and Asaba areas could not travel safely to other parts of the State and "the few brave ones" who did in order to resume their work or trade "were never heard of again". Mohammed expresses the opinion that the Ika-Ibos are "cooperative and friendly" and ought to be given some encouragement. The letter wonders: "Why fight to keep Nigeria as one country if two and a half million people in a state in that country

Group 3: Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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 In OutFORM DS-323
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Drafted by:

EXA: Newch:hs/5-23-68

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Authority VND 950503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

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Page 2
LAGOS A- 639

cannot live together happily. It is hoped that the people of Mid-West State can cultivate the spirit of forgiveness of one another's past misjudgements in the spirit of one Nigeria."

According to Sam Obara, a Nigerian lawyer and Embassy local employee who has close contacts with Mid-West officials, General Gowon's reaction upon receipt of Col. Mohammed's letter in early November, 1967 was to summon the Mid-West Solidarity Committee which at that time had been established in Lagos. Since this committee did not include any Ibo-speaking Midwesterners, Gowon invited P. A. Asiodu, a Mid-West Ibo who is Permanent Secretary of Industries in the Federal Government. Gowon read Mohammed's letter to the Solidarity Committee and ordered the formation of the Mid-West Reconciliation Committee. This committee subsequently met in Benin.

The Mid-West Reconciliation Committee soon came up with several good recommendations (for example, to disband the witch-hunting Omo-Ebuh "Rebel Atrocities" Tribunal) and some less useful recommendations. According to Obara, none of the sensible recommendations were adopted by the Mid-West State Government (which had had nothing to do with the establishment of the Reconciliation Committee), but some of the less important recommendations were accepted.

Apparently General Gowon's and Col. Mohammed's efforts to avert tribal bitterness in the Mid-West State ended at this point, except for encouraging advice.


Comment: This alleged letter of Col. Mohammed's is at variance with the popular impression in Lagos of Mohammed as a "murderer" and a person who hates southern Nigerians. The cyclo-styled version of the letter, which was circulated at Gowon's behest, ends with "(signed) Lt-Col M.R. Mohammed, General Officer Commanding, 2 Division", and it seems unlikely that General Gowon would permit a serious misrepresentation to be perpetrated.

Enclosure:
As stated

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[Signature]

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LAGOS A- 639

General Officer Commanding,
HQ 2 Division,
Mid-West State,
BENIN.

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
PROBLEMS IN MID-WEST STATE

(For the attention of Commander-in-Chief)

1. The occupation of Mid-West State in August, 1967 by Ojukwu's rebel soldiers and their collaborators necessitated the formation of 2 Division and this Division so formed was given the task of liberating the Mid-West State from the hands of the rebels. By the grace of Almighty God, the task has been completed. Every effort is now being directed towards resettling the innocent civilians who are victims of this unfortunate war by the Federal Troops in the Mid-West State in the spirit of one Nigeria.
2. The greatest problem today in Nigeria is Ojukwu's rebellion which is known by every Nigerian. The problem in the Mid-West State is greater than Ojukwu's Rebellion. The few weeks 2 Division spent in the Mid-West State have given us an insight to the complex problem of each ethnic group in the state. There is a general mistrust and lack of confidence amongst all the ethnic groups. The General Officer Commanding, 2 Division, has on many occasions discussed this unwarranted accusation and counter accusation of collaborating with the self-styled Biafrans during the planning and the final occupation of the Mid-West State. It is true that the senior Army officers in the Mid-West State who are from Ika Ibo and Asaba areas joined hands with the rebels, civilians of other areas collaborated too with the rebels in one way or another. This notwithstanding, other ethnic groups have made the Ikas and the Asabs their scapegoat. The lives of these victims of unfortunate circumstances from Ika and Asaba areas are being made very difficult. They almost lost their sense of belonging as members of the Mid-West State.
3. It is a fact that people from Ika and Asaba cannot travel out of their areas to other parts of the State. The few brave ones who travelled to Benin City or Sapele from Ika areas in order to resume their various works or trade, were never heard of again. This persecution is being done by civilians against civilians. It could be wrong to say the Mid-West State Administration is bias against the Ikas and the Asabas but a definite move must be made to restore the confidence and mutual trust amongst the ethnic groups in the state. From our experience during our short stay in the

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
LAGOS A- 639

Mid-West State, Ika and Asaba proved to be co-operative and friendly and have in various ways shown that they are willing to accept life for what it is if they are given some encouragement. One wonders at times: why fight to keep Nigeria as one country if two and a half million people in a state in that country cannot live together happily. It is hoped that the people of Mid-West State can cultivate the spirit of forgiveness of one another's past misjudgements in the spirit of one Nigeria. To keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done with the co-operation of every true Nigerians.

(Signed) Lt-Col M. R. Muhammed,
General Officer Commanding,
2 Division.

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POL 16 BIAFRA
TR POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SA 01, SAH 03, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, PC 04,

RSR 01, 0/145 W

R 221800Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 696
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDISABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LOPE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEA/AFSA
DIA
USMISSION USUN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 9312

SUBJECT: ASIKA SPEAKS ON RECOGNITION OF "BIAFRA".

②
1. UKPABI ASIKA, AN IBO, WHO IS FMG ADMINISTRATOR FOR ENUGU AND LIBERATED PORTIONS EAST CENTRAL STATES, HELD PRESS CONFERENCE MAY 21 IN WHICH HE ELEGANTLY


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By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 936

PAGE 01 ABIDJAN 03170 221230Z

47
ACTION AF 15

INFO: EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 100,
P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, ID 13, AID 28, PC 04, SRI 01,
ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, ACDA 16, NIC 01, NEA 13, RSR 01, 184 W

R 220915Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2442
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALEEM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
RUQU AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 083
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CINCMEAFA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU UNN
AMEMBASSY LOME UNN
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
ZEN AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU UNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 3170

REF: STATE 166161 POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria
XAPL 16 Biafra

SUMMARY: STATED MAIN POINTS OUR POSITION ON NIGERIA TO FORMINI
USHER. HIS COMMENT CONCENTRATED ON STOPPING ARMS SUPPLY TO FMG.
CONTRASTING BRITISH POLICY ON USE OF ARMS AGAINST BLACKS IN
NIGERIA AND WHITES IN RHODESIA. BELIEVE WE SHOULD AMPLIFY
RATIONALE OF OUR POSITION ON TS ISSUE.

1. HOUPHOUET OUT OF TOWN UNTIL WEEKEND. HAVE REQUESTED APPOINTMENT
WHICH I HOPE GET THEM OR EARLY NEXT WEEK. GIVEN THIS DELAY I
STATED MAIN POINTS OUR POSITION ON NIGERIA DURING CALL ON FORMINI
USHER MAY 21. OUR ANALYSIS OF MILITARY SITUATION KAMPALA.

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PAGE 02 ABIDJA 08170 221230Z

NEGOTIATIONS:

NOW THE MAIN CHANCE FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH HOPEFULLY WOULD REINTEGRATE BIAFRA HONORABLY INTO NIGERIA. FEAR LEST FURTHER RECOGNITION BIAFRA MIGHT PREVENT SOLUTION BY HARDENING BOTH SIDES. PROBLEM PRIMARILY AFRICAN. AFRICANS CAN PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN GIVING BIAFRANS CONFIDENCE THAT THEY CAN BE SAFELY REINTEGRATED INTO NIGERIA.

2. USHER FOCUSED ON ARMS SUPPLY BY OUTSIDE POWERS. PRESSED HARD AND REPEATEDLY FOR US TO PERSUADE BRITISH TO CEASE SUPPLY TO FMG. SAID SIMILAR EFFORTS WERE BEING TAKEN TO BRING PRESSURE ON USSR, UAR, ALGERIA. I OUTLINED OUR EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE ARMS SUPPLY BY OUTSIDE POWERS LAST YEAR, CITING DEPT'S AUGUST STATEMENT AND FAILURE OF ANY AFRICAN STATE TO SUPPORT. SAID THIS WAS CRITICAL STAGE. ONCE USSR BEGAN, VARIOUS OTHER POWERS STARTED SUPPLYING BOTH FMG AND BAFRA. GIVEN THIS TWO-SIDED TRAFFIC AND OUR OWN POSITION OF NON-ININVOLVEMENT, WE DO NOT RPT NOT FEEL IN POSITION TO INTERCEDE NOW WITH ARMS SUPPLIERS.

3. USHER SAID HE FOUND OUR POSITION INCOMPREHENSIBLE. WAS NOT RPT NOT ASKING US TO TAKE PUBLIC POSITION, BUT SAW NO RPT NO REASON WHY WE COULD NOT RPT NOT TALK PRIVATELY TO BRITISH. THOUGHT BRITISH MIGHT AT LEAST BE WILLING AGREED STOP THEIR ARMS IF USSR AND OTHER SUPPLIERS DID. I COUNTERED WITH ASSERTION THAT GIVEN MILITARY SITUATION, MAIN HOPE NOW LAY IN KAMPALA NEGOTIATIONS. USHER REPLIED SHOULD STOPFIGHTING NOW WITHOUT WAITING FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND ONE WAY WAS CUT OFF ARMS. I ASKED WHAT GOING TO STOP SUPPLY TO BIAFRANS. USHER SAID THEIR SUPPLIES NEGLIGIBLE, FURNISHED BY "A FEW PIRATES." FURTHER STRESSED RISING AFRICAN HOSTILITY TO BRITISH POSTURE OF REFUSING USE FORCE AGAINST RHODESIAN WHITES, BUT HAVING NO RPT NO COMPUNCTION ABOUT ENABLING BLACKS SLAUGHTER BLACKS IN NIGERIA. SAID THIS FEELING SHARED BY MANY AFRICANS WHO KEEP SILENT ABOUT BIAFRA FOR DOMESTIC REASONS. I QUESTIONED VALIDITY OF ANALOGY WITH RHODESIA. THROUGHOUT DISCUSSION USHER SEEMED WHOLLY OBSESSED WITH PROBLEM OF ARMS SUPPLY, TOOK NO RPT NO INTEREST IN MY REPEATED STRESS ON ROLE OF AFRICANS CREATING FAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

4. COMMENT: HOWEVER FAULTY THE ANALOGY WITH RHODESIA MAY BE, IT HAS INFLAMMATORY PSYCHOLOGICAL POTENTIAL, AND IF MODERATES LIKE IVORY COAST JOIN IN EXPLOITING IT IN AFRICA IT CAN CAUSE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 ABIDJA 03170 221230Z

TRouble in THE UN, PERHAPS ELSEWHERE. BELIEVE BEFORE I SEE HOUphouet IT WOULD BE USEFUL AMPLIFY OUR RATIONALE RE ARMS SUPPLY IN EFFORT WEAN IVORIANS AWAY FROM THEIR OBSESSION. WHILE TOO REMOTE FROM NIGERIAN AFFAIRS TO JUDGE WHAT FEASIBLE, BELIEVE SOMETHING ALONG FOLLOWING LINES MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT MORE PERSUASIVE HERE:

A. WE HAVE BEEN CONTINUALLY IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH ON NIGERIAN PROBLEM, LONG BEFORE AS WELL AS SINCE HOUphouet's DEMARCHE. BRITISH HAVE OWN REASONS FOR THEIR DECISIONS WHICH NO REP. NO DOUBT THEY COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY. WE CONVINCED THAT CRITICAL FOCUS NOW IS KAMPALA NEGOTIATIONS. EVERYTHING SHOULD BE DONE THAT WILL HELP NOTHING THAT WILL HINDER MILITARY SITUATION NOW SO ADVANCED THAT TOTAL ARMS CUT-OFF WOULD STILL ALLOW FMS TO COMPLETE OCCUPATION BIAFRA IF DESIRED. THUS SOLE HOPE OF STOPPING BLOODED LIES IN NEGOTIATION. ARMS CUT-OFF WOULD MERELY PUSH FMS INTO MORE AGGRESSIVE STANCE, JEOPARDIZE NEGOTIATIONS.

B. IF WE CAN TRUTHFULLY SAY THAT MASSIVE BOMBING OF CIVILIANS AND USE OF NAPALM AGAINST VILLAGES HAVE CEASED AND ARE UNLIKELY BE RENEWED, WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL SAY SO. THESE ARE POINTS THAT HAVE MOST CONCERNED IVORIANS.

C. PLEASE INSTRUCT. ON OTHER POINTS I OF COURSE PLAN USE WHOLE BODY OF INSTRUCTIONS IN STATE 164142 AND 166161 WHEN SEE HOUphouet.
GPA
MORGAN

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(1) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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Intelligence
Note - 382

May 22, 1968

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TM*
Subject: NIGERIA: The Kampala Peace Talks

As representatives of Federal Nigeria and Biafra begin full-dress peace negotiations on May 23 in the Ugandan capital, knotty procedural issues could break up the conference before it gets to substantive matters.

Stumbling Blocks. The nine days of preliminary talks in London (May 6 through 14) produced no agreement on two key questions: whether an African leader (not a Nigerian) would chair the formal talks, and whether outside observers would be present. The Federal spokesmen opposed both of these Biafran proposals on the grounds that the confrontation was internal and must not be turned into an international affair. The Biafrans insisted that only in this way could the Federal Military Government (FMG) be held to any agreement it might make. At London the two sides could only agree to put these questions at the top of the Kampala agenda.

High Stakes. The steady deterioration in Biafra's military fortunes in recent weeks and its simultaneous diplomatic successes--including recognition by four African states--have served to further polarize the two positions. The FMG is increasingly determined to go into the woodshed with Biafra alone, and is disposed to argue the matter as long as necessary to win its point. Biafra, despite a defiant announcement that it is now moving into the guerrilla phase,

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PL 27/14 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
RC 16 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
RPOL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
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PAGE 01 LAGOS 09264 211737Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, OPR 02, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, FBO 01, RSR 01, 1099 W

R 211610Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 668
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMIAFSA
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

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SUBJECT: CONDITIONS IN PORT HARCOURT

1. LAGOS PAPERS MAY 20 CARRIED PICTURES TAKEN IN PORT HARCOURT (PH) AFTER ITS CAPTURE BY FMG, INCLUDING PICTURE TWO ENGLISHMEN ALLEGED BE "MERCENARIES." ALLEGATION DENIED BY BRITISH HIGH COMISSION AND RETRACTED BY PAPER.

2. ENGLISHMEN INVOLVED WERE BUSINESSMEN WHO HAD STAYED IN PH THROUGHOUT CIVIL WAR: JOHN DOWNING, EMPLOYED BY MOTHERCAT (OVEREAS) LTD., AND WILLIAN BLAKELY, EMPLOYED BY NIGERIAN MARITIME SERVICES, LTD. THEY WERE SEIZED BY FEDERAL TROOPS WHO TREATED THEM HARSHLY BEFORE THEY TAKEN TO COL. ADEKUNLE. LATTER QUICKLY DISCOVERED THEY NOT MERCENARIES, HAD THEM LOOKED AFTER PROPERLY, AND BROUGHT THEM TO LAGOS IN HIS OWN PLANE (DC-3) ON MAY 20. HIGH COMMISSION HERE HAD THEM EVACUATED TO LONDON TODAY.

3. EMBASSY OFFICERS WHO TALKED WITH BLAKELY AND HICOM OFFICERS RESPONSIBLE LEARNED FOLLOWING:
(a) DOWNING AND BLAKELY DROVE THROUGH AREA CONTROLLED

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Department of State

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BY FEDERAL TROOPS ON SATURDAY, MAY 18, LOOKING FOR KEROSINE WITHOUT REALIZING FMG TROOPS WERE THERE UNTIL THEY WERE SEIZED.

(B) MOST OF PEOPLE IN PH, TROOPS AS WELL AS CIVILIANS, FLED OUT OF CITY ON FRIDAY, MAY 17. ENGLISHMEN DESCRIBED CITY AS "DESERTED" BY TIME THEY WERE PICKED UP BY FMG FORCES ON MAY 18.

(C) PLANE WHICH BROUGHT THEM TO LAGOS WAS PROBABLY FIRST FMG PLANE TO TAKE OFF FROM PH AIRPORT SINCE WAR STARTED.
(D) BLAKELY WAS IN CHARGE NIGERIAN MARITIME SERVICE WAREHOUSE IN WHICH PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS USG EMPLOYEES STORED. HE TOLD EMBOFF THIS MORNING THAT AS OF MAY 18 THOSE EFFECTS SECURE AND WAREHOUSE INTACT. OTHER TWO WAREHOUSES IN WHICH US PROPERTIES STORED ALSO INTACT AND LOCKED.

4. EMBASSY DELIVERED NOTE TODAY TO MINEXTAFFI REMINDING MINISTRY OF PREVIOUS EXCHANGES OF NOTES RE PROTECTION USG PROPERTY IN WAR AREAS AND REQUESTING, IN PARTICULAR PROTECTION OF PROPERTIES STORED IN PH. ALSO REQUESTED APPROVAL FOR EVACUATION THOSE PROPERTIES ASAP. DATT GAVE COPY OUR NOTE TO MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, URGING QUICK ACTION.

DECON 5/21/69. OLSON

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Re 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 786

PAGE 01 201311Z

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ACTION AF 09

INFO SS 20, GPM 04, INR 07, IO 03, EUR 08, ACDA 07, RSR 01, FILE 01, /060 W

P R 201155Z MAY 68
FM USDAO LAGOS NIGERIA
TO DIA PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC
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CINCLANT
INFO CIA
DA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

CONFIDENTIAL 0219 MAY 68. SGD: HALLIGAN. COUNTRY:
NIGERIA.

SUBJECT: UPDATE CURRENT FMG/EASTEGF MIL SITUATION.

DIA1ZOU

DIACO: SVIXCCSTRIKE FOR STRJ2-C: DA FOR ACSI.

1. WELL PLACED/USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCES SUPREME HQ SAY MEETING SUPREME MIL COUNCIL (SMC) SCHEDULED 20 MAY EXPECTED COMMENCE APPROX 1400 HOURS LOCAL TIME. SOURCES SAY TWO MAJOR AGENDA ITEMS ARE: ONE. FORMULATION AND AGREEMENT ON POLICIES/PLANS/OBJECTIVES FOR CONTINUATION MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST SECESSIONIST "BIAFRA" IN PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD WHEN PEACE TALKS BETWEEN PARTIES CONCERNED SCHEDULED FOR KAMPALA. TWO. SELECTION FMG NEGOTIATING TEAM FOR KAMPALA TALKS.

2. WITH RESPECT CONTINUATION MILITARY CAMPAIGN, SOURCES SAY PREVAILING SENTIMENT, "WHICH WILL BE THRASHED OUT AT MEETING", SEEMS TO BE FOR CONTINUATION CAMPAIGN DURING TALKS BUT AT CONTROLLED AND REDUCED PACE. THAT IS, FIRST AND SECOND DIVISIONS TO MAINTAIN "MODERATE PRESSURE" ALL ALONG NORTHERN FRONT WHILE THIRD DIV ON SOUTHERN AND SOUTHEASTERN FRONT "MAINTAINS PRESSURE", CONSOLIDATES AND CLEANS UP LOOSE ENDS IN RIVXSERS STATE. (WITH RESPECT FIRST AND SECOND DIV, DATT SEES LIKELIHOOD FIRST DIV CONTINUING PRESSURE IN AGBANI AND AFIKPO AREAS WHILE SECOND DIV CONTINUES MOVE TOWARD NNEWI - WHICH CURRENTLY UNDER WAY - AND CONSOLIDATES FED CONTROL ONITSHA/AWKA/UDI ROUTE. WITH RESPECT THIRD DIV, DATT SEES POSSIBILITY MODERATELY HEAVY PRESSURE CONTINUING AT ABA; POSSIBLE ACTIONS AIMED AT ALL OR SOME OF

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5/20/68

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PAGE 02 201311Z

TARGETS DEGEMA, BRASS, YENAGOA, AHOADA; AND CLEARING AND CONSOLIDATION FEDERAL POSITIONS BOTH TO REAR AND FORWARD OF CURRENT THIRDDIV FRONT LINES.)
3. WITH RESPECT NEGOTIATING TEAM SOURCES SAY MILITARY MEMBER LIKELY BE COLONEL I.D. BISALLA (CHRISTIAN MIDDLEBELTER) WHO JUST RELINQUISHED ARMY C/S JOB TO KATSINA (WHO TAKES OVER TODAY 20 MAY).
4. RELIABLE AND EXPERIENCED EXPAT REPORTERS (US AND UK) WHO HAVE BEEN IN PORT HARCOURT AREA ALL SEEM AGREED SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT POINTS:
A. DAMAGE REFINERY AND PORT HARCOURT AREAS (TO INCLUDE NORTHERN SUBURBS CITY WHICH THEY HAD SEEN) "APPEARED LIGHT".
B. ADEKUNLE'S THIRD DIV FORCES: "WELL EQUIPPED, WELL CLOTHED, ORDERLY AND DISCIPLINED, AND HURTING FOR NOTHING (PLENTY OF AMMO, ARTY, ARMORED VEHICLES, TRANSPORT, COMM) NOTED!!".
C. REBEL RESISTANCE APPEARED "MUCH LIGHTER THAN AT ONITSHA".
GP-3

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Intelligence Note

-370

May 20, 1968

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *tu*
Subject: Zambia Recognizes Biafra

Wrong and Right. Zambia's eleventh-hour recognition of Biafra probably stems from mixed motives in Lusaka. However, the Zambians seem to have decided some time ago that there was more wrong than right on Gowon's side, and the decision to recognize reflects President Kenneth Kaunda's strongly moralistic political style. Tanzania's earlier recognition probably had some influence on the Zambian Government, but this in itself probably would not have been enough to move the Zambians unless they had first convinced themselves. One influence has probably been the Zambian High Commission in Lagos, which has had strong pro-Biafran sympathies.

Nigeria Seen from Lusaka. The Zambians have been wrestling with the Nigerian problem for more than a year. They were the prime movers of a July 1967 peace appeal and tender of good offices, proffered jointly with Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. At the September 1967 OAU summit, the Zambians pressed hard for an OAU-sponsored mediation effort. They seem to have long been convinced that the old Nigerian unity was no longer possible, and that Gowon was doing far more harm than good in pursuing it. In Kaunda's eyes, Gowon resorted to force when he should have negotiated, and did not whole-heartedly

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GROUP 3
Declassified at 12 years
or less; not
initially classified

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 01016 201128Z

46
ACTION AF 15

INFO 10 13, SAH 03, E 15, AID 28, CIAE 00, DODE 20, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03.

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSSI 01, /140 W

R 201000Z MAY 68
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 751
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL IBADAN

UNCLAS KADUNA 1016

MAY 20 NEW NIGERIAN EDITORIAL HAILS CAPTURE OF PORT
HARCOURT AS "END OF REBELLION" OR AT LEAST "END OF
EFFECTIVENESS OF OJUKWU'S REGIME." NOW THAT REBELS ARE
"HEMMED IN" ECONOMIC BLOCKADE CAN BE "COMPLETELY
EFFECTIVE" AND CONTINUED RESISTANCE CAN LEAD ONLY TO
"ONE THING WE ALL WISH TO AVOID - TOTAL MILITARY DEFEAT
FOR THEM." NEW NIGERIAN STATES THAT FMG WILL BE
"MAGNANIMOUS" AT KAMPALA AND WILL "COMPROMISE OVER
SOME THINGS." CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER OJUKWU'S MAY 19
CALL FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE "WHICH COULD DRAG ON FOR
MONTHS AND YEARS." EDITORIAL ASKS IBOS TO "PLAY THEIR
PART" IN BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE AS "THEY ARE NIGERIANS
JUST AS MUCH AS WE."

STOKES.

REF ID: A65424
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10/5/03	

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MAY 20 1968
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PL 27 BIAFRA -
NIGERIA
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RECEIVED
TO : Department of State
INFO: AmEmbassy LAGOS
FROM : AmEmbassy LONDON
SUBJECT: Article by Frederick Forsyth in Evening Standard.
May 14, 1968
REF :

HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE: May 17, 1968

The enclosed article by Frederick Forsyth is unfortunately typical of the emotionally-charged reporting on the Nigerian war that has appeared in the London press, most of it strongly pro-Biafran. The Forsyth article (which also appeared, virtually word-for-word in the Sunday Times, May 12) is, if anything, more heavy-handed than most with its suggestion that the FMG uses Yorubas as expendable shock troops and its reference to "British mercenaries screaming, 'Come on, you black bastards - Move!!'"

BRUCE

Enclosure:
Standard Article.
(to all addressees)

FORM DS-323
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Clearances:

POL/RA/MStearns/ps 5/16/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:
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0707

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Authority *VND 950503*
By *MVN* NARA Date *10/5/05*

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BIAFRA: the terrible slaughter that Britain ignores...

by FREDERICK FORSYTH

The writer, aged 29, single, was three years a reporter with the Eastern Daily Press in Norfolk, four years a foreign correspondent with Reuters, serving in Paris, Brussels, Madrid, East Berlin, Prague and Budapest. Joined the Foreign Office staff as a reporter October 1965, appointed Assistant Diplomatic Correspondent February 1967. Coverred first three months of the Biafra war for BBC; July-September 1967, left the Corporation February 1968 to return to Biafra on conscientious grounds.

It is not an easy thing for an Englishman to watch children burned alive by napalm and to know that even though Britain did not send the bombs she is nevertheless giving massive support in other ways to those who do use napalm on civilians.

But this is an everyday occurrence in the war now going into its 11th month between Nigeria and the tiny breakaway state of Biafra, formerly Nigeria's Eastern Region.

It started two years ago when close to 30,000 Eastern Iboos were slaughtered by the Moslem Northerners. After nine months Northern leader, Colonel Ojukwu, had come to the conclusion that the Nigerian Government, headed by Northern Colonel Yakubu Gowon, had no intention of guaranteeing the Eastern people the right to security of life and property to which they felt they were entitled.

Pull out

The answer said Ojukwu, was to pull out of the Federation in a bid for separate independence. The fighting started last July as a Federal Government made its final onslaught to try and bring all Biafrans back into Nigeria.

Since then Britain has given enormous and steadily escalating military and diplomatic support to Nigeria, apparently regardless of the use to which the guns and bullets sent out from London are being put.

In 10 weeks living with the Biafran Army Commandos I saw what these guns are being used for. Predictably, the war has degenerated from a politico/economically oriented campaign to one where the sole motivation is the old race-hate so prevalent in Africa.

Damned forces have been unleashed which are now out of control: the Federal Army is on a blood-rampage across the face of Biafra with one thought in mind—Kill the Iboos.

In forays with the commandos

behind the Nigerian lines I have seen occupied Biafra; it is being turned into a charnel house of rotting corpses and wrecked hamlets.

The few survivors

cowering timorously in the bush

describe how the Federal

soldiers came, machine-gunned the menfolk, raped and

mutilated the women, butchered the children.

Crack troops

At the town of Onitsha, 300 Ibos of the Apostolic Church stayed to pray for deliverance as the crack Nigerian Hausa Second Division under the ferocious Colonel Mohammed marched towards the town. The 300 were dragged from the church, hands tied behind their backs, and executed.

Enclosure to London A-3578

Three hours later following into the town with Biafran Colonel Achuzie's 3rd battalion, I came across the carnage—limp corpses still warily piled high as a man's shoulder. It took us 18 hours to shift them out of the road.

In conversations with close to 100 Federal prisoners, I tried

to find out what drives them to these excesses. With their Ibo captors sent out of earshot, the Federal soldiers spoke openly.

Why do they do it? Kill Ibo, they reply. But why? Nigeria off, without Ibo.

But what about the inspiration of One Nigeria, so much publicised in the Federal capital of Lagos? Oh, yes, they reply, One Nigeria — without Ibo.

Genocide is an ugly word, but

an even uglier reality. Ten months ago I regarded the Biafrans' claims that in the event of defeat, they faced extermination as a gross exaggeration.

No longer; the fear has become a fact.

Tiny circle

Aided by their vastly superior artillery, mortars and British-supplied armoured cars, the Federal Army can, indeed, squeeze Biafra into a tiny circle with nothing but the women, the children and the 5,000,000 refugees inside.

What will follow then, with the Nigerian Army in its present mood, blood-drunk beyond listening to any pleas from moderate voices, will be the biggest massacre the Commonwealth or Africa has ever seen. It will be too late then for pious hands to be raised in horror.

The time to call the whole thing off is now, and the only country that can set the lead by calling a halt to the arms flow that keeps the war alight is Britain.

Colonel Ojukwu would call the war off tomorrow if someone would guarantee his people the right to live in safety. But until that time, he and his 1.4 million fellow-Biafrans say, "What the hell! If we're going to die we might as well die like men and not wait to be killed like rats." So they fight on, outnumbered, outgunned, in a closing circle with their families in the middle.

The horror

Already the Pope, the World Council of Churches, the Anglican Church and a dozen African statesmen and uncounted journalists have expressed horror at what is going on in this corner of the Commonwealth. But from Whitehall come only pious hopes and shipments of guns.

Not that the Nigerian Army is keen to fight. I've watched them charge the Biafran positions—Second Division in the front, thousands of terrified conscripts who don't even know why they are fighting...

Behind them come the more fanatical Hausa with orders to shoot down any Yoruba who turns and runs. Behind them come the Gwodo-Gwodo, almost sub-human black mercenaries from the Chad Republic up in the North.

Right at the back you can hear the British mercenaries screaming: "Come on, you black bastards—MOVE ON!" you black While the fighting rages on jets scream down on the civilian centres to deposit their ugly loads on schools, hospitals and market places. It has been estimated that in 10 months in Biafra more civilians have died than in three years in Vietnam. Small wonder then that for an Englishman in the thick of Britain's role throughout this whole episode gives little cause for pride.

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VND 950563
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By: MNARA Date: 05/05/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

101 27 Biafra Nigeria

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(2) PAGE 01 DAR ES 03232 171611Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 28, RSR 01, /127 W

R 171520Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4314
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

UNCLAS DAR ES SALAAM 3232

SUBJ: KAUNDA MAY CHAIR KAMPALA TALKS

MAY 17 "STANDARD" REPORTS THAT AS RESULT OF CORRIDOR CONVERSATIONS DURING RECENTLY-ENDED EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN SUMMIT IN DAR, ZAMBIA'S PRESIDENT KAUNDA MAY BE ASKED TO CHAIR NEXT WEEK'S KAMPALA TALKS ON NIGERIAN PROBLEM. BEHIND-SCENES TALKS APPARENTLY INVOLVED KAUNDA, OBOTE, DIALLO TELLI, AND (BY TELEPHONE) ARNOLD SMITH.
BURNS

VERIFIED BY IS/R

(2) UNCLASSIFIED

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Authority NND950503
By MNARA Date 10/5/03



POL27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
TR POL16 NIGERIA 48

CONFIDENTIAL 759

PAGE 01 LAGOS 09189 171924Z

87
ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,1070 W

P R 171520Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 626
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMIAFSA
DIA

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 9189

LIMDIS/NOFORN

SUBJECT: NIGERIA AND BIAFRA
REF: ABIDJAN 3086 *POL27 Biafra Nigeria*
TR Pol16 Biafra

1. APPARENTLY HOUPHOUET IS NOT REPEAT NOT ADEQUATELY INFORMED ABOUT NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND ROLE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN PLAYING. BRITISH, HOWEVER, ARE FULLY AWARE OF HOUPHOUET'S VIEWS. BRITISH AMBASSADOR ABIDJAN REPORTED HIS TALK WITH HOUPHOUET ON MAY 15 AS FOLLOWS:

2. "IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA I WAS SUMMONED TO PRESIDENCY. SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND GERMAN AND DUTCH CHARGES WERE ALSO TO MY KNOWLEDGE SUMMONED SEPARATELY. U.S. AMBASSADOR HAD AUDIENCE AT HIS OWN REQUEST.

A. "PRESIDENT SPOKE AT GREAT LENGTH ON LINES OF STATEMENT REPORTED IN PARIS TEL NO. 415 OF WHICH NO DOUBT TEXT IS AVAILABLE IN LONDON, BUT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO SUPPLY OF "ARMS OF THE MOST DEADLY KIND". HE SPOKE WARMLY OF HIS ADMIRATION AND RESPECT FOR BRITAIN, IN PARTICULAR ITS WAR SACRIFICES AND DECONLONISATION RECORD, BUT COULD NOT UNDERSTAND ITS APPARENT INDIFFERENCE TO THE CARNAGE AND HUMAN SUFFERING.

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 09189 171924Z

IN NIGERIA AND ITS AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE SUPPLYING ARMS. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD ASKED THE NIGERIAN REP IN GENEVA TO REPORT THAT THE SENSELESS SLAUGHTER AND DESTRUCTION COULD ONLY BRING ABOUT ECONOMIC DISASTER AND COMMUNISM. HE WAS AWARE OF THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RECOGNITION BUT FELT THAT SUCH A GESTURE AFTER 11 MONTHS OF FAILING TO HALT THE CIVIL WAR WAS THE ONLY REMAINING WAY OF IMPRESSING THE FEDERAL GOVT WITH THE HUMAN CONCERN FELT BY AFRICANS AT THE CONTINUATION OF SLAUGHTER. HE ENDED BY ASKING ME TO TRANSMIT TO HMG HIS PERSONAL PLEA THAT THE LATTER SHOULD (A) PUBLICLY CALL FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND (B) REFUSE TO SUPPLY FURTHER ARMS. BIAFRA WAS NOW CUT OFF AND COULD NO LONGER IMPORT ARMS AND FURTHER SUPPLIES TO THE FEDERAL GOVT WERE UNNECESSARY AND UNJUSTIFIABLE.

B. "I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF OUR TEL UNDER REF ECHOING AS FAR AS POSSIBLE THE PRESIDENT'S HUMANITARIAN APPROACH. I EXPLAINED THE POINTS MADE IN PARA 2 OF YOUR TEL 89 AND HANDED HIM A FURTHER COPY OF LORD SHEPHERD'S STATEMENT. SOME DISCUSSION ENSUED OF THE VARIOUS POINTS RAISED. THE PRESIDENT RECOGNISED HMG'S DILEMMA AND THE DELICACY OF THEIR POSITION VIS A VIS INDEPENDENT COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES. HE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT THE TIME HAD COME WHEN THEY COULD NO LONGER STAND ON THE SIDELINES. THE ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT THE AUDIENCE WAS FRIENDLY AND RELAXED THOUGH THE PRESIDENT DID NOT CONCEAL HIS INTENSE EMOTIONAL ENGAGEMENT".

3. BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS AUTHORIZED DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS TO COMMENT ON NIGERIAN SITUATION ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. "YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO DENY EXAGGERATED REPORTS ABOUT BRITISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, IN PARTICULAR THAT WE HAVE SUPPLIED ANY MILITARY AIRCRAFT OR AERIAL BOMBS, OR THAT BRITISH SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN SENT TO FIGHT IN NIGERIA."

B. "WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE KAMPALA TALKS COULD BE DAMAGED IF BIAFRA IS RECOGNISED BY COUNTRIES IN ADDITION TO TANZANIA, GABON AND THE IVORY COAST. FURTHER RECOGNITION

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PAGE 03 LAGOS 09189 171924Z

AT THIS JUNCTURE MIGHT STIFFEN THE BIAFRAN ATTITUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND MIGHT ENCOURAGE THOSE ON THE FEDERAL SIDE WHO WOULD PREFER TO SEEK A MILITARY SOLUTION RATHER THAN NEGOTIATE. THIS WOULD BE REVERSE OF WHAT WE AND PRESUMABLY BIAFRA'S FRIENDS WISH TO SEE, NAMELY THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE END TO THE WAR".

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

~~TOP SECRET~~

L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

Screener

POST Lagos
SERIAL 9189

(Time Received)
1968 MAY 17 PM 6 27

DISTRIBUTION		MONTHLY COUNT
<u>Secretariat</u>	<u>Geographic</u>	<u>Other</u>
S/S-S	AF5 <u>X5</u>	ACDA5
S/S-O	ARA9	AID/EXSEC3
S/S-Screener	EA11	AA/AFR2
S/S-EX	EUR9 <u>✓9</u>	AA/VN2
S/S-CMS	NEA7 <u>7</u>	AA/EA2
S/S-O DIR		AA/NESA2
MilRep		
Summary		
Task Force		
<u>Principals</u>	<u>Functional</u>	<u>PC</u>
ES2	CU	
S	E2	
U	H	
M2	IGA	
G	INR6 <u>✓6</u>	
SIG	IO4	AEC3
S/AH3	L2	AGR3
S/AL	O3	COM2
S/C	OPR	EXIM
S/CPR	OC	FRB
S/GOV	SY	LAB
S/IL	WLG	NASA
S/P	P2	NIC
S/R	SCA	STR
S/FW	SCS	TRANS
S/PM	SCI	TRSY6
M/WP		JUS
G/PM	OTHER AGENCIES	IRS
G/DP	WH10 <u>✓10</u>	INT
	CIA F	BOB
	DOD	FBI
	USIA4 <u>✓4</u>	CEA
	NSA	FAA
		File
		Burned

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 Authority VND959503
 By MNARA Date 10/5/05



37

POL 16 BIAFRA
Department of State *X* TELEGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA ^{2d}

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PAGE 01 TUNIS 04510 171530Z

50
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, TO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, RSR 01, 112 W

R 171400Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5383
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LONDON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TUNIS 4510

SUBJ: RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA?

1. ALTHOUGH TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT HAS LONG DEPLORED TRAGEDY OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, OFFICIAL ACTION OF MAY 17 OFFERED HINT THAT GOT MIGHT BE RE-THINKING ITS POLICY TOWARD NIGERIA. EDITORIAL NOTES THAT BIAFRAN RESISTANCE HAS DRAWN WORLD ATTENTION AND IS CONTINUALLY EARNING GREATER SYMPATHY. PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES SAID BY L'ACTION TO BE RELATIVE GIVEN HORRIBLE NATURE OF NIGERIAN WAR. ISSUE IS MORAL ONE IN WHICH MILLIONS OF LIVES ARE AT STAKE. RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA BY TANZANIA, GABON, AND IVORY COAST IS PROTEST AGAINST THIS MASSACRE. PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S REMARKS AT OTTAWA MAY 10 THAT ONE CANNOT REST WITH FOLDED ARMS QUOTED BY EDITORIAL. ALTHOUGH PLANNED NEGOTIATIONS AT KAMPALA SEEM AS HOPEFUL SIGN, EDITORIAL CONCLUDES BY WARNING LAGOS THAT IN WHITE AFRICA AS WELL AS IN BLACK AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE OPINION IS BEGINNING TO BE AROUSED AND INTERNATIONAL CONSCIENCE CANNOT ALWAYS BE CHALLENGED WITH IMPUNITY.

2
BUREAU OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

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By MNARA Date 10/3/05

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERA

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17 MAY 68 20 16z
16 BIAFRA

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ABIDJAN

Info:

INFO: Amembassy ACCRA

- " ADDIS ABABA
- " COTONOU
- " DAKAR
- " DAR ES SALAAM
- " KAMPAIA
- " KINSHASA
- " LAGOS
- " LOME
- " LUSAKA
- " NIAMEY
- " OUAGADOUGOU
- " PARIS
- " LONDON

STATE

REF: Abidjan 3086, State 164142

1. In next meeting with Houphouet, guidance supplied State ref has particular point, in view his requests to you. You should dwell on US view that Nigerian problem is essentially African responsibility. At same time, US realizes each side feels ~~national~~ existence at stake and strong emotions create no mood to accept well-intended advice even from Africans. ~~Hexahedron GOI Exappx rachexxx~~
Regret that ~~Exitixix~~/US initiative such as he proposes does not appear propitious. We have quietly made known to Nigerians our deep concern over bloodshed, but under circumstances do not believe we can usefully assume essentially African role of seeking to influence non-African powers to intercede with FMG.

2. US has been deeply troubled by expanding refugee problem on both sides

Drafted by:

AFW:RMMelbourne:emb 5/17/68

Tel. Ext.

2619

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd

Clearances:

AFCW - Mr. Schaufele

WOH/DRC - Mr. Tripp (substance)

FORM DS-322
8-65

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to

Amembassy ABIDJAN

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[of fighting lines and has become very active in humanitarian efforts. Private (non-
Title II) contributions for Nigerian relief of food, clothing medicine and cash have
reached \$1.1 million by American registered Voluntary Agencies. Like contributions to
Biafra from same sources amounted to \$931,000 including \$115,000 charter aircraft cost.
American Red Cross also working closely with ICRC. FMG tacitly has approved ICRC
flights which have taken place into Biafra on understanding these ICRC ~~responsibility~~ responsi-
bility and undertaken at ICRC risk. Emergency Title II food program of \$1.1 million
approved by AID for FMG area, including FMG controlled areas of Biafra, and to be
administered by Catholic Relief Services. US studying what further expanded measures
may be taken.

3. While our own noninvolvement in supply of arms known to Houphouet, it also should be
recalled to him that US publicly deplored great power involvement in conflict which
Soviet arms sales precipitated. It might be helpful in this respect if you gave him
copy of our statement of August 21, 1967 and remind him that we have yet to hear any
African country speak out re this unfortunate interference. Soviets gained considerable
prestige and concrete advantage with Nigerian people by these sales. Since then, FMG
has been obtaining arms from various Western sources, as have Biafrans. In view this
two-sided traffic and US noninvolvement policy, it in no position to intercede with
foreign suppliers.


4. Although we appreciate motivations leading Houphouet take this step, believe it most
important that he be given US position, our doubts that further diplomatic recognitions
of Biafra may moderate conflict, and our evaluation of military situation. FYI. We
do not exclude possibility that GOIC and France would not be too unhappy if economic

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy ABIDJAN

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[power in West Africa represented by United Nigeria were somewhat diluted by breakup or weakening of Federation. END FYI.]

END


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FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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Intelligence
Note - 358

May 17, 1968

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *H.C.D.H.*
Subject: IVORY COAST: Recognizes Biafra

President Houphouet-Boigny's reasons for recognizing Biafra (May 14) are in part those of the two African Presidents who beat him to it--Tanzania's Julius Nyerere and Gabon's Albert Bongo--but there are also differences because of Houphouet's conception of his role on the African stage.

POL 11 BIAFRA
K POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XPOL 151/IV CST

Painful Decision. Like other African chiefs of state, Houphouet went along with the OAU summit decision of September 1967 to condemn Biafran secession and give Nigeria a free hand in checking it. He probably hoped, along with most of them, that Nigeria would meet its self-imposed (and carelessly announced) deadline of March 31 for defeating Biafra, and thus permit a page to be turned. He respected the pro-Nigerian stance of his four Entente associates (Dahomey, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta), all neighbors or near neighbors of Nigeria. When on April 22 he praised Nyerere's April 13 recognition of Biafra, he coupled his threat to do the same with a fervent plea for an end to the bloodshed and early peace talks. Ivory Coast's recognition comes at a time when the Nigerian military encirclement of Biafra is tightening while peace talks appear deadlocked.

A Political Gesture. Houphouet's chief aim, like that of Nyerere and Bongo, is to promote peace in Nigeria by seeking to redress in Biafra's favor the balance that Nigeria's growing military advantage is tilting

(3)
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Authority *ND 959503*
By *MARINA* Date *05/05*

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XR POL 17 NIGERIA - THE CONGO

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Kigali 1560
5-16-68

PAGE 01 KIGALI P1560 160948Z

20
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DCODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 26, RSR 41

/140 W

R 160900Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 797
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 1560

1. NIGERIAN AMB TO KINSHASA (BAYERO) PAID COURTESY CALL TODAY.
SAID HE VISITED KAMPALA WHERE OBOTE TOOK POSITION OF NON-
INTERFERENCE IN NIGERIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS RE BIAFRA. AMB MOST
GRATIFIED THIS POSITION. SAID FORMER AMB TO US MARTIN WOULD
BE GOING KAMPALA FOR NIGERIAN-BIAFRAN CONFERENCE AS HE ALSO
FORMER AMB IN EAST AFRICA AND KNOWS PRINCIPALS INVOLVED.

2. BAYERO MET WITH PRES KAYIBANDA YESTERDAY AND RECEIVED
PROMISE RWANDA WOULD NOT RPT NOT CHANGE POSITION ON NON-INTERFERENCE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NIGERIA.

3. HE PROCEEDING BUJUMBURA BY TOMORROW'S JET.

GP-3
KINSEY

REFURBISHED BY USA

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 YAOUNDÉ 00815 161609Z

51
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07,
LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28.

RSR 010/148 W

028627

R 161100Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3228
INFO RUTAHN/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 101
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BANGUI
AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE YAOUNDE 815

SUBJ: PRES AHIDJO'S PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS ON NIGERIA

1. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD IN BAMENDA, WEST CAMEROON, ON MAY 9, AT THE CONCLUSION OF A 3 DAY TOUR OF WEST CAMEROON, PRES AHIDJO MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS ABOUT THE NIGERIAN CONFLICT:

"IN THAT WHICH CONCERN CAMEROON AND CONCERN ME, AS LONG AS I AM THE HEAD OF THE CAMEROON GOVT, THERE WILL NEVER BE A QUESTION OF CAMEROON RECOGNIZING THE SECESSIONIST STATE OF NIGERIA, WHICH CALLS ITSELF BIAFRA, TODAY OR TOMORROW, OR (RECOGNIZING) ANOTHER STATE OR ANOTHER REGION WHICH WILL CALL ITSELF BY ANY OTHER NAME. I THINK, WITHOUT CONDEMNING THEM, THAT THOSE WHO HAVE RECOGNIZED BIAFRA MUST HAVE THEIR REASONS, BUT THEY HAVE NOT RENDERED A SERVICE TO NIGERIA OR TO THE SECESSIONIST REGION. THE PROBLEM OF THE CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA IS A SAD PROBLEM FOR ALL AFRICANS AND TO RESOLVE IT REQUIRES RECIPROCAL UNDERSTANDING AND COMPROMISE, COMPROMISE WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF ONE UNITED NIGERIA. THERE"

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CANNOT BE A DEFINITIVE SECESSION OF ONE PART OF NIGERIA. THE CIVIL WAR CAN LAST 5-10 YEARS, NIGERIANS SUFFER AND DIE BUT THERE WILL NEVER BE A STATE OF BIAFRA."

2. THE PRES. THEN COMMENTED THAT HIS POSITION ON NIGERIA HAD BEEN CRITICIZED BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CAMEROON AND PEOPLE HAVE EXPLAINED HIS REASON IS FEAR FOR CAMEROON WHICH IS SO DIVERSE AND HAS TWO STATES. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE CRITICS DID NOT KNOW CAMEROON VERY WELL AS THERE IS NO ATTEMPT AT SECESSION IN CAMEROON. IF HE DID HAVE ANY FEAR FOR HIS COUNTRY, IT WOULD BE A NORMAL FEAR FOR ANY HEAD OF STATE OF SOUND MIND AND WORTHY OF THE NAME. CANNOT ADMIT THAT ONE PART OF HIS COUNTRY CAN SECEDER.

3. IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER QUESTION ON THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE IN NIGERIA, AHIDJO REITERATED THAT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AMONG ALL NIGERIANS - EAST, WEST, NORTH - AND A RECONCILIATION AMONG THEMSELVES IS THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE WAR. HE FURTHER STATED THAT IN MONROVIA AS WELL AS IN CAMEROON HE HAD MADE, IS MAKING AND WILL MAKE HIS MODEST CONTRIBUTION TO EFFECT SUCH A RECONCILIATION.

4. COMMENT: THE ABOVE STATEMENT ON THE NIGERIAN SITUATION IS EVEN STRONGER THAN THE STATEMENT AHIDJO MADE AT GAROUA AND SHOWS A DEFINITE DEPARTURE FROM HIS PREVIOUS POSITION. SINCE THE INITIATION OF THE CIVIL WAR, AHIDJO SUPPORTED THE FEDERAL NIGERIAN GOVT. AND COMPLETELY REJECTED THE IDEA OF SECESSION BUT HE HAS AVOIDED PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF BIAFRA. FOUR POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE CHANGE CAME TO MIND:

A. AHIDJO COULD BE RESPONDING TO INTERNAL PRESSURE FROM THE MOSLEM NORTH AGAINST HIS LIMITED SUPPORT FOR HIS NEIGHBORING MUSLEM BROTHERS.

B. GROWING SYMPATHY FOR BIAFRA IN WEST CAMEROON, PARTICULARLY IN THE BAMENDA AREA WHICH WAS THE SCENE OF AN IBO RIOT LAST YEAR. EXTRA SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN DURING THE VISIT MAY HAVE BEEN BASED ON RUMORED OR ANTICIPATED TROUBLE FROM THE IBO COMMUNITY.

C. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE INTRANSIGENT BIAFRAN POSITION THAT CAUSED THE FAILURE OF THE RECENT MONROVIA CONCOM MEETING.

D. AHIDJO, ON THE BASIS OF RECENT EVENTS, I.E., RENEWED FMG OFFENSIVE, RESIGNATION OF DE GAULLE, AND THE ADVENT OF A NEW FRENCH GOVT, IS NOW CERTAIN THAT BIAFRA CANNOT WIN AND, THEREFORE, HE NO LONGER FEELS IMPELLED TO STRADDLE THE FENCE OR PLAY IT-SAFE.

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S. THIS LATEST PUBLIC STATEMENT CONFIRMS AHIDJO'S HARDENING POSITION IN FAVOR OF THE FMG, REPORTED AT THE CONCOM MEETING, AND MAKES IT IMPROBABLE THAT HE WILL BE MORE THAN MILDLY INTERESTED IN OTHER CONCOM ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THAT NIGERIAN PROBLEM, DESPITE HIS STATEMENT THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR RECONCILIATION. PAYTON

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POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ABIDJA 03091 161029Z

19
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15,CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,

P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,SUSIA 12,SAH 03,AID 28,IO 13,PC 04,NIC 0
SCS 04,SCA 02,RSR 01,151 W

R 160840Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2410
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
RUTAOD/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 427
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 3091

REF# ABIDJAN 3086 — *pe 27 P* *pe 16 Biafra*

SUBJ: NIGERIA AND BIAFRA

THIRD SENTENCE OF PARA 3 SHOULD READ "...PEACEFUL POLITICAL
SOLUTION."

GP-4
MORGAN

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 712

PAGE 01 LAGOS 09160 161842Z

53
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 23, AID 28, PC 04, SA 01, ACDA 16,

IO 13, RSR 01, /161 W

P R 161630Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 612
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
RUTAOD/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 391
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFA
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L L A G O S 9160

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN ARMY CAPTURES FOUR TOWNS IN
"BIAFRA" CLOSE TO PORT HARCOURT

1. NIGERIAN MININFO RELEASED THIS AFTERNOON FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT:
2. "THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS TODAY ANNOUNCED

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Authority	NID 950503
By	MN
NARA Date 10/5/03	



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LAGOS 09160 161842Z

THAT LIBERATION OF MANY STRATEGIC PLACES AROUND PORT HARCOURT. THE PLACES SO FAR LIBERATED ARE THE FOLLOWING: OKRIKA; ALETU; OBIGBO; AND ELELENWA.

A. "THE OIL REFINERY AT OKRIKA IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SLIGHTLY DAMAGED BY THE REBELS. AND EVER SINCE THE CAPTURE OF OKRIKA THE REBELS HAVE BEEN TRYING, BY HIGH ALTITUDE HELICOPTER BOMBING, TO DO MORE DAMAGE TO THE REFINERY. BUT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. THE MORALE OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS HAS BEEN VERY HIGH AND THE TROOPS ARE MAKING GOOD PROGRESS".

3. TOWNS LISTED WERE CAPTURED SEVERAL DAYS AGO BUT FMG, ACCORDING UWS USUAL CAUTIOUS PRACTICE, DID NOT ANNOUNCE UNTIL ABSOLUTELY SURE THOSE PLACES FIRMLY UNDER ITS CONTROL.

4. VARIOUS RELIABLE SOURCES TODAY INDICATE THAT PORT HARCOURT ITSELF IS UNDER ATTACK FROM ARTILLERY AS WELL AS PLANES. BY SEIZING OBIGBO, AND BRIDGE THERE OVER IMO RIVER, FMG HAS CUT MAIN ROAD BETWEEN PH AND ABA.

5. "BIAFRANS" HAVE NOW LOST (A) MAJOR ELECTRIC POWER PLANT AT AFAM, NORTHEAST OF OKRIKA, WHICH WAS LAST SUCH PLANT IN AREA CONTROLLED BY REBELS; (B) OIL REFINERY AT OKRIKA, WHICH WAS ONLY MEANS PRODUCING GASOLINE IN REBEL AREA; AND (C) USE OF AIRPORT NORTH OF PH, WHICH WAS ONLY FIELD THAT COULD TAKE LARGE PLANES IN REBEL AREA. WITH THESE LOSSES ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CONDITIONS WITHIN "BIAFRA" LIKELY BECOME CRITICAL VERY SOON.

6. IN LIGHT FOREGOING MILITARY GAINS BY FMG, QUESTION RAISED BY NIGERIAN OFFICIAL IN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS BECOMES RELEVANT. YESTERDAY THIS OFFICIAL PRIVATELY LAUGHED AND ASKED FOR DEFINITION OF "BIAFRA" WHICH IVORY COAST RECOGNIZED. HE WONDERED IF HOUPHOUET AND OTHERS REALIZE THAT REBELS ARE NOW IN PHYSICAL CONTROL OF ONLY ONE-THIRD OF AREA OF FORMER EASTERN REGION WHICH SECEDED IN MAY, 1967.

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Authority NID 959503
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ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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A-625 UNCLASSIFIED

TO : Department of State

INFO : ABIDJAN, ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, COTONOU, DAR ES SALAAM, DAKAR, FORT LAMY, IBADAN, KADUNA, KAMPAIA, KINSHASA, LOME, MONROVIA, NAIROBI, NIAMEY, OUAGADOUGOU, YAOUNDE, CINCPRIEST/CINCMIAFSA, DIA

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

DATE: May 16, 1968

SUBJECT: Aluko Answers World Council of Churches

REF :

Enclosed is the full text of a letter written by Professor S. A. Aluko to the Secretary of the World Council of Churches in Geneva, as it appeared in the Lagos Sunday Post of May 12, 1968.

Samuel A. Aluko is Professor of Economics and Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, at the University of Ife in the Western State of Nigeria. He is also currently a member of SASP (Specialized Assistance to Social Projects) of the World Council of Churches. As he mentions in his letter, he was formerly a professor of economics at Nsukka University in Eastern Nigeria and was intimately acquainted with many Ibo leaders, including Col. Ojukwu, before the Eastern Region seceded as "Biafra." After the massacre of Ibos in northern Nigeria in October, 1966, the Eastern Region government forced non-Easterners to leave and Aluko, who is a Yoruba, also had to depart, even though he was an adviser to Ojukwu. He is one of Nigeria's best known economists and a man generally highly considered by his fellow Nigerians.

which
Aluko's letter is an answer to various Christian church groups/have criticised the Nigerian Federal Government's war to end the rebellion and tend to accept pro-"Biafran" propaganda. In particular, it is a reply to the joint appeal of the Vatican and the World Council of Churches which was issued on March 20, 1968 in Rome and Geneva, and called for an immediate end to the Nigerian war.

Enclosure: *all m.m.*
Text of Prof. Aluko's letter written
to the World Council of Churches

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Drafted by:


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
Aluko makes several points which are worth noting. As a friend of many Ibos, he tried to prevent secession. He says "it is not true that the Ibos are the Jews of Nigeria being persecuted and unwanted." He points out that in the civilian regime Ibos gained many jobs "out of proportion to their number or merit" and that "Ibo leaders themselves are not without great blame" for the "iniquities of Nigeria." He is "convinced that if 'Biafra' is allowed to secede, both Nigeria and 'Biafra' will go and rearm for the ultimate conflict."

Aluko calls on the World Council to urge reconciliation "within an integrated union" and points out that "there are more Christians in Nigeria outside 'Biafra' than within 'Biafra.'" Of the six Nigerians in executive or advisory positions in the World Council of Churches who attended their 1966 Geneva Conference, "five of us are not 'Biafran,' only Sir Francis Ibiham is a 'Biafran,' and he is married to a Yoruba woman." He emphasizes that many Christians in Nigeria "fully support the keeping of Nigeria together, particularly under the new twelve states structure which some of us, including many Ibos, had been advocating since the 1950's." He asserts Ojukwu once told him there would be no peace in Nigeria until there were at least 15 states. He concludes that those who love the Ibos and their fellow Nigerians should persuade Ojukwu to negotiate on the basis of the reintegration of Nigeria as one political entity.

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Enclosure 1
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ALUKO Writes Council of Churches

Dear Secretary,

Since the Nigeria - Biafra war, the World Council of Churches, either individually or in conjunction with the Vatican, has taken active interest and concern in seeing an end to the hostilities.

The Council has also made some pronouncements which had appeared to be partisan in favour of "Biafra" and which has been consequently criticised in Nigeria, by both the Military, the Church and the Laity.

I have been angry myself at some of the reported pronouncements of the Council, even though I accept that, as christians we all must show concern and sympathy for the suffering, no matter how the suffering arose.


When I was in London to attend the meeting of the SASP in March, I talked at length to some of the members of the SASP about the situation in Nigeria and I discovered that while Sir Francis Ibiam was in Geneva in December 1967 and again early in 1968, he had a long session with the officials of the Council and also its many leading members in Europe.

Naturally, they were taken in. I gave an account to my colleagues on the SASP in London, and did so as impartially as I could and I had no doubt that they were more informed. I also talked to a number of church dignitaries in London, including Lord Soper, the Vicar of Methodist Church, Kingsway, London, who is a member of the House of Lords and an occasional Chairman of the British - "Biafra" Association in London. I have just sent a long letter to him about the situation.

I am a Yoruba from Western Nigeria. I was the Head of the Department of Economics at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Eastern Nigeria from 1964 until all non-Easterners were asked to leave the East in October, 1966. I was also a very close personal friend of Ojukwu, the Military Governor. Although the enormity of the crises in Nigeria and the killings and subsequent movement of persons and property ought to worry christian conscience, and did worry even the consciences of almost all Nigerians, yet, many of us rightly and religiously believe that the solution is not secession of the East into a "Biafran Republic."

I tried, personally, through October 1966 - July 1967, to appeal to Ojukwu not to take any precipitate action. I travelled to Enugu from here about five times, the last time was in May 1967, in the company of four-man delegation of leading Nigerian members of the National Reconciliation Committee to appeal to the Eastern leaders and Colonel Ojukwu. I wrote many letters and was telephoning Ojukwu almost everyday between October 1966 until the morning when he announced secession. All along he assured many of us his admirers, that he would never secede. Even Dr. Francis Ibiam, his adviser, and a vice president of the World Council of Churches, urged me, on three occasions, to write to appeal to Colonel Ojukwu not to secede and he advised me to meet Ojukwu personally. When Sir Francis was here in Ife on May 15, 1967, he took 22 letters from me to various Eastern leaders, including Ojukwu, appealing for a peaceful solution and the keeping of Nigeria together. He made a public statement here then that there would be no secession.

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When I was going to Jerusalem early in March, 1967 to attend the 1967 SASP meeting, I met Sir Francis at the Lagos Airport and we discussed the matter at greater length. He advised that I should write to Ojukwu from Jerusalem, which I did. I also throughout this period wrote to all the other Military Governors and met almost all of them who promised to see a peaceful solution to the problem. My attitude to the problem is that although the Ibos had suffered deprivations, it was not the whole of Nigeria that inflicted them. It was not even the whole of the North. It is mere propaganda.

Even on March 1, 1967, I appointed as confidential secretary to my department of Economics at Ife here an Ibo stenographer. My colleague, the Professor of Education, who was also Professor of Education at Nsukka until we were expelled, appointed another Ibo as Faculty secretary. Both of them were working with us at Nsukka. When I was in London I had meals in the houses of three of my age-old Ibo senior staff who come from the East Central State, two of whom are still working in the Nigerian High Commissioner in London. My Ibo friends around the world, England, France, Brazil to mention a few write to me amorphously regularly as fellow Nigerians, calling for an end to the crisis and a peaceful re-integration as one country. So, it is not true that the Ibos are the Jews of Nigeria being persecuted and unwanted. In fact, it was partly because the Ibos had had more than their normal entitlement in Nigeria that caused the problem in the North which is the less developed part of Nigeria and which resented the dominance of the Ibos and their contemptuous attitude to the Northerners. Also the Ibo leaders, themselves are not without great blames for all the iniquities of Nigeria. They were dominant in the Federal Government of Nigeria - President, Speaker of Senate, most influential Ministers, vice-chancellor of our two Federal universities, Economic Adviser to the Federal Government, University Professors and leading Permanent Secretaries, all out of proportion to their number or merit, mainly because they formed a political alliance with the Northern based party, when the North had very few qualified people.

That time we in the other parts of the South, who obviously had more qualified and more experienced people than the Ibos had our leaders in the opposition in the Federal Parliament and so were denied even the normal fair entitlements, based on merit. While we condemned carnage and genocide, we feel that a solution can and should be found within the Nigerian Union. After all, the Northern and Western leaders were killed in the Army Mutiny of January, 1966, and there was no threat of secession by them. Also, I am convinced that if "Biafra" is allowed to secede, both Nigeria and "Biafra" will go and rearm for the ultimate conflict. The Western Powers and the Eastern Block will side one against the other, as they are now doing in Vietnam, Germany, Korea and even in India and Pakistan. The lives that will be lost that time will be many times more than what has been lost and is being lost as a result of this crisis. So, it is not christianly also to say "let the two of them live their separate lives" because we should know that it will not be peaceful separate lives. Therefore, it appears to me that the proper role of the Christian and here I am sure, the World Council can help, is to bring a reconciliation between "Biafra" and Nigeria within an integrated union. If those who support "Biafra", hold this view and advise them accordingly, I am quite sure that there will be a thaw in their outlook. Every time they quote the views of the leaders of the World Council of Churches, that "Biafra" be left alone. This is sad, because there are also genuine Christians in Nigeria who tried through delegations, in words and in deeds, to bring about reconciliation and peaceful settlement, and particularly to reassure "Biafra" but who were rebuffed. There are more Christians in Nigeria outside "Biafra" than within "Biafra".

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
Of the six of us, Nigerians, in Executive or Advisory positions in the World Council of Churches, and who attended the 1966 World Council of Churches Conference in Geneva five of us are not "Biafran" only Sir Francis Ibiam is a "Biafran", and he is married to a Yoruba (Western) woman. So, the Nigerian Christians feel a pinch of sadness at some of the side pronouncements from both the Vatican and the World Council. There are not many more sincere friends of the Ibos than some of us in Nigeria. But we fully support the keeping of Nigeria together, particularly under the new twelve States structure which some of us, including many Ibos, had been advocating since the 1960's. Therefore, it is a lie that Major-General Yakubu Gowon, the Head of the Federal Military Government just sat down without consultation and broke Nigeria into twelve States. In fact, the twelve States are the minimum that meet the demands of the many groups in Nigeria. Even right now, there are still demands for further States in the West and in the North. Even in the East while I was there, there were very loud demands for two States in the Ibo areas. The demand for Calabar - Ogoja (now South Eastern State) and the Rivers State (now Rivers State) had been an active political issue since the early 1960's. The voters in the areas had consistently voted against the Government party at Enugu on this basis. So, it is not true to say that all the ethnic groups in the East support secession and are solidly behind Ojukwu. Ojukwu and I used to discuss this till late at night until October 1966 and he himself once told me that he believed that there would be no peace in Nigeria until there were at least 15 States (1) Asaba-Onitsha as one State (2 & 3) other Ibo area broken into 2 States, (4) South Eastern (5) Rivers (6) Midwest, (7) West, (8) Lagos and (9-15) seven States in Northern Nigeria. Now, 12 of his fifteen States had been created.

In fact, more than 90 per cent of Nigerians, apart from the Ibos whose views cannot now be ascertained, are very jubilant, that, at last, we are going to have a country. We also feel that without military decree, the States may never be created, because the three large ethnic groups in Nigeria - Ibos in East, Yorubas in West and Hausa-Fulani in the North would never normally allow their empires to be shrunk if they were asked to vote for States. It was only during 1962-63, when the Yorubas were in disarray, as a result of the crisis in the Western State, that the Mid-West State was created by the combined forces of the East and North in 1963. But for the opportunity, that State would never have been created. If we vote, the Yorubas would have rigged the election which they would have supervised, and would have proved that the Mid-Westerners wanted no State.

As a Yoruba man myself, I know that the non-Yorubas in the Mid-West did not want to be in the same State with us, but whenever we told those in power in the West, they usually regarded a few of us as unpatriotic and traitorous who were supporting the shrinkage of the Yoruba domain, while the Ibos held their own minorities tightly and also the Hausa-Fulani in the North were not letting their minorities go. Such were the unrealities and selfishness of the era. The new era cannot be based on that, nor can we accept the Ibo claim for referendum (that will be supervised and rigged by them) to determine whether the non-Ibos wanted separate States within the Nigerian Union. We are all sure that they do want their States and should have them.

I have written at such great length to let you know that many of the "Biafran" propaganda and those of their mentors are false and meant to cast wool on the eyes of their foreign sympathisers. Those who love the Ibos and their fellow Nigerians should bend their energies towards the re-integration of Nigeria as a political entity and persuade Ojukwu to negotiate on that basis. Any other alternative is the road to ruin.

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I can see no fears for any law-abiding group in Nigeria, with the present State structures, which are subject to modifications and adjustments. The Ibos are welcome into Nigeria. Many thousands of them are living with us and the sympathy for them is now more than it ever was. There are Ibo lecturers at this University and at the University of Ibadan. The Administrator for the Federal controlled Ibo areas - Mr. Ukpabi Asika - was a lecturer in Political Science at Ibadan, there are three others still lecturing there. Those who had fled will be welcome. I shall gladly appoint qualified Ibos in my department and Faculty.

I have no doubt that the present war will continue until we either all Nigerians or all Biafrans. In spite of its tragedies this is the overwhelming view of Nigerians who believe that all those who side "Biafran" secession, whether they be Tanzania or Christians of the World Council of Churches or of Vatican are only imperialist agents wishing to see puppet States which will be for ever, the football of the Western imperialists, who while actively planning for the integration of the separate European Communities - in spite of two world wars among them - are now supporting disintegration in Nigeria.

Immediately after the Army take-over in 1966, it was the Western Powers and radio that first described the coup as an Ibo coup, even when Nigerians of all tribes were jubilating. Later, these propaganda seeped in and with the constant British and American Press commentaries that the Northerners must hit back to revenge the loss of their leaders, the Northerners rose in May and July 1966. These Press turned round and termed it 'pogrom' and an attempt to exterminate the Ibos through genocide and that the Ibos could no longer live in peace with the other Nigerians, even though no Westerner, Midwesterner or Lagos people - all Nigerians also killed a single Ibo. I know that many of the Christians are not aware of all the facts and that they are moved by genuine Christians sympathies.


My suggestions are that the World Council of Churches should:

- (a) Make all efforts to persuade Ojukwu and his supporters to agree to be part of Nigeria on guarantee of pardon and safety for the main leaders of the "Biafra" Army and leaders.
- (b) Contact Major-General Gowon to be prepared to meet Ojukwu and his supporters to negotiate the basis of togetherness, based on (a) above.
- (c) Appeal to all Nigerians, including "Biafrans" to agree to live together again as brothers and sisters.
- (d) See that the war is ended and reconstruction commence with all the friends of Nigeria abroad assisting us to carry out the costly reconstruction.

While I do not expect you to reply with same length as I have written, I should be pleased to read from you and I promise to keep in constant touch with you until I see you in Upsalla in July.

Yours sincerely

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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NIGERIA

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

HANLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : ACCRA, BONN, DAKAR, FREETOWN, BUDAPEST, KADUNA, KAMPALA, IBADAN, LONDON, MONROVIA, MOSCOW, PARIS, TOKYO

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

DATE: May 16, 1968

SUBJECT: Declarations of Support for FMG

REF :

During the past week, Nigerian news media have published or broadcast several items containing information about demonstrations or declarations of support for the Nigerian Federal Military Government (FMG) and the 12-state system by groups of Nigerians from the former Eastern Region, who are living abroad. The region which seceded as "Biafra" has been divided by the FMG into three states: the South Eastern State and part of the Rivers State have been liberated by Federal forces; nearly half of the East Central (Ibo) State is also held by the FMG. Many of the articles are based on Nigerian government press releases. A roundup of these articles follows:

1. Japan. A press release of the FMG carried complete in the May 15 Morning Post, stated that in Tokyo a group of Nigerian students and residents from the two states (South Eastern and Rivers) delivered a message to their ambassador and requested him "to convey their wishes to remain within the federation, denouncing Ojukwu and his regime."

2. Liberia. The same release stated that in Monrovia, a group from the same two states sent a resolution to Major General Gowon pledging their loyalty to the FMG and support for "the division of Nigeria into 12 states which are autonomous and which we consider and sincerely believe is the only way which Nigeria could be kept as a stable and harmonious state."

3. Senegal. In Dakar, according to the same article, seven representatives of Rivers and South Eastern states origin and residing in Senegal called at the Nigerian Embassy to oppose those nations who by

Decontrol following May 16, 1968

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5/16/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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 Authority NID 950/503
 By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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recognizing Biafra were leaving the five million members of the minority tribes subject to "Ibo domination."

4. United States. A Nigerian government press release of May 13, described a demonstration held, according to the release, over the weekend in Washington, D. C. by students from the South Eastern and Rivers states in support of the FMG. A letter delivered to the Nigerian Ambassador declared the students' support for 12 states,^a for the early defeat of the rebels who, according to the letter, are equivalent to Ibos. This item appeared in the press and was carried on television May 15.

5. Sierra Leone. According to another government press release, in Freetown on May 13 a joint resolution drafted by the South Eastern State Union and the Rivers State Union was presented to the Nigerian High Commissioner. The resolution supported the 12-state formula and asserted that they had wanted their own states for some time. This item was also read on the May 15 television broadcast.

6. The Netherlands. In The Hague, ^apress release asserts that "Nigerian students of South Eastern and Rivers states origin staged a peaceful demonstration yesterday (May 14), watched by hundreds of people." The release adds that a note protesting the recognition of Biafra was delivered to the Tanzanian Embassy and one of support was left at the Nigerian Embassy.

7. United Kingdom. Nigerian television in the evening news broadcast of May 15, carried pictures of a large pro-FMG demonstration in London.

8. Hungary. Under the caption "More Nigerians Support Federal Government," the government-owned Morning Post of May 16 published an article in which twenty-four students in Hungary were said to have pledged their support to the FMG in a letter sent to Major General Gowon. The students wrote they had donated drugs through the Hungarian Red Cross Society.

9. Ghana. The May 13 New Nigerian stated that Radio Ghana had broadcast the news of a demonstration in Accra by people of Central Eastern State origin (implying they were Ibos) in support of the FMG. The same newspaper stated that students from South Eastern and Rivers states at the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana, had written a letter to General Ankrah opposing the interference of Tanzania and Gabon in the internal affairs of Nigeria.

10. USSR. The May 13 New Nigerian also stated that on May 12, 20 students from the former Eastern Region demonstrated in support of the FMG before the Nigerian Embassy in Moscow.

11. West Germany. Nigeria's Ambassador to West Germany made a statement on May 14 in response to a protest letter delivered by Dr. Ephraim Nseabasi Bassey, representative of the South Eastern and Rivers states in West Germany. Ambassador Haastrup, according to the FMG press release, emphasized FMG support for the 12-state formula.

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
The overall impression given in Nigeria by the reporting of this barrage of demonstrations is one of widespread support for the FMG. At a time when discussions between the Federal Government and "Biafra" representatives have been taking place in London, the Nigerian press and government seem particularly eager to show that the FMG enjoys considerable support from members of the minority tribes in the Eastern states. The publicity given to these groups of eastern Nigerians, who are opposed to the secessionist government, is obviously aimed at strengthening the FMG's public image at home and abroad.

It is easy to speculate that these demonstrations were not entirely spontaneous. The fact that they have taken place on four continents seems like too much of a coincidence. Yet it is not surprising that the minority tribes should be particularly concerned about their future in Nigeria as negotiations are to begin in Kampala, on a substantive peace settlement.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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S E C R E T PARIS 14066

NOFORN:

SUBJ: FRENCH AIRCREWS FOR BIAFRA RUN

REF: LISBON DAO MSG DTG 071700 MAY 68

1. REFERENCE MESSAGE JUST SEEN BY EMBASSY HERE. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF REPORT, IT CONFORMS TO PAST PATTERN. FRENCH USE AFRICAN STATES (E.G. GABON) AS COVER FOR MONKEY BUSINESS. CAPTURE OF PORT HARCOURT AIRFIELD BY FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT (LAGOS 9072) MAY MAKE REPORTED FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN AIRLIFT ACADEMIC RATHER THAN REAL. NEVERTHELESS WE ARE INTERESTED IN CONFIRMING REPORT IF POSSIBLE.

2. SUGGEST REFERENCE MESSAGE BE REPEATED TO EMBASSY OR DAO ABIDJAN WHERE MILITARY OR AVIATION SOURCES MAY BE ABLE TO CONFIRM OR DENY ITS ACCURACY.

GPA-10 SHRIVER

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Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria

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By MNARA Date 05/05



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION: AF: 15:

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SCS 04, SCA 02, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, 151 W

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AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC

C O N F I D E N T I A L : A B I D J A N 0 8 6

REF: STATE 164142 (NOTAL)

SUBJ: NIGERIA AND BIAFRA

1. MY PLANS FOR TOUR D'HORIZON WITH HOUPNOUET WERE OVERTAKEN TODAY BY HIS SUMMONING ME FOR BRIEF AUDIENCE DURING WHICH HE MADE FORMAL DEMARCHE ON NIGERIA. SAID HE HAD NEVER BELIEVED NIGERIAN FEDERATION VIABLE BECAUSE OF DEEP TRIBAL DIFFERENCES. WHEN CIVIL WAR DREW NEAR HE HAD TRIED SECRETLY THROUGH TUBMAN AND AFTER WAR BROKE OUT THROUGH DAU TO SECURE PEACEFUL SOLUTION. MORE RECENTLY IN GENEVA HE HAD TWICE TALKED WITH FNG REPRESENTATIVES IN EFFORT TO GET THEM OFFER REASONABLE COMPROMISE, BUT WITHOUT

(2) MICROFILMED BY RS CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND9501503
By MNARA Date 10/5/03



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ABIDJA 03086 171142Z

SUCCESS. FINALLY HE HAD TAKEN PUBLIC POSITION, INCLUDING RECOGNITION BIAFRA, IN EFFORT TO MOBILIZE AFRICAN OPINION, FORCE IT TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SITUATION DEEPLY DAMAGING TO ALL. THE LONGER THE KILLING GOES ON, THE MORE DIFFICULT THE DAMAGE WILL BE TO REPAIR. CONTINUED BLOODSHED PLAYS SOLELY INTO HANDS OF COMMUNISTS, AND OF SOUTH AFRICANS AND PORTUGUESE WHO CITE IT AS JUSTIFICATION THEIR POLICIES TOWARD BLACKS. HOUPHOUET CONTRASTED US HUMANE CONCERN TO CONCENTRATE ON MILITARY TARGETS IN VIETNAM WITH INDISCRIMINATE BOMBING OF CIVILIANS IN BIAFRA. SAID HIS VIEWS ON NEED TO STOP WAR NOW SHARED BY NEIGHBORING AFRICAN STATES WHO FOR SPECIAL REASONS UNABLE TAKE PUBLIC POSITION.

2. HOUPHOUET SAID HE WANTED USG TO UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR WHAT HE HAD DONE BECAUSE OF OUR CONTINUING CLOSE RELATIONS. IN ADDITION REQUESTED USG TO USE ITS BEST INFLUENCE TO GET BRITISH PERSUADE FNGL STOP MASSACRE OF CIVILIANS AND LET RED CROSS ENTER BIAFRA WITH FOOD AND MEDICAL CARE. ALSO ASKED WE INFLUENCE BRITISH AND DUTCH TO STOP SUPPLYING ARMS. SAID HE FELT FACT THAT SOVIETS SUPPLYING ARMS WAS INVALID EXCUSE. WESTERN ARMS MAKE MATTERS WORSE, AND DO SERIOUS HARM TO WESTERN POSITION IN AFRICAN EYES.

3. GIVEN BREVITY OF INTERVIEW I WAS UNABLE USE MUCH OF GUIDANCE IN REFTEL, WHICH I NEVERTHELESS GREATLY APPRECIATE, AND HOPE USE MORE EXTENSIVELY DURING TOUR D'HORIZON WITH HOUPHOUET NEXT WEEK. DID HOWEVER MANAGE INSERT FOLLOWING POINTS: WE HAVE DENIED ARMS BOTH SIDES. WE AGREE RE DISTRESS AT BLOODSHED AND HOPE FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL SITUATION. AFRICAN STATES HAVE MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY IN CREATING FAVORABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE. HOUPHOUET MADE NO RPT NO REFERENCE TO OUR VIEWS ON RECOGNITION BIAFRA; SO I DID NOT RPT NOT RAISE.

4. WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR DEPT'S RPLY, HOWEVER PROVISIONAL, TO REQUEST PARA 2 ABOVE IN TIME TO CONVEY TO HOUPHOUET EARLY NEXT WEEK.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND950503
By MNARA Date 10/5/03



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ABIDJA 03086 151946Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15ARSR 01, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, DOD 01, IO 13, AID 28, PC 04, SAH 03,

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R 151620Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2407
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
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AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMMBASSY PARIS 444
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 3086

REF# STATE 164142 (NOTAL)

SUBJ# NIGERIA AND BIAFRA

1. MY PLANS FOR TOUR DR ORIZON WITH HOUPNOUET WERE OVERTAKEN TODAY BY HIS SUMMONING ME FOR BRIEF AUDIENCE DURING WHICH HE MADE FORMAL DEMARCHE ON NIGERIA. SAID HE HAD NEVER BELIEVED NIGERIAN FEDERATION VIABLE BECAUSE OF DEEP TRIBAL DIFFERENCES. WHEN CIVIL WAR DREW NEAR HE HAD TRIED SECRETLY THROUGH TUBMAN, AND AFTER WAR BROKE OUT RHOUGH OW, TO SECURE PEACEFUL SOLUTION. MORE RECENTLY IN GENEVA HE HAD TWICE TALKED WITH FNG REPRESENTATIVES IN EFFORT TO GET THEM OFFER REASONABLE COMPROMISE, BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS. FINALLY HE HAD TAKEN PUBLIC POSITION, INCLUDING RECOG-

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Authority	ND 959503
By	MNARA Date 05/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABIDJA 03086 151946Z

NITION BIAFRA, IN EFFORT TO MOBILIZE AFRICAN OPINION, FORCE IT TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SITUATION DEEPLY DAMAGING TO ALL. THE LONGER THE KILLING GOES ON, THE MORE DIFFICULT THE DAMAGE WILL BE TO REPAIR. CONTINUED BLOODSHED PLAYS SOLELY INTO HANDS OF COMMUNISTS, AND OF SOUTH AFRICANS AND PORTUGUESE WHO CITE IT AS JUSTIFICATION THEIR POLICIES TOWARD BLACKS. HOUPHOUET CONTRASTED US HUMANE CONCERN TO CONCENTRATE ON MILITARY TARGETS IN VIETNAM WITH INDISCRIMINATE BOMBING OF CIVILIANS IN BIAFRA. SAID HIS VIEWS ON NEED TO STOP WAR NOW SHARED BY NEIGHBORING AFRICAN STATES WHO FOR SPECIAL REASONS UNABLE TAKE PUBLIC POSITION.

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Authority NND959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAMSAC 3 Red Cross
X-1-Palz Biafra Nigeria

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(80 gm)

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: Amembassy LAGOS
" LONDON
USUN NEW YORK

FROM : U.S. Mission GENEVA

DATE: May 15, 1968

SUBJECT: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the
Nigeria-Biafra Conflict.

REF: Geneva 3403 and A-601. - action to AF Palz 7

Per 5/10/68

Attached is the text of a revised version of the ICRC's April 23 appeal
(see Geneva A-601) to national Red Cross societies for assistance on
behalf of victims of the conflict between Nigeria and secessionist
"Biafra".

TUBBY

✓ ✓
Enclosures as statedFORM DS-323
4-62

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 In OutDrafted by:
RMRC:RLKing:fch

5-14-68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM:CHMace

Clearances:

RMRC:JLCarlin

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND9501503
By MNARA Date 10/15/03

POL 27 BIAFRA-
164 NIGERIA

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

15 MAY 68 00 29z

Origin ACTION: Amembassy ABIDJAN PRIORITY

Info:

INFO: ALL AFRICAN POSTS - circular American

STATE _____

REF: Abidjan 3032 (NOTAM)

SUBJECT: Nigeria and Biafra

1. News just received that Ivory Coast has recognized Biafra does not change / general
(subject to such tailoring to that development as you regard desirable)
guidance herein if general subject arises during your meeting with Houphouet.

You can state that like him we too deeply distressed by continuing bloodshed.

From outset of political dispute and subsequent armed conflict we have urged political solution on both parties. We share with him hope that peace can be achieved at early date and are encouraged that preliminary talks in London apparently are to be followed by negotiations in Kampala.

2. It was painful decision for US to decline to supply arms to FMG, which we recognize as government of Nigeria, but we did not want to contribute to expansion of conflict. We similarly have done everything possible prevent arms of US origin reaching Biafra. US deplores misery and tragic consequences stemming from war while recognizing that attendant excesses are not all one sided. While instances indiscriminate killings by FMG have received considerable press attention, it our information that Ibos also have been guilty of extremist acts against minority peoples and elsewhere in Nigeria such as Mid-West. US concern has been over

Drafted by: *Rue* Tel. Ext. 2619 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
AFW:RMMelbourne:AF:JPalmer:emb 5/14/68 AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd

Clearances:

AFCW - Mr. Nadelman (draft) *Rue*

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FORM DS-322
8-65

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Authority NND 950503
By MNARA Date 05/05

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Classification

[consequences for all Nigeria if one sector should split off. It our hope that formula] can be found to enable Ibos to live in peace and be honorably reintegrated into life of all Nigeria. Thus, we think peace talks now beginning should be given every opportunity. US does not intend recognize Biafra. In fact, it is not sure whether any further recognitions at this point would moderate situation or embitter and exacerbate it. By raising Biafran hopes, they could cause Ibos to resist reasonable terms and to continue struggle despite their deteriorating military position.

3. Information available to US shows that FMG has been gaining considerable ground and that its apparent strategy is to isolate Iboland or the 60% of Eastern people who are Ibos. Minority tribes are apparently cooperating with Federal troops and turning against Ibos whenever opportunity develops. Three state Federal organization for East related to military situation. Calabar-Ogoja State is in Federal hands and strong drive on Port Harcourt continues which, if successful, could establish all Rivers State area under Federal control. This would leave East Central State (Ibo heartland) as only remaining area of truncated Biafra.

4. US has believed since beginning of controversy that African states have vital role to play in helping to bring peace. By taking strong interest in problem, they may be able create psychological climate which may help reassure Ibos that latter not isolated in Africa. They would be aware that they have friends who are anxious minimize possibility of reprisals against them when peace restored and who will hold FMG at least morally accountable for Ibos effective and honorable reintegration into Nigerian life.

5. Foregoing represents our own frank views on Nigerian problem. At same time we recognize this more of an African than a US responsibility. We therefore do not wish

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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Authority VN12959503
By MNARA Date 05/05

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Classification

be in position of professing monopoly of wisdom on this any more than on any other African subject and would be most grateful for Houphouet's insights into problem.

6. To extent other AF chiefs of mission requested for US views on Nigerian situation, they may draw on foregoing. We wish avoid, however, any appearance of making series of formal or coordinated demarches around continent at this time.

7. For Abidjan. Guidance other subjects Houphouet meeting septel.

END

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FORM DS-322A
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Authority VND950503
By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRA-
NIGERIA

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

RECEIVED

INFO : USUN

MAY 16 1968

FROM : Amembassy HELSINKI

DATE: May 14, 1968

SUBJECT: Foreign Minister's Statement on Finland's Possibilities to Mediate Between Nigeria

REF : and Biafra

In response to a question from the floor of Parliament, Foreign Minister Ahti KARJALAINEN said on May 7 that Finland might be able to contribute toward a peaceful solution in the conflict between Nigeria and Biafra if both parties were to request Finland's good offices.

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Replying to Liberal Peoples Party Member of Parliament Arne BERNER's inquiry as to what diplomatic action the Finnish Government has taken in the controversy between the two African countries, the Foreign Minister made the following statement: "It has been regrettably necessary to conclude that it has not been possible for us to have an influence on the civil war between Nigeria and Biafra that might lead toward bringing it to an end. There might be possibilities for doing so if the parties involved in the conflict were prepared to request mediation services or submit their case to an international organization such as the United Nations for arbitration. Finland as a neutral nation might in such an instance have possibilities to encourage a peaceful solution and exercise an influence in ending the bloodshed. At present it would, however, appear that the belligerent parties are more interested in establishing direct contact with each other."

THOMPSON

Decontrol following May 1, 1969.

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5/10/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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Authority NND 959503
By MM/NARA Date 10/5/05

ASSENT/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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U.S. EMBASSY WASHINGTON D.C.

AMERICAN BRANCH

DATE: May 14, 1968

TO : Department of State

INFO : KADUNA, LAGOS, PARIS, TEL AVIV ^{DAY 24} 12 15 PM (EST)

FROM : Amconsul IBADAN

SUBJECT : NNDP Leader Speaks on Current Situation

REF : Ibadan's 421 and 314 ^{NC} ^{POL 18 NIGERIA} AF

SUMMARY

R.O.A. Akinjide, former NNDP Federal Minister of Education and generally acknowledged leader of the banned NNDP party in Ibadan, said that the United States has lost ground in Nigeria due to the failure of the U.S. Government to support the FMG by permitting purchases of war material in the U.S. He cautioned against "rascals" getting into power in Lagos implying such opportunists would seek bloc assistance and suggested that the United States should be as forthcoming as possible in responding to future requests for assistance. Mr. Akinjide thought that there would be no peace in Nigeria unless the rebels gave up secession and accepted the new states.

1. BACKGROUND: R.O.A. Akinjide is a former NCNC politician who later became an NNDP Federal Minister of Education. He was a protégé of Adelabu, the "boss" of Ibadan in the early 1950's and served as the publicity secretary of the NCNC-Mabolaje Grand Alliance. Mr. Akinjide is only 37 years old, one of the leaders in the agitation for the establishment of a Yoruba Central State (YCS) and generally conceded to have a bright political future if the YCS is established. On the other hand, he has been detained on at least two occasions for allegedly plotting against the life of Western Military Governor Adebayo. As long as Adebayo and/or the AG have anything to say he is not likely to have much of a political future. In other words, he is one of the present "outs" who would very much like to be "in." Mr. Akinjide is a person who

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Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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
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arouses strong emotional responses in Yoruba politics. To AG supporters he is an anathema and represents the unrepentant politician who is completely without any principles of any sort in his search for political power. NNDP supporters may not love him, but they accept him as one of their most effective spokesmen during this period of their oppression. His opinions probably represent the "hard-line" NNDP view.

These remarks were made during the course of a luncheon at the residence of the reporting officer. The only other guest present was the American Consul.

2. THE UNITED STATES AND THE NIGERIAN CRISIS: Akinjide spent much time on his theme that the United States had not proven itself to be a true friend of Nigeria because of its failure to support the FMG in its time of need (Ibadan 421). He used the analogy that if one neighbor fails to help another neighbor to put out the fire when his house is burning, he is scarcely considered a friend. As a result of U.S. inaction, Russia had made much headway in the current crisis. He felt that the danger would be especially acute if "rascals" achieved political power after the military relinquished power (it was clear from the context that he meant Awo). He felt that the best thing that the United States Government can do with respect to future policy in Nigeria is to be as forthcoming as possible in responding to requests for assistance. He commented favorably on the amended loan agreement on the Ibadan Water Supply Expansion Project. He thought that much of the ill-will engendered from our previous lack of support might thus be dissipated, but he still believed there would be some bitter taste left.

3. ON PEACE TALKS: Akinjide was pessimistic of anything consequential coming out of peace talks at this time. He did not believe that the Ibos had the feeling that they had lost the war. Until they knew that they had lost the war, he feared that all the Ibos would try to do would be to buy time in order to rearm themselves to fight a more bloody conflict. For this reason, he did not think there could be any going back on a strong federal system with a minimum of 12 states. He specifically rejected a confederation and/or a return to the regional system with devolved powers going to the states. He thought the Ibos would have to accept FMG terms or else --. When asked what he meant, Akinjide replied: "Well, I am afraid that it means", and gave a chopping motion with his hand. Whether this meant "taught a lesson" or exterminated is not clear. It is clear that he feels that the war will have to be fought through to military victory and that he does not believe the war is close to being over.

4. FOREIGN POWERS AND THE NIGERIAN CRISIS: When asked to explain a reference to "imperialist" powers aiding the East, Akinjide talked about reported French assistance, about which he had no doubt. He also claimed that there was increasing evidence of Israeli assistance to the East. He

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By MMNARA Date: 10/5/03

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He said that Israel is furnishing arms to the rebels and is training Easterners in Israel in sabotage techniques. Israel is doing this because of the affinity they feel with the Ibos as a so-called "persecuted race." He also claimed Israelis are masters at playing both sides, particularly where they can see financial advantages in so doing. Akinjide professed to not believe the charges of U.S. espionage and intervention made by such publications as "Towards a New Nigeria" which is put out by the Committee of Ten. He said that there is a "rascal or two" on the Committee of Ten and he can just "see him pushing through his radical ideas because others on the Committee are too busy to take an active interest in opposing the rascal." He presumed the U.S., like other countries, carried on intelligence activities but did not agree that PCV's were spies.

TO BARRACKS:


5. ON THE MILITARY RETURNING: Akinjide said that he thought the soldiers should continue to run Nigeria past 1969. It was observed that the 1969 date was announced before the civil war started. Akinjide said that the Nigerian Civil War had so far been one of the shortest civil wars in history. He compared it to the American and English Civil Wars. He felt that the army should stay on through reconstruction, but would not estimate how long. He considered the Committee of Ten recommendation that the FMG continue for a six-year period as over long.

6. ON TRADITIONAL RULERS: Akinjide said that there was still a great deal of respect for the traditional rulers. The AG was currently trying to change the recommendation of the Oyemesi (the Oyo kingmakers) for the next Alafin of Oyo. The Oyemesi had made their choice known to the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs, but this was unacceptable to Chief Ajayi, the Commissioner, (an AG supporter) since the candidate nominated is the son of the Alafin deposed by the AG in 1956 and a known NCNC supporter. He said that the Alafin of Oyo was considered the most important temporal ruler of the Yoruba people. He said that the obas and chiefs still have a great deal of influence in deciding for whom their people would vote within their local constituencies. He observed that the Oni of Ife, while considered the spiritual leader of the Yorubas, could not influence voters outside his jurisdiction, but the Alafin of Oyo could exert influence throughout the areas in the YCS.

7. ON IBADAN: Akinjide claimed that there are 2.7 million in Ibadan Province and 1.4 million in Ibadan Division. He said that the problem of the native settler population was not of any great significance since only about 100,000 of the Yorubas resident in Ibadan were not "sons of the soil" (non-residents of the YCS).

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Ibadan A-99

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8. COMMENT: While many of the usual subjects did not come up, it is safe to assume that Akinjide and his followers still continue in their opposition to the Somolu Tribunal and their agitation in favor of the creation of a YCS. The discussion provided very little new information on current NNDP thinking; however, it is significant that Akinjide does not hold out much hope for the current talks about talks. He may be considered "a hawk" in that the Ibos must realize that they have lost the war before there can be any lasting peace in Nigeria. Moreover, though he didn't say so, he may feel that a negotiated peace would favor the position of Awo and the AG, while a crushing military victory would strengthen the hand of the military and thus increase the likelihood of the establishment of a Yoruba Central State.

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Authority WID 950503
By MN NARA Date 05/03

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *CF. 1967-1969 Pol*
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 51-2

DATE: 5/14/68 MSG NO.: - TYPE: TE

FROM: usDAO L2jos TO: DIA

SUBJECT: (Military Developments)

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: OTHER: ✓

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:


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Department of State

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 09072 131911Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
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CCO 00, ACDA 16, RSR 01/155 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 570
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AVOMBASSY KINSHASA 676
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AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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AMCONSUL IBADAN
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RUEBBEA/CINCSTRIKE/CINCMIAFSA
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CONFIDENTIAL LLAGOS 9072

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS

1. PORT HARCOURT UNDER ATTACK. SUNDAY TIMES (MAY 12) HEADLINED "PH AIRPORT SURROUNDED" AND EDITORIAL ASSERTED "PORT HARCOURT IS UNDER SEIGE". ARTICLE APPARENTLY BASED ON BRIEF REPORT FROM TIMES' PHOTOGRAPHER WITH COL. ADEKUNLE'S FORCES. EDITORIAL STATES REBELS ARE DEFENDING PH AIRPORT "TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WAR IS STALEMATED", THEREBY STRENGTHENING THE REBELS STAND AT THE PEACE TALKS, BUT ONCE THIS AIRPORT HAS BEEN TAKEN THE CITY ITSELF MAY BE EITHER UNDEFENDED OR ONLY HALF-HEARTEDLY DEFENDED, BECAUSE

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05



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PAGE 02 LAGOS 09072 131911Z

WE THINK THE RECENT WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY IN PH WAS A PRELUDE TO REBEL WITHDRAWAL FROM THERE TO DEFEND THEIR HOMETOWNS UMUAHIA AND ABA". (COMMENT: EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS FROM CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE THAT AIRPORT WAS PROBABLY SEIZED BY FEDERAL FORCES TODAY). "BIAFRA" RADIO AT 0600 GMT MAY 13 ADMITTED: "ENEMY HAS BEEN TRYING TO INFILTRATE" INTO PH BUT "BIAFRA ARMED FORCES HAVE COUNTERATTACKED HEAVILY".

2. OJUKWU'S MESSAGES TO TROOPS. A PICTURE OF CONFUSION AND DISARRAY AMONG REBEL FORCES AND LEADERS WAS PAINTED IN ARTICLE IN BOTH SUNDAY TIMES AND SUNDAY POST. "FEARING THE IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF HIS FORCES IN ALL FRONTS, OJUKWU AT THE WEEKEND SENT DESPERATE MESSAGES TO ALL FRONTS MAKING FANTASTIC PROMISES OF FINANCIAL REWARDS, REINFORCEMENTS AND ARMS TO HIS MEN. THE MESSAGES URGED THAT ALL EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO SAVING PORT HARCOURT WHICH HE CALLS "OUR PORT HARCOURT". OJUKWU'S PROMISE OF EXTRA PAYMENTS WAS SAID TO PUT INTO DOUBT THE CONTENTION THAT HE AND HIS SUPPORTERS WERE FIGHTING FOR SURVIVAL". ARTICLE ADDED THAT SUCH MESSAGES HERALDED "IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF THE REBEL REGIME".

3. DEMONSTRATION IN LAGOS BY RIVERS PEOPLE. SUNDAY POST STORY PLAYED UP DEMONSTRATION BY "HUNDREDS OF PLACARD CARRYING RIVERS STATE PEOPLE". ACCORDING TO PARTICIPANTS KNOWN TO EMBODIES LESS THAN FIVE HUNDRED PEOPLE INVOLVED. DEMONSTRATORS SENT NOTE TO MAJOR-GENERAL GOWON PROTESTING AGAINST REBEL ATROCITIES AND EMPHASIZING THAT RIVERS STATE WOULD PROVIDE MINORITY TRIBES WITH SECURITY AFTER WAR IS OVER. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH PAPER DID NOT SO STATE, THERE IS FEAR AMONG SOME RIVERS PEOPLE THAT DURING PEACE TALKS PH OR OTHER PARTS OF RIVERS STATE MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO EAST CENTRAL STATE AS PART OF COMPROMISE PEACE AGREEMENT WITH REBEL IBOS. DEMONSTRATION WAS ORGANIZED BY YOUNG MEN FROM THE RIVERS STATE WHO WERE NOT SATISFIED BY ASSURANCES OF THEIR ELDERS THAT FMG DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE ANY CHANGE IN BOUNDARIES OF RIVERS STATE.)

4. FMG HAS SENT TEAM OF DIPLOMATS TO LOBBY THEIR CASE

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PAGE 03 LAGOS 09072 131911Z

IN KAMPALA AND OTHER EAST AFRICAN CAPITALS. INCLUDED ARE:
ADE MARTINS, UNTIL RECENTLY AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON AND
FORMERLY HIGH COMMISSIONER IN EAST AFRICA, AND CHIEF H.O.
DAVIES.

GP-3.
OLSON

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05



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Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Defense Dept.
5/13/68
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 355

PAGE 01 131219Z

49
ACTION AF 15

INFO GPM 04, INR 07, RSR 01, FILE 01, /028 W

P R 131120Z MAY 68
FM USDAO/LAGOS NIGERIA
TO DIA PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC
CINCSTRIKE
CINCLANT
INFO CIA
DA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L 0209 MAY 68. SGD HALLIGAN. COUNTRY: NIGRIA.
SUBJECT: UPDATE CURRENT FMG/EASTERN MIL SITUATION. DIA FOR
DIACO; CNCSTRIKE FOR STRJ2-C; DA FOR ACSI.
KNOWLEDGEABLE AND USUALLY RELIABLE STAFF OFFICER HQ NIGERIAN
ARMY TOLD DAO MAP OFFICER 131100Z "LATEST NEWS FROM THIRD DIV IS
THAT THEY NOW HOLD (SIC) PORT HARCOURT AIRFIELD". SOURCE SAID INFO
NOT YET RELEASED AND HE DID NOT KNOW FOR SURE WHEN GOVT WOULD
MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT. GP3

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By MN NARA Date 10/15/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

<i>AF-5</i>		
RM/R	REP*	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
	2	5
L	FBO	AID
3		
GPM 5P		
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
		NSC
		6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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44 A-537

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R. Ferguson
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
STATE
MAY 18 6 29 AM 1968INFO: LONDON, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA, DAR-ES-SALAAM,
KAMPALA

FROM :

Amembassy NAIROBI DATE: May 12, 1968

SUBJECT:

DAILY NATION Urges Quick Nigerian Talks

REF :

Nairobi's 4219 and 4296

NC NC

The DAILY NATION editorial of May 9 urged that talks get underway as soon as possible between Biafra and the FMG. The NATION suggested that Biafra may be procrastinating in hopes that its bargaining power will be strengthened by further diplomatic recognition. The editorial also implied that Biafra was waiting for economic pressure on behalf of the UK and France to strengthen her hand. The main thrust of the editorial was summed up in the concluding lines: "Tanzania's recognition of Biafra played an important part in bringing the two sides closer to negotiation. It would be tragic if hope for further advantages on either side should now hold them apart. Africa can only gain if talks begin to produce concrete results quickly. Haggling over a site is really a form of shadow-boxing with no justification in view of the internecine slaughter taking place in Nigeria. Nigeria and Biafra should hasten with enthusiasm to the main issues, not haggle stubbornly over minor ones."

COMMENT: This particular editorial is noticeably neutral in the Biafra-FMG dispute when compared to previous ones in the DAILY NATION which have been outspokenly pro-Biafra in flavor.

WPC-
FERGUSON

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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 In Out

Drafted by:

POL:DHShinn:sn 5-9-68


Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM:WBCOOTE WPC

Clearances:

POL:RCheater

0754





Ref 27 Biafra - Nigeria
XR Dif 9 Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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CONFIDENTIAL 664

PAGE 01 111335Z

47
ACTION AF 06

INFO SS 20, GPM 04, L 03, IO 03, INR 07, ACDA 07, AIDI 10, EUR 08, RSR 01

FILE 01, /070 W

P R 111202Z MAY 68
FM USDAO LAGOS NIGERIA
TO DIA PRIORITY
SECSTATE
CINCSTRIKE
CINCLANT
INFO CIA
DA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KUSUNA

CONFIDENTIAL BY 0510Z 11 MAY 68
(2)
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0207 MAY 68. SGD HALLIGAN. COUNTRY: NIGERIA.
SUBJECT: UPDATE CURRENT FMG/EASTERN MIL SITUATION. DIA FOR
DIACO; CINCSTRIKE FOR STRJ2-C; DA FOR ACSI.
1. REF PAR 1, MY 0202; AND PAR 1, MY 0205 BOTH MAY 68; INFO NOW
AVAIL INDICATES MUHAMMED LEFT FAMILY AT KANO DURING PLANE STOP
THERE ENROUTE LONDON. IT ALSO NOW APPEARS THAT FOR PERHAPS
THIRD TIME IN COURSE APPROX LAST YEAR, MUHAMMED HAS SUBMITTED HIS
RESIGNATION AS OFFICER NIGERIAN ARMY. ULTIMATE DISPOSITION THIS
LATEST MOVE UNKNOWN AS IT PIGEONHOLED FOR PRESENT.
2. REF PAR 2B, MY 0205; AS OF MORNING 11 MAY, SENIOR OFFICERS
ARMY HQ NOTED IN CONVERSATION WITH ONE OF SENIOR BRIGADE
COMMANDERS, FIRST DIV, NEWLY RETURNED LAGOS FROM FRONT. FROM
INFO GATHERED THESE SOURCES IT APPEARS ARMYSTAFF NOW CONCERNED
AT FACT BIAFRAN FORCES BEEN FORCING HEAVILY AT PORT HARCOURT
BY MOVING LARGE UNITS (SIC) FROM OTHER FRONTS". IN RESPONSE,
ARMY PLANNERS, WHO HAD ORIGINALLY HOPED CONTINUE ESSENTIALLY HOLDING
ACTIONS OTHER FRONTS WHILE EFFORT GOING INTO PORT HARCOURT
OFFENSIVE NOW INITIATING COUNTER MOVES. "AT LEAST SEVERAL WELL
SEASONED BNS" FROM EACH OF FIRST AND SECOND DIVISION WILL BE
ALERTED FOR MOVEMENT AND ATTACHMENT TO ADEKUNLE'S THIRD DIV. IN
ADDITION, DATT BELIEVES BOTH FIRST AND SECOND DIVS WILL VERY
SHORTLY LAUNCH LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPS IN ATTEMPT FIX MAX NUMBER
REBEL FORCES IN PLACE AND TO EXPLOIT, WHERE POSSIBLE, POSSIBLY
WEAKENED DEFENSES REBEL FORCES CROSS RIVER AND NORTH. IN MOVE

Defense Dept.
89/11/5

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 111335Z

POSSIBLY RELATED THIS NEW FMG APPROACH TO REBEL STRATEGY, HQ FIRST DIV (MAIN) MOVING FROM MAKURDI TO ENUGU AS OF NOW.
3. REF PAR 3B, MY 0205 MAY: LARGE NUMBERS NEW SPANISH CETME RIFLES NOTED IN HANDS TROOPS MOVING BONNY/CALABAR AREAS LAST SEVERAL DAYS. OTHERS BELIEVED FLOWN OR SHIPPED LAGOS TO BONNY/ CALABAR.

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

C Pol 7 TANZAN²²

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C Pol 27 Biafra-Nigeria

PAGE 01 KINSHASA 9165 111142Z

49
ACTION AF 15.

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAF 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 23, AID 28, IGA 22, E 15,
CAB 09, COM 08, DOT 10, RSH 01, /184 W

P R 111142Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7989
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGUI
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS

UNCLAS KINSHASA 9165

DEPT PASS USIA FOR IPS AND IBS

SUBJ: UEAC HEADS OF STATE MEET IN KINSHASA

1. PRESIDENTS BOKASSA OF CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND TOMBALBAYE OF CTPAD ARRIVED IN KINSHASA FRIDAY EVENING ENROUTE TO FAST-CENTRAL AFRICAN SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN DAR OPENING MAY 12. AT AIRPORT PRESS CONFERENCE, BOTH PRESIDENTS EMPHASIZED THAT STOPOVER IN KINSHASA ORGANIZED MAINLY TO FURTHER COOPERATION AMONG THREE COUNTRIES OF UEAC. BOKASSA SAID THAT ATTENDANCE AT DAR SUMMIT WOULD BE ONE OF MATTERS DISCUSSED IN KINSHASA, AND THAT IT IS STILL PREMATURE TO STATE THAT UEAC PRESIDENTS WILL IN FACT BE PRESENT AT DAR.

2. QUESTIONED ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD NIGERIAN PROBLEM, TOMBALBAYE SAID THAT PREVIOUS STATEMENTS MADE ON THIS SUBJECT BY MOBUTU SPEAK FOR CHAD AND CAR AS WELL. HE SAID UEAC SUPPORTS POLICIES OF OAU AND UN WHICH PROHIBITS INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A FRIENDLY COUNTRY. HE SAID PROBLEM OF BIAFRA SECESSION REMAINS SOLELY WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NIGERIAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND UEAC IS NOT ABOUT TO RECOGNIZE BIAFRA. QUOTE WE WILL NEVER ENCOURAGE REBELLION WITHIN AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY UNQUOTE.

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By MNARA Date 01/5/05



POL 16 BIAFRA

Department of State TELEGRAM

XK POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 YAOUND 01441 101150Z

53
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 03, AID 28, PC 04, IO 13, RSA 00

/132 W

P R 101010Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBWVSY YAOUNDE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2008
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGUI
AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

UNCLAS YAOUNDE 1441

DEPT PASS USIA/IBS AND IPS

SUBJ: AHIDJO STATEMENT ON RECOGNITION OF "BIAFRA"

1. OFFICIAL NEWS SERVICE ACAP (AGENCE CAMEROUNAISE DE PRESSE) CARRIES TEXT OF "INTERVIEW" ACCORDING TO THE AGENCY BY EL HADJ AHMADOU AHIDJO, PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON. ITEM DATED 10 MAY. TEXT OF INTERVIEW, WHICH CONSISTED OF ONE QUESTION AND ONE ANSWER, FOLLOWS IN UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

BEGIN TEXT

2. QUESTION: THE NIGERIAN CRISIS SEEMS TO BE AMENABLE TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN VIEW OF THE READINESS OF THE TWO PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AT KAMPALA. CERTAIN AFRICAN STATES HAVE THOUGHT THEY COULD HELP HASTEN A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BY RECOGNIZING BIAFRA AS A SOVEREIGN STATE. THEY JUSTIFIED THEIR ATTITUDE BY HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS AND BY THE DESIRE

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PAGE 01 ABIDJA 03032 101743Z

45
ACTION AF 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, IO 13, AID 28, ACDA 16, RSR 01,
1141 W

R 101630Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2386

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ABIDJAN 3032

HOPE SEE HOUPHOUET MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK. WOULD APPRECIATE
DEPT'S THINKING ON BIAFRA AND ANY OTHER MATTERS OF CURRENT
INTEREST I MIGHT SHARE WITH HIM.

DECON ON RECEIPT.

MORGAN

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see d. 164142

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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UNCLASSIFIED 817

PAGE 01 ACCRA 03450 101542Z

54
ACTION: AF 15

INFO P 04, INR 07, RSC 01, RSR 01, 028 W

R 101500Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO USINFO WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 4004

UNCLAS ACCRA 3450

CURRENT REACTION, ATTN: IOP/R, IBS, IPS, IAA

1. ACCRA, MAY 10 -- DAILY GRAPHIC TODAY ENDORSED KAMPALA AS SITE FOR NIGERIAN TALKS. QTE KAMPALA WE THINK IS A GOOD CHOICE NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS IN AFRICA BUT ALSO BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THE MORE TEMPERATE NATURE OF THE CLIMATE WILL HELP KEEP TEMPERS WITHIN REASONABLE BOUNDS UNQUOTE.

2. GRAPHIC SAID THAT WHILE KAMPALA QTE APPARENTLY SUITS BOTH SIDES UNQUOTE AND EFFORTS TOWARD PEACEFUL SOLUTION HALFWAY THROUGH MOST IMPORTANT OBSTACLE QTE IS YET TO BE SURMOUNTED UNQUOTE. EDITORIAL SAYS PROBLEM IS WHO WILL SUPERVISE DISCUSSIONS. WINKLER

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By	MVNARA Date 05/05

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DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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Intelligence
Note - 345

May 10, 1968

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *tu*

Subject: Why Gabon Recognized Biafra

Gabon's explanation of its May 8 recognition of Biafra-- its desire to hasten negotiations and end the "genocide" of civil war-- parallels the position taken publicly by Ivory Coast and privately by France. While both countries probably influenced the move, it also reflects President Albert Bongo's growing determination to make a name for himself.

Respect for Houphouet-Boigny. Bongo's admiration of Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny, with whom he conferred recently in Switzerland, had something to do with his decision. Bongo's first official visit after assuming office last December (aside from a trip to Paris) was to Ivory Coast. Two days after Tanzania's April 13 recognition of Biafra, Houphouet-Boigny made the first of several public statements that seem to foreshadow early Ivory Coast recognition. On April 25, after huddling with de Gaulle to tell the Paris press that although recognition was a matter for each state to decide for itself, other African leaders would do well to refer to Houphouet-Boigny's remarks on the subject.

To Please Paris. Bongo's announcement of recognition came at the end of a two-week visit to Paris, where it seems certain he was encouraged to take this step. There is ample precedent for French-inspired policy in Gabon. The most recent example was Bongo's invitation to Quebec to attend the February 1968 meeting in Libreville of French-speaking ministers of education. Bongo has committed himself to obtaining international financing for construction of a

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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GROUP 3
Declassified at 12 years


POL 16 BIAFRA RE POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
RE POL 15-1 GABON RE EIN 3 ODEAR

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By MMNARA Date 10/5/05

PAGE(S) MISSING IN ORIGINAL

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PAGE 01 KAMPALA 02057 110954Z

14.
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 28, RSR 01,

/140 W

R 101320Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2719
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE KAMPALA 2057

SUBJ: NIGERIAN PEACE CONVERSATIONS

1. FONOFF PERM SEC BAINGANA TOLD ME LAST NIGHT GOU HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY FMG AND BY BIAFRA SEEKING SOU APPROVAL HOLD CONVERSATIONS KAMPALA. BAINGANA TOLD ME GOU IS READY WHEN NIGERIANS ARE BUT NOTED THERE STILL REMAIN MANY MATTERS WHICH MUST BE DECIDED IN LONDON BEFORE TALKS HERE COULD START. HE ADDED THERE NUMBER SUITABLE PLACES KAMPALA/ENTEBBE AREA FOR SUCH TALKS. MINAG KAKONGE ALSO TOLD ME HE DELIGHTED UGANDA HAD BEEN SELECTED AND CONSIDERED IT REAL FEATHER IN OBOTE'S CAP.

2. ACTG NIGERIAN HICOM TOLD MEMBER MY STAFF TALKS WOULD PROBABLY NOT START WITHIN TWO-THREE WEEKS. DECON 5/69. STEBBINS

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X Ref 7 Nigeria - UK 48

CONFIDENTIAL 335

PAGE 01 102051Z

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ACTION AF 06

INFO GPM 04, INR 07 RSR 01, FILE 01, MC 01, EUR 08, ACDA 07, OPR 02, 037 W
P R 101540Z MAY 68
FM USDAO LAGOS NIGERIA
TO DIAPRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC
CINCSTRIKE
CINCLANT
INFO CIA
DA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

Defense Dept.
9/10/68

CONFIDENTIAL 335
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0205 MAY 68. SGD HALLIGAN. COUNTRY: NIGERIA. SUBJECT: UPDATE CURRENT FMG/EASTERN MIL SITUATION. DIA FOR DIACO, CINCSTRIKE FOR STRJ2-C, DA FOR ACSI.
1. REF PARA 1, MY 0202 MAY 09 AND MY SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS 0200 MAY 08 (NOTAL). ON 10 MAY, SOURCE A, MSG 0200, DISCUSSED SITUATION PARA 1, MY 0202. SOURCE SAID MUHAMMED HAD ADVANCED TWO REASONS, TO DIFFERENT GROUPS PERSONS, FOR LATEST SUDDEN AND UNANNOUNCED DEPARTURE. TO SEVERAL POLITICAL ASSOCIATES HE SAID HE GOING PARIS TO GET ARMS DEALS MADE DURING LAST LONDON VISIT BACK ON TRACK AFTER "(SOURCE A) AND AMINO KANO HAD SHORT CIRCUITED HIM WITH LONDON CONTACTS AND HAD GOTTEN THEIR HANDS ON MONEY HE (MUHAMMED) HAD HAD TO SPEND". (SOURCE A LAUGHED AND SAID "HE IS RIGHT, IT WAS NO PROBLEM STOPPING DEALS HE THOUGHT HE HAD MADE. WE (SIC) ALSO USED HIS MONEY FOR OUR OWN ARMS (FMG) DEAL IN SPAIN (SIC)". TO INNUA WADDA "WHO TRIED TALK HIM OUT OF FLIGHT AT IKEJA WEDNESDAY MORNING", MUHAMMED SAID HE LEAVING BECAUSE "I MADE BIG MISTAKE, WENT TOO FAR WITH GOWON, AND NOW HIS BOYS (SIC) OUT TO GET ME".
2. IN RESPONSE DATT PROBE ALONG LINES "CERTAINLY GOWON WILL HAVE TO DO SOMETHING NOW (ABOUT MUHAMMED) OR LOSE FACE" SOURCE A RESPONDED QUICKLY AND WITH EVIDENTLY STRONG FEELING. HE SAID SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS: "WHO HAS REALLY LOST FACE? NOT JACK (GOWON) CERTAINLY; HE STILL HERE WHILE MUHAMMED HAS TAKEN HIS WIFE AND FAMILY (SIC) AND RUN AWAY TO LONDON. HE IS LAUGHING STOCK ENTIRE OFFICER CORPS THIS POINT BECAUSE WHEN CHIPS WERE DOWN HE FOUND HE STOOD ALL ALONE. GOWON, AS USUAL, PLAYED IT

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By MMNARA Date 10/5/03



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COOL AND CAME OUT ON TOP". IN RESPONSE DATT QUERY AS TO WHEN IT LIKELY MUHAMMEDI WOULD RETURN AND WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD BE HIS ULTIMATE FATE, SOURCE A SAID "WHY WORRY ABOUT HIM NOW. HE HAS RUN OFF AND WON'T BE BACK FOR A WHILE. WHEN HE DOES COME BACK HE WILL HAVE HAT IN HAND AND WE CAN DEAL WITH MATTER THAT TIME. RIGHT NOW, WITH HIM GONE, WE CAN CONCENTRATE MORE IMPORTANT THINGS LIKE WAR".
2. AS OF 10 MAY, WELL PLACED, USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCES SUPREME AND ARMY HQ SAID:

A. THIRD DIV/ SOUTHEASTERN FRONT: DIVISION DOING VERY WELL AND "GETTING SET NOW FOR FINAL PUSH". SOURCES SAID "WITHIN FEW DAYS NOW, HE (ADEKUNLE) WILL HAVE ALL HE NEEDS TO GET JOB DONE AND HE SHOULD HAVE IT (PORT HARCOURT) IN HIS HANDS BY NEXT WEEKEND (18/19 MAY)". SOURCES ALSO SAID HE NOT ALLOWING DEFENDING REBEL FORCES CONCENTRATE HARCOURT ALONE AS HE "KEEPING STRONG AND STEADY" PRESSURE ON ABA. IF THEY PULL ANYTHING FROM THAT AREA FOR HARCOURT ITSELF, BENJIE WILL RUN RIGHT DOWN THEIR THROATS".

B. ENUGU AREA: SOURCES SAID INCREASED FEDERAL PATROLLING AND SCOUTING ACTION RELATIVELY DORMANT FRONT SOUTH ENUGU INDICATED FEDERAL PRSSURES PORT HARCOURT AREA MAY BE FORCING THINNING OUT REBEL DEFENSES ON "NORTHERN FRONT".

C. MISCELLANEOUS:

A. NIGERIAN NAVY: NEWLY ACQUIRED SDB IBADAN II TO SEA 091310 MAY.

B. DAO OBSERVERS IKEJA AIRPORT NOTE INFLUX ARMS AND AMMO CARRYING DC7C CARGO PLANES BELONGING SPANISH "TAE AIRLINES" OVER LAST SEVERAL DAYS. (THIS UNDOUBTEDLY RELATED APPROPRIATE ITEM PAR 1 ABOVE AND TO PAR 2 MSG 0202 MAY 68). GP=3

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PAGE 01 YADUND 00775 090728Z

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, UPW 01, AID 28, IO 13, SR 01,

ORM 03, EUR 17, RSR 01, /153 W

110727

R 090640Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3210
INFO AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

C O N F I D E N T I A L YAOUNDE 775

SUBJ: MONROVIA CONCOMI MEETING

REF: SECSTATE 069426

POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
XLR POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
3 OAU

1. SINCE HIS RETURN FROM THE MONROVIA MEETING, PRESIDENT AHIDJO HAS NOT MADE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE CONFERENCE. LOCAL NEWS MEDIA REPORTED THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WHICH AHIDJO AND ZINSON ISSUED IN COTONOU (COTONOU'S 4231).

2. SENGAT-KUO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT, WHO WAS A MEMBER OF THE CAMEROONIAN DELEGATION OBSERVED THAT DURING THE CONCOMI MEETING, AHIDJO AND MOBUTU SAW EYEBALL TO EYEBALL ON THE NIGERIAN PROBLEM.

3. COMMENT: SINCE THERE WAS A MARKED LACK OF OPTIMISM REGARDING CONFERENCE ON PART OF CAMEROONIANS, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN DISAPPOINTED AT THE OUTCOME. IT WILL PROBABLY BE VERY DIFFICULT TO INVOLVE AHIDJO PERSONALLY IN ANOTHER CONCOMI EFFORT ALTHOUGH CAMEROON MIGHT CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE IN ANY NEW OAU INITIATIVES.

GP-3. PAYTON

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Authority	NND 959503
By	MVNARA Date
	10/5/03



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Col 27 Biafra - Nigeria
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PAGE 01 091724Z

43:

ACTION AF 06

INFO EUR 08, INR 07, GPM 04, SS 20, RSR 01, FILE 01, MC 01, /048 W

PI R/ 091520Z MAY 68
FM USDAO/LAGOS NIGERIA
TO DIA PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC
CINCPAC
CINCLANT
INFO CIA
DA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
DA GRNC

Defense Dept
86/6/5/68

CLONFIDEN TIA LI 0202 MAY 68. SGD HALLIGAN. COUNTRY: NIGERIA.
SUBJECT: UPDATE CURRENT FMG/EASTERN MIL SITUATION. DIA FOR
DIACOB CINCSTRIKE FOR STRU2-C DA FOR ACSI; LONDON FOR DAO AND POL.

1. USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, IN POSITION KNOW, TOLD DATT COLONEL MURITALLE MUHAMMED DEPARTED LAGOS FOR LONDON MORNING BOAC FLIGHT 09 MAY. SOURCE SAID THERE "HAD BEEN SMALL PALAVER (DISCUSSION) AT AIRPORT" BUT MUHAMMED HAD BEEN PERMITTED DEPART. DATT CHECKED RELIABLE SOURCE SUPREME HQ WHO SEEMED UNAWARE ACTUAL FACT DEPARTURE BUT SAID MUHAMMED HAD BEEN "AROUND HQ YESTERDAY AFTERNOON" (08 MAY) ASKING BISALLA FOR LEAVE "BUT HAD BEEN TOLD BY BISALLA HE WOULD BE BETTER OFF GOING BACK TO HIS DIVISION. (FURTHER DETAILS AS AVAILABLE).

2. THIRD DIV/SOUTHEASTERN FRONT: SOURCES ARMY AND SUPREME HQ SAY DIVISION CONTINUES "REALLY GOOD PROGRESS" IN HARcourt CAMPAIGN. NONE WILLING REALLY COMMITT SELVES BUT IMPRESSION WAS MOST BELIEVED DIVISION UNITS AT OKRIKA AND VERY CLOSE TO AIRFIELD. AIR OF OPTIMISM PREVAILS AND ALL APPARENTLY BELIEVE "FEDERAL CONTROL HARcourt VERY NEAR". RESUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT OPERATIONS FROM LAGOS CONTINUE VERY HIGH RATE. KEY LOGISTICS OFFICER SUPREME HQ, VERY RECENTLY LAGOS FROM EUROPEAN PURCHASING MISSION, SAID HE HAD LOCATED AND PURCHASED "TEN THOUSAND NEW AUTOMATIC WEAPONS WHICH ALREADY ARRIVING BY AIR". (CORROBORATIVE

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OBSERVATIONS MADE IKEJA AIRPORT SUPPORTS THIS CLAIM AS RATHER STEADY AND SUBSTANTIAL INFLUX ARMS CARRYING PLANES NOTED BY DAO PERSONNEL OVER LAST SEVERAL DAYS. SOME THESE GOING THIRD DIV BY AIR FROM LAGOS, OTHERS GOING BY SEA ALONG WITH AMMO, SUPPLIES, EQUIP, TROOPS IN RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBERS-MAGNITUDE FOUR/FIVE THOUSAND. LCT NNSLOKOJA DEPARTED LAGOS FOR BONNY AREA NITE 08/09 MAY. NIG NAT LINES VESSEL "OPUSO" HEAVILY LOADED DEPARTED LAGOS FOR BONNY/CALABARI 090700A).

3. IN FACE RECURRING CLAIMS "RADIO BIAFRA" ON SINKING OF NIG NAVY VESSELS, DAO PROBES IN APPROPRIATE AREAS NAVY AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONNEL INDICATE ALL COMBAT VESSELS FLEET AFLOAT AND ACCOUNTED FOR. SDB IBADAN II HAS BEEN COMMISSIONED AND BEING MADE READY FOR SEA UTILIZING CREW FROM SDB BONNY WHICH HAS HAD HISTROY RECURRING ENGINE TROBEL. GP-3.

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PAGE #1 IBADAN 00466 100843Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,
USIA 12, AID 28, SAH 03, IO 13, RSR 01, /125 W

R 091506Z MAY 68
FM AMCONSUL IBADAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 553
DIA
INFO CIA
CINCSTRIKE
AMCONSUL FODUNA
AMBASSY LAGOS

Ibadan 466
5/9/68

C O N F I D E N T I A L IBADAN 466

SUBJECT: RESURGENT YORUBA FEARS OF NORTH

1. WESTERN NIGERIA'S TOP CIVIL SERVANT, PETE ODUMOSU (PROTECT SOURCE), UNBURDENED HIMSELF MAY 9 TO ASST. AID DIRECTOR REED ON RESURGENT FEAR OF NORTH AMONG WESTERN YORUBAS. CITED NUMBER INCIDENTS REAWAKENING THIS FEAR.

2. ONE INVOLVED APPOINTMENT NIGERIAN ASSISTANT MANAGER FEDERAL AMMUNITION PLANT IN KADUNA (MANAGER IS GERMAN). THERE WERE TWO YORUBA CANDIDATES, ONE OF WHOM TOPPED LIST IN PAPER QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE. FMG APPOINTED LESS QUALIFIED NORTHERNER.

PAGE 2 RUTALS 466BB C O N F I D E N T I A L
AS ACTING ASST. MANAGER. GERMAN MANAGER TOOK MATTER UP WITH HASSAN KATSINA ON GROUNDS FAULTY PROCEDURE BUT KATSINA TOLD HIM APPOINTMENT STOOD.

3. ANOTHER INCIDENT INVOLVED FIRE AT SAME AMMUNITION PLANT AFTER WHICH POLICE DETAINED SAME TWO YORUBA EMPLOYEES WHO HAD APPLIED FOR JOB GIVEN NORTHERNER. EFFORTS OF RELATIVES: OBTAIN THEIR RELEASE ONLY RESULTED THEIR TRANSFER TO ARMY CUSTODY (APPARENTLY WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES OR TRIAL). RELATIVES HAVE

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PAGE 02 IBADAN 00466 100843Z

SINCE APPROACHED ADEBAYO WHO HAS WRITTEN TO GOWON AND NORTH CENTRAL STATE MILGOV KYARI ON THEIR BEHALF.

4. WESTERN STATE RECENTLY ASKED NOMINATE CACEIDATE FOR DEPUTY GOVERNOR NIGERIAN CENTRAL BANK. NOMINATED H.S.A. ADEDOKI ONE OF WEST'S MOST EXPERIENCED AND CAPABLE CIVIL SERVANTS. NOW PERMSEC MINHEALTH, FORMERLY PERMSEC MIN TRADE/INDUSTRY, CHAIRMAN WESTERN NIGERIAN MARKETING BOARD, WESTERN FINANCE CORPORATION AND AGRICULTURAL CREDIT CORP. ALSO NOMINATED WAS FORMER NORTHERN PERMSEC FINANCE. LATTER FAVORED BY FED. PERMSEC FINANCE ATT (IGBIRRA FROM KWARA STATE). AWOLOWO TOLD GOWON ADEDOKI BETTER QUALIFIED BUT GOWON PREFERRED NORTHERNER

PAGE 3 RUTALS 466BB C O N F I D E N T I A L
WHEN ODUMOSU IS CONFIDENT WILL BE APPOINTED. THIS WOULD BE SECOND BY-PASSING YORUBA CANDIDATE. FORMER WESTERN PERMSEC FINANCE CHIEF DINA, WHO WAS CONSIDERED HERE AS LEADING CANDIDATE FOR BANK GOVERNOR, WAS PASSED OVER WHEN IFONG (EASTERN MINORITIES MAN) WAS NAMED. *R&P/nyanya*

5. ON LIST OF PERSONS TO GO OVERSEAS TO TELL FMG STORY (IBADAN A-94) WAS OLAWOYIN, AG LEADER IN KWARA STATE. WHEN HASSANI KATSINA SAW LIST, HE VETOED INCLUSION OLAWOYIN. VETO STOOD.

6. COMMENTS THESE MIGHT BE DISMISSED AS MINOR EXAMPLES LONG STANDING YORUBA SUSPICIONS OF NORTH; HOWEVER, WHEN SOBER OFFICIAL LIKE ODUMOSU CITES THEM GM ILLUSTRATE NORTHERN POWER, IT CAN BE TAKEN TO REFLECT SIGNIFICANT SEGMENT YORUBA THINKING. ACCORDING ODUMOSU, KATSINA REPRESENTS POWER OF OLD NORTH. HIS TRANSFER TO LAGOS AWAKENS DEEP YORUBA FEARS. IT IS HE ALONG WITH ALLIES IN LAGOS WHO REALLY CONTROL FMG. GOWON IS WEAK AND HIS CONTROL WHICH NEVER STRONG, APPEARS HAVE DECLINED FURTHER ODUMOSU LIKENS KATSINA TO LATE SARDAUNA WITHOUT SARDAUNA'S FINESSE. GOWON IS LIKE

PAGE 4 RUTALS 466BB C O N F I D E N T I A L
BALEWA BUT WEAKER. ODUMOSU THINKS GOWON'S POSITION PRECARIOUS. WHSFE AWO HAS COURAGE TO SPEAK OUT IN FMG COUNCILS, HE IS

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PAGE 63 IBADAN 02466 100843Z

INCREASINGLY LESS LISTENED TO. IN SUM, HE SEES OLD NORTH STRENGTHENING POSITION IN LAGOS, SHUNTING GOWON AND AWO ASIDE, WITH VIEW ASSURING POST-WAR DOMINANCE NIGERIA. HE REPEATED OFT-HEARD REMARK THAT AFTER IBOS SUBDUED, NORTHERNERS WOULD TURN ON YORUBAS. THIS WOULD INTENSIFY TRIBAL CONFLICT AND NIGERIA MIGHT EVEN NOT HOLD TOGETHER. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT OJUKWU DID NOT TRUST KATSINA, COULD NOT COUNT ON GOWON AND HE DID NOT BLAME HIM.

7. WHILE ODUMOSU'S MOOD REFLECTS CURRENT YORUBA WAR WEARINESS AND PESSIMISM RE FUTURE, WE HAVE PICKED UP OTHER STORIES SUGGESTING THAT YORUBAS BELIEVE GOWON'S CONTROL OF EVENTS WEAKENING AND AWO'S INFLUENCE DECLINING. ONE STORY IS THAT COL. MUHAMMAD TOLD GOWON AND OTHER MEMBERS SMC OF HIS INTENTION GO LONDON AND DEFIED THEM DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. MOREOVER, HE REPORTEDLY TELEPHONED AWO FROM LONDON AND GOT 1.5 MILLION POUNDS RELEASED FOR ARMS PURCHASES. REFERENCE TO AWO PUZZLING THOUGH MUHAMMAD

PAGE 5 RUTALS 466BB C O N F I D E N T I A L APPARENTLY DID HAVE SIZEABLE FUNDS AT HIS DISPOSAL IN LONDON BUT POINT IS STORY FITS PATTERN OF STORIES BELIEVED BY THOUGHTFUL WESTERN YORUBAS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO LEAN TO AGW GP-3 STRONG

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12 POL 27 BAFRA Nigeria
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XR POL 23-8 Nigeria

XR POL 13-2 Nigeria

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PAGE 01 IBADAN 00464 091031Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 28, IO 13, PC 15, SR 01,
ORM 03, CU 04, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /164 W

R 081520Z MAY 68
FM AMCONSUL IBADAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 552
INFO AMCONSUL KADUNA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L : IBADAN 464

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF WESTERN NIGERIA MILITARY GOVERNOR

1. FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS TOUR D'HORIZON MILGOV ADEBAYO
MAY 8 MY REQUEST:

2. MILITARY: FMG STRATEGY TAKE PORT HARCOURT "WITHIN
NEXT FEW DAYS," THEN HOLD AND NEGOTIATE WITH REBELS FROM
POSITION OF STRENGTH. AGREED FIGHTING WOULD BE TOUGH BUT
SHOWED LITTLE APPRECIATION MAGNITUDE TASK.

3. PEACE TALKS: FMG MUST MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS BUT IN SUCH

PAGE 2 RUTALS 464BB C O N F I D E N T I A L
FIELDS AS AMNESTY FOR TROOPS, RESTORATION OF REBEL OFFICERS
TO NA, ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES AND IN RECONSTRUCTION, GUARANTEES
OF SAFETY TO IBOS AND READMISSION IBOS TO NATIONAL POLITICAL
LIFE. REAFFIRMED FMG POSITION THAT NO CONCESSIONS POSSIBLE
ON 12-STATE FORMULA OR SOVEREIGNTY. AGREED THIS MEANT REBEL
SURRENDER BUT THOUGHT ONCE PH TAKEN THEY WOULD BOW TO INEVITABLE.
AGAIN APPEARED UNDERESTIMATE PROBLEMS.

4. AID: SPOKE HIGHLY OF GOOD WORKING RELATIONS BETWEEN AID
PERSONNEL AND WESTERN MINISTERIES AND HOPE FOR IT CONTINUANCE

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7R AID (CAM) NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 08921 071350Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, GPM 04, NSC 10, SP 02, SS 20, RSC 01, L 03, H 02,

CIAE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00, SAH 03, RSR 01, PC 04, P 04, USIA 12, /144 W

R 071150Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 502
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LOOME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
DIA
CINCSTRIKE CINCMEAFA
AMCONSUL IBADAN

AMCONSUL KADUNA

CONFIDENTIAL LLAGOS 8921

SUBJEC: CAMEROON SUPPORTS FEDERAL NIGERIA

1. ACCORDING BRITISH REPORT FROM YAOUNDE MAY 3,
PRESIDENT AHIDJO IS "FIRM" IN CONTINUING SUPPORT
FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT (FMG) AGAINST
SECESSIONIST "BIAFRA."

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AGE 02 LAGOS 08921 071350Z

A HIDJO REPORTED TO HAVE SAID TO A DIPLOMAT,
CONFIDENTIALLY, THAT OUTWARDLY HE HAD TO BE
NEUTRAL BUT IN FACT HE WAS GIVING FMG BOTH "MORAL
AND MATERIAL" SUPPORT. WHEN ASKED WHAT WAS MATERIAL
SUPPORT HE SAID "FOOD AND MONEY," WHICH BRITISH
ASSUME MEANS SUPPLIES ON CREDIT.

gP3 OLSON

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May 7 1968
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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 24, USIA 12, SAH 03, E 15, COM 08, INT 06, AID 28,

IO 13, OPR 02, RSR 01, /171 W

R 071200Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 503
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSTRIKE CINCMEAFA
DIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L L I L A G O S 8 9 2 2

SUBJECT: FMG PAPER WARNS REBELS NOT DESTROY
PORT HARCOURT

PAGE 2 RUTALS 8922CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
REF: LAGOS 8906

1. IN FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL MAY 7, FMG-CONTROLLED MORNING POST WARNED REBELS OF CONSEQUENCES OF REPORTED DESTRUCTION BRITISH PROPERTY IN PORT HARCOURT (REFTEL).

2. AFTER CASTIGATING REBELS FOR "STEPPED-UP ATROCITIES," POST SAYS "IT WOULD NOT TAKE A KING SOLOMON TO REALIZE THAT THESE ACTS OF WANTON DESTRUCTION STRONGLY BELIEVE REBEL OFT-REPEATED CLAIM THAT PORT HARCOURT IS

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 08922 071409Z

IBOLAND, WHEN IT RECALLED THAT REBELS DID NO RPT NO DAMAGE TO ENUGU, NSUKKA AND OTHER IBO TOWNS BEFORE BEING PUSHED OUT BY FEDERAL TROOPS. WHAT THEY DOING NOW IN PORT HARCOURT IS IN KEEPING WITH GENERAL PATTERN IN OTHER NON-IBO AREAS, LIKE CALABAR, ORON AND BONNY." EDITORIAL GOES ON TO SAY INHABITANTS EAST-CENTRAL STATE "SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT FAR FROM MAKING BRITISH WORSE OFF BY THEIR UNPROVOKED ACTS OF VANDALISM, THE DESTRUCTION OF PORT HARCOURT WILL NEITHER BE FORGOTTEN NOR FORGIVEN BY RIVERS PEOPLE BECAUSE IT WILL BRING IN

PAGE 3 RUTALS 8922CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
ITS WAKE SUCH A DEEP-SEATED BITTERNESS THAT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR TIME OBLITERATE...HARMONIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN ("BIAFRANS") AND THEIR IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS, AFTER DUST OF WAR HAS DIED DOWN, BOUND TO BE MORE IN THEIR OWN INEREST...WE DO HOPE A WORD IS SUFFICIENT FOR THE WISE."

3^o COMMENT: "BIAFRAN" DESTRUCTION EXPATRIATE PROPERTY MAY REFLECT IBO FEELING THEY UNLIKELY BE ABLE CONTROL AREA (AS INDICATED REFTEL), BUT QUESTION IT BEING "NON-IBO AREA" AS ALLEGED IN EDITORIAL IS MORE COMPLICATED. WHILE INDIGENOUS POPULATION OF PH IS MOSTLY NON-IBO, THERE WAS GREAT MIGRATION OF IBOS TO PH WITH DEVELOPMENT OF PORT AND OIL INDUSTRY. EDITORIAL ALSO REFLECTS CONTINUING EAGERNESS FMG (AND RIVERS STATE PEOPLE IN PARTICULAR) TO ASSERT THAT NIGERIAN OIL CENTER IS NOT RPT NOT IBO IN TERRITORY (RELATIVELY UNDEVELOPED RIVERS PEOPLE HAVE MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THEY HOPE BENEFIT MOST FROM OIL-GENERATED REVENUE). IT LIKELY, HOWEVER,

PAGE 4 RUTALS 8922CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
THAT SINCE CIVIL WAR STARTED MANY IBOS HAVE BEEN EVACUATED FROM PH AND BY TIME IT IS CAPTURED BY FMG IT WILL BE LARGELY NON-IBO CITY.

GP-3. OLSON

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 08931 072140Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 28, USIA 12, IO 13, AID 28, PC 04, SAH 03, RSR 01,

/144 W

R 071609Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 507
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
RUEBEEA/CINCSTRIKE/CINCMIAFSA
DIA

CONFIDENTIAL LLAGOS 8931

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PAGE 2 RUTALS 8931CC CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: OJUKWU POSITION ON GUARANTEES FOR IBOS AS
PART OF SETTLEMENT

REF: PARIS 13567 (NOTAL)

Pol 16 Biafra

(2) 1. PARA 3 REFTEL S YS RESPONSIBLE QUAI OFFICIAL
NOTED OJUKWU STATEMENT TO AFP CORRESPONDENT MAY 2
THAT HE "READY LISTEN TO ANY PROPOSAL" BY FMG FOR

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UNIFIED NIGERIA WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE SAFETY OF POPULATION OF "BIAFRA" ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTED SUCH FORMULA COULD BE FOUND. FRENCH OFFICIAL INTERPRETED THIS AS SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION BY OJUKWU IN INTEREST REACHING NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

2. EMBASSY NOW HAS TEXT OF ONE QUESTION RECORDED DURING ALLEGED OJUKWU PRESS INTERVIEW WITH AFP REP AND MEISLER OF LOS ANGELES TIMES ON MAY 2 AND BROADCAST BY REBELS MAY 4 (FBIS ITEM N060810). IMPRESSION CONVEYED BY

PAGE 3 RUTALS 8931CC C O N F I D E N T I A L RECORDING WHICH "BIAFRANS" BROADCAST DOES NOT SEEM JUSTIFY CONCLUSION REACHED BY FRENCH THAT THIS "SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION."

3. BROADCAST SAYS (PRIOR PLAYING RECORDING OF QUESTION AND OJUKWU REPLY) "OJUKWU HAS RESTATED THAT ONLY POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY WILL GIVE THE SORT OF GUARANTEE REQUIRED BY

BIAFRANS FOR THE SECURITY OF THEIR PERSONS AND PROPERTY WITHIN AND OUTSIDE BIAFRA. NOW HERE IS THE RELEVANT QUESTION AND REPLY BY THE HEAD OF STATE." QUESTION WAS "IF TALKS (WORDS INDISTINCT) WHAT GUARANTEE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BIAFRA FOR SETTLEMENT THAT WILL NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY...?"

4. OJUKWU'S RECORDED REPLY BEGAN WITH "I HONESTLY CAN NOT THINK OF ANY SUCH GUARANTEE. I CAN NOT THINK OF ANY FORMULA THAT WILL GIVE US THE SORT OF GUARANTEE WE REQUIRE AFTER OUR EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST YEAR. MY NOT BEING ABLE TO SAY DOES NOT MEAN OF COURSE THAT IT DOES NOT EXIST...WE CAN SEE WHAT PROPOSALS CAN

PAGE 4 RUTALS 8931CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
BE MADE FROM OTHER QUARTERS. BUT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, HAVING PICKED ALL BRAINS AVAILABLE HERE, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE WORK OUT ANOTHER FORMULA THAT WOULD GIVE SORT OF GUARANTEE REQUIRED...OTHER THAN POLITICAL

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SEPARATENESS."

5. OJUKWU THEN POINTED TO INADEQUACY "PAPER GUARANTEES" IN ENTRENCHED CLAUSES ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN OLD NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION; RIDICULED GOWON'S CODE OF CONDUCT FOR FMG TROOPS; AND SAID GOWON GIVES ASSURANCES TO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND STATESMEN DAILY WHICH NOT HONORED. ACCORDING OJUKWU, "CONTINUED ATROCITIES" AND BOMBING OF CIVILIANS CAN "ONLY ARISE FROM TWO THINGS--EITHER GOWON NOT SINCERE, WHICH WHAT WE RELIEVE HERE, OR THE OTHER, ...OUR OWN BELIEF THAT GOWON HAS CREATED A MACHINE WHICH HE CANNOT CONTROL. WHICHEVER YOU TAKE, OUR PEOPLE CONTINUE SUFFER, AND ASSURANCES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE PROTECT THEM. THIS IS REALLY WHAT I AM DRIVING AT."

6. COMMENT: WHILE IT TRUE THAT FOREGOING DOES NOT COMPLETELY

PAGE 5 RUTALS 8931CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
RULE OUT REBEL FLEXIBILITY IN NEGOTIATING SETTLEMENT, WHOLE THRUST OF THIS PORTION HIS INTERVIEW (WHICH ALL WE HAVE FROM REBEL RADIO) IS TO REMIND LISTENERS OF IBO MISTRUST OF FMG AND UNYIELDING INSISTENCE ON POLITICAL SECESSION. CONSEQUENTLY, EMBASSY MORE INCLINED REGARD STATEMENT AS ARTFUL RESTATEMENT STANDARD LINE, WHICH LEAVES TINY ESCAPE HATCH. WE DO NOT REGARD IT AS SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION.

7. REGARDING FMG POSITION, WE NOT AWARE ANY EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY GUEURY'S NOTING(PARA 3 REFTEL) AS SIGNIFICANT "APPARENT WILLINGNESS FMG DROP TWELVE-STATE FORMULA AS PRECONDITION TO CEASE-FIRE." FMG MAY NOT INSIST THAT TWELVE-STATE STRUCTURE BE FIRST ITEM ON AGENDA OF PEACE TALKS, BUT THERE IS NO RPT NO REASON BELIEVE FMG WILL CONCEDE THIS BASIC PRINCIPLE IN FINAL SETTLEMENT. TEN STATE ARE IN OPERATION NOW. WE SUSPECT FMG EXPECTS TO LIBERATE ALL OF RIVERS STATE BY MILITARY ACTION IN SHORT TIME AND THEN 11 SES WILL BE UNDER FMG CONTROL. ALL THAT WILL BE LEFT FOR

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PAGE 6 RUTALS 8931CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
REBELS IS PART OF THE REMAINING 12TH STATE IN WHICH
TBOS ARE STILL RESISTING.

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 28, ACDA 16,
RSR 01, /156 W

D 071750Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3433
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY DAKAR

S E C R E T LONDON 8747

NOFORN

(1) SUBJ: NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS

REF: LONDON'S 8701

I: COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT'S HENSLEY AND ASTON TELL US
YESTERDAY'S MEETING BETWEEN FMG AND BIAFRAN REPS WAS STICKY
AND UNPRODUCTIVE. MBANEFO CONTINUED TO PRESS ENAHORO FOR
YES OR NO ANSWER ON IBO PROPOSAL THAT SUBSTANTIVE TALKS BE

RECORDED BY 185

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 8747 S E C R E T
HELD IN DAKAR. ALTHOUGH ENAHORO DID NOT REJECT DAKAR HE
INSISTED THAT OTHER POSSIBLE VENUES BE CONSIDERED AS WELL.
HEATED DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT CONTINUED FOR ALMOST
THREE HOURS WITHOUT RESOLVING IT. EVENTUALLY MBANEFO
SUGGESTED THE TWO SIDES RETIRE AND PREPARE MEMORANDA PUTTING
FORWARD THEIR POSITION ON QUESTION OF VENUE. IF CW SYG
ARNOLD SMITH FOUND BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION IN MEMOR-
ANDA THERE WOULD BE SECOND MEETING THIS EVENING (MAY 7)
AT 8 O'CLOCK.

SECRET

078:

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 08747 071827Z

2. SMITH RECEIVED BIAFRAN MEMORANDUM THIS AFTERNOON BUT FMG REPS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN TRYING TO CONTACT LAGOS AND HAVE NOT YET SUBMITTED THEIR MEMORANDUM. MBANDFO'S COMMUNICATION ASSUMES FMG REJECTION OF DAKAR AND PROPOSES AS ALTERNATIVES ARUSHA OR KAMPALA. IN ADDITION MBEANEFO REVIVES OJUKWU'S IDEA OF MEDIATION UNDER JOINT CHAIRMANSHIP. SMITH MEANWHILE AWAITS FMG MEMORANDUM TO SEE WHETHER GROUNDS EXIST FOR SECOND MEETING TONIGHT.

3. WE ADVISED ASTON AND HENSLEY THAT SIR LOUIS MBEANEFO

PAGE 3 RUDTCR S E C R E T
HAD CONTACTED THE CONSULAR SECTION REQUESTING VISA AND SAYING HE HOPED TO DEPART US SOMETIME TOMORROW (MAY 8).
GRUCE

SECRET

0782

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By MNARA Date 05/05



46 FN 9 BIAFRA-UK
HR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 08936 271936Z

14 ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INK 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 0,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 28, E 15, DPR 02, RSR 01.

INT 06-7163 W

R 061830Z MAY 58
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 494
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCPRT/CINCNEAFA
DIA

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 8946

SUBJECTS REPORTED DESTRUCTION BRITISH PROPERTY
BY "BIAFRANS".

PAGE 2 PUTALS 89 ACC CONFIDENTIAL
1. NIGERIAN PRESS AND RADIO ARE PLAYING UP REPORTS THAT
BRITISH INVESTMENTS IN PORT HARCOURT AREA, ESTIMATED
AT MORE THAN 70 MILLION STERLING, "ARE UNDER SERIOUS
THREAT OF BEING DESTROYED BY CIVILIANS" REBELS)
ANGERED BY ALLEGED CONTINUED BRITISH MILITARY AID
TO NIGERIA".

2. STORIES ARE BASED ON MONITORED "BIAFRAN"
BROADCASTS AND COPY FILED BY REUTERS(1301) CORRESPONDENT
FROM PORT HARCOURT. LATTER SOURCE SAYS FIVE

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ORIGIN/ACTION		
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TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
34		3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

4
[9] A-601 *Enc. Reproduced* UNCLASSIFIED

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106 27-BIAFRA-Nigeria

123/57-685

HANDLING INDICATOR

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2
10

R/S/R file

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5/1

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Geneva Encl. A-601
A-601 Geneva 5-5-68
D 1019 b

COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL
DE LA
CROIX-ROUGE

Geneva, April 23, 1968

APPEAL TO NATIONAL RED CROSS, RED CRESCENT AND
RED LION AND SUN SOCIETIES

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Following on the requests received, on the one hand from the Central Committee of the Nigerian Red Cross and on the other hand from the Red Cross Organization in areas controlled by the Secessionists, "Biafra", as well as on requests made by its delegates to the two parties in conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross urgently appeals to your Society on behalf of the very considerable number of victims of the conflict between Nigeria and the seceding province of "Biafra".

Since July 6, 1967, the civil war has caused havoc amongst the population. Women and children take refuge in the bush carrying with them only the barest necessities. With the destruction of villages they wander in search of food and shelter. Fortunate are those who have been able to form themselves into groups in the regions occupied by the Federal Forces, or else in centres still in the hands of secessionist troops.

In the fighting zones situated in contact with territory controlled either by the Federal or by the secessionist forces, the war has no front and is without a field of battle. Federal troops occupy the lines of communication, whilst the secessionist forces are in control of the bush in disputed areas.

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- 2 -

To this should be added the effects of the blockade imposed for many months by the Lagos authorities on land, sea and in the air against secessionist forces of Biafra. There is, consequently, malnutrition and the spreading of sickness due to a deficiency in nourishment or to a lack of essential medicines.

A. NIGERIA

1. Activity of the Nigerian Red Cross

Voluntary detachments of the Nigerian Red Cross, assisted on the technical level by personnel sent out by a group of National Societies (Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) lend their services to hospitals and attempt to come to the aid of the many civilian victims of the conflict. However, the tasks which the Nigerian Red Cross has to face exceed its own capacities.

The Nigerian Red Cross has arranged for action in three phases. The first phase is one of emergency, a question of caring for and feeding the starving and clothing those who no longer possess anything. Emergency relief posts installed at key-points give first-aid to the wounded and sick and distribute food and water for several days.


The second phase is that of survival. Food, vitamins and medicines are distributed for several months and refugee camps are organized. It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of human beings will have need of this assistance, for, in the event of an advance by Federal troops, the inhabitants of reconquered territory will no longer be able to buy anything with their money, no longer being of any value. The success of this programme depends not only on donations, but also on personnel and an effective transport system.

Finally, the third phase will be one of the reconstruction of houses, schools, lines of communication and workshops and will be the responsibility of the Government after the cessation of hostilities.

2. Intervention by the International Red Cross

Whilst the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva is giving its support to the development of the Nigerian Red Cross, the International Committee of the Red Cross is, for its part, acting by virtue of the Geneva Conventions on behalf of the victims of the conflict.

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- 3 -

Its delegates have been established in Lagos since the beginning of the conflict and have, with the Nigerian authorities and Red Cross, organized its traditional activity.

In addition, under ICRC auspices, medical teams, of which there are at present three, have been sent out to the spot and are now still operating in several places. The Swiss, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish Red Cross Societies, as well as the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod Association, have contributed to this action by sending out medical personnel.

Furthermore, medicines, surgical instruments, bandaging material, sheets and blankets provided by different donors have already been distributed to a value of 231,000 Sw.frs.

3. Appeal from the Nigerian Red Cross

In view of the great needs, the Federal Government, on April 10, asked the Nigerian Red Cross to contact the International Red Cross.

The League of Red Cross Societies, having retransmitted that appeal to it, the International Committee of the Red Cross, as a neutral intermediary in the event of conflict, appeals to your Society to help it cover the following needs :

1. Food

Protein-rich commodities for 200,000 people for at least a month.

Cash donations to the Nigerian Red Cross to enable it to purchase food locally. It needs ₦ 40,000 immediately and from ₦ 20,000 to ₦ 40,000 monthly for four months.


2. Medical supplies

200 stretchers
200 first-aid kits
20,000 bandages

3. Clothing

400 tons clothing and material
50,000 blankets
50,000 pairs of sheets

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4. Sundry supplies

200,000 bars of soap
30,000 lbs detergent
100 tons chloride of lime
50 tons disinfectant (e.g. Teyes)
2 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons DDT
6 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons Shelltox or similar

5. Personnel

Three independent mobile medico-social teams immediately, with others later, with responsibility for about 200 sq. miles of territory. Teams to consist of a leader, a supply specialist, one or two doctors and locally recruited helpers.

Operations control and team assignments will be directed by the Nigerian Red Cross in co-operation with ICRC delegation, Lagos.

These teams will require

1 five-ten ton lorry
2 vans
1 motor-cycle

6. Transport

The Nigerian Red Cross will also need

10 ten-ton lorries

These lorries will be maintained by the army.

7. Cash

a) Personnel. The costs of teams not included, but the following basis for calculation is recommended.

Per diem plus accommodation	£	7 a day
Team expenses including local labor	£	300 a month

b) Food (see under 1)


c) Petrol and part maintenance of vehicles has up till now been provided by the Armed Forces. It is impossible to say if this can be obtained for an increased organisation

£ 4,000

d) Customs duties are not levied other charges are partly waived, but handling charges must be paid

£ 2,000

0788



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- 5 -

- e) Railway transport - free of charge
- f) Shelter supplies
(sleeping mats, brooms, etc) ₦ 5,000
- g) Stores - free of charge
- h) Contingency Reserve ₦ 9,000

* * *

National Societies are requested to send cash contributions to the Swiss Bank Corporation, Geneva, for credit to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and stating reference "Nigeria".

Aid in kind should be advised beforehand to the ICRC, Relief Department, which will cable instructions for despatch.

National Societies are urged to advise ICRC immediately what technical and medical personnel they can make available.

B. AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE SECESSIONISTS ("BIAFRA")

1. Red Cross


Nigerian Red Cross sections in areas controlled by the Secessionists, with a population of several millions, have continued and even developed their activities as best as circumstances permit. In often extremely difficult conditions, first-aiders carry on helping the wounded, the sick and refugees.

2. ICRC intervention

ICRC medical teams have been working in areas controlled by the Secessionists from the outset of hostilities and medical supplies to a value of Sw.frs. 217,800 have already reached these teams, while further consignments on the way include medicines, dressing material, surgical instruments, vaccines, vitamin products, powdered milk.

Despite this emergency aid, the blockade by the federal forces is severely felt.

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Famine is rife. Although the country is fertile, protein foods are lacking. Hospitals and first-aid posts are short of the most elementary supplies. Conditions are going from bad to worse.

Alerted by the local Red Cross and its own delegates on the spot, the ICRC lists below the most urgent needs which it has itself observed :

a) Food

200 tons powdered milk
unlimited vitamin products
unlimited tonics
protein-rich commodities
protein-rich malt-extract
cod liver oil

b) Medical

unspecified quantity anti-malaria drugs
anti-diarrhoea drugs
100,000 smallpox vaccines
anti-typoid drugs
anti-tetanus drugs
antibiotics
1,000 first-aid kits
200 stretchers
100 pairs crutches
X-ray films

c) Clothing

5,000 blankets
10,000 sheets
1,000 draw-sheets
1,000 plastic raincoats

d) Sundries

100 field cooking pots
10,000 plastic tumblers
12 mechanical sewing machines

e) Special, for Red Cross first-aiders

APC tablets
Chloroquine
Phtalazol or Mexaforme
Dettol
Gauze
Adhesive dressings
Adhesive tape
Triangular bandages
Bandages

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Geneva
5-5-68

- 7 -

f) Cash

Cash donations for air transport expenses, as well as for local food purchases by ICRC delegates should be sent to the Swiss Bank Corporation, Geneva, for the ICRC's account, reference "Areas controlled by the Secessionists ("Biafra")".

Donations in kind should be notified to the ICRC, Relief Department, Geneva, which will cable instructions for despatch.

The ICRC hopes that your Society will give a favourable reception to this urgent appeal and takes this opportunity of expressing its high consideration.



R. Gallopin

Member of the International Committee
of the Red Cross
Director-General
for External Affairs

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By NARA Date 10/15/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria

(3)

UNCLASSIFIED 357

PAGE 01 DAR ES 03064 051052Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, ACDA 16, RSR 01,

/128 W

R 050800Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4232
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

UNCLAS DAR ES SALAAM 3064

SUBJ: NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS.

1. AUSTINE IKWU, "BIAFRA" PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE DAR PROPOSED ARUSHA, "ECONOMIC CAPITAL EAST AFRICA", AS SITE FOR NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS ACCORDING "STANDARD" REPORT MAY 5.

PAGE 2 RUDSVD 3064 UNCLASSIFIED

2. REPORT INDICATES TANZANIAN REACTION "GUARDED" AND INDICATES INFORMED SOURCES DAR BELIEVED VENUE UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE LAGOS.

3. OKWU TOLD PRESS REASON FOR CHOICE OF ARUSHA WAS THAT IN ECONOMIC CAPITAL AND THEREFORE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE "OUTSIDE POLITICAL INFLUENCES".

OKWU ADDED THAT ARUSHA WAS EASY TO REACH FOR CO-CHAIRMAN PROPOSED BY BOTH SIDES; IT HAD BEEN SITE OF LAST YEAR'S SUCCESSFUL KENYA-SOMALIA MEETINGS; AND IT WAS CAPITAL OF ASSOCIATION OF TYPE WHICH "BIAFRA" WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP WITH NIGERIA.

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TELEGRAM

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4. OKWU SAID "BIAFRA" WOULD PROPOSE ZAMBIA'S PRESIDENT KAUNDA AS IT CO-CHAIRMAN FOR NEGOTIATIONS DURING LONDON MEETINGS. STANDARD SAYS FMV HAS ALREADY INTIMATED THAT PRESIDENT KENYATTA IS THEIR CHOICE.

5. "STANDARD" POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT COMMENTS THAT: (A) LAST WEEK OKWU REJECTED LONDON AS SITE FOR FULL SCALE PEACE TALKS BECAUSE OF UK MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FMG AND SOME OBSERVERS FEEL ARUSHA SUGGESTION TO BE JUST PART OF "POSITIONAL PLAY" PRIOR TO VENUE BEING AGREED UPON; AND (B) IT TRUE ARUSHA AN ECONOMIC CAPITAL, BUT FACT THAT IT INSIDE TANZANIA LIKELY HOLD MORE WEIGHT WITH LAGOS. SPECULATES THAT NAIROBI STILL MAY BE MORE LIKELY VENUE.
PICKERING

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By *MN* NARA Date *10/5/05*



POL 16 BIAFRA
Department of State

TELEGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 ABIOJA 02961 041433Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00,000E 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
P 24, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 28, PC 04, IO 13,
ACDA 16, PSP 01, SA 01, /161 W

R 041225Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 365
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ABIOJA 2961

REF ID: ABIDJAN 2956 - POL 16 BIAFRA

SUBJ: NIGERIA

1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT PRESS EDITORIAL PUBLISHED MAY 4
EMPHASIZED THEME REPEATED IN PAST THAT NIGERIAN PROBLEM
HAS BECOME HUMAN PROBLEM AND END OF WAR IS FIRST PRIORITY.
EDITORIAL TRACED BRIEFLY IVORY COAST ATTITUDE AS EXPRESSED.

PAGE 2 ABIOJA 2961 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
SEVERAL WEEKS AGO BY HOUphouet. IVORIAN PEOPLE KNOW THAT WAR
MUST END AND THAT IF NO CEASE FIRE FORTHCOMING, THEY WILL BE
CONSULTED AND OFFICIAL POSITION TAKEN ON BIAFRA. EDITORIAL
HINTED USHER STATEMENT MAY 3 INTENDED PLACE FACTS AND ARGUMENTS
CLEARLY BEFORE PEOPLE, WITH STRONG IMPLICATION STATEMENT.
INTENDED PRIME PUBLIC OPINION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE OFFICIAL POSITION.

2. ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT HOUphouet QUESTIONED ON FMG-BIAFRA
TALKS STATED IN PARIS YESTERDAY THAT: "WE HAVE ALWAYS DESIRED
PEACE. IF THESE NEGOTIATIONS LEAD TO PEACE, WE SHALL BE THE
FIRST TO APPLAUD. BUT TODAY, PEOPLE OVER THERE CONTINUE TO DIE
AND THERE IS STILL NO CEASEFIRE."

(2) MICROFILMED BY RVR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 08865 041330Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, SAH 03, IO 13, PC 04, SCS 0
PPT 02, SCA 02, RSR 01, /152 W

R 041145Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 467
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 8865

SUBJ: NEW YORK TIMES STORIES

REF: STATE 156915

1: STORIES IN NEW YORK TIMES ABOUT ALLEGED BIAFRAN GAINS
IN NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR REPORTED REFTEL DISCUSSED WITH NYTIMES
LAGOS CORRESPONDENT, ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR. HE IS QUITE UNHAPPY
THAT WILDLY EXAGGERATED BIAFRAN RADIO CLAIMS AND REPORTS SUB-
MITTED BY ROBINSON HAVE BEEN GIVEN SO MUCH PROMINENCE AND

PAGE 2 RUTALS 8865CC C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
APPARENT CREDIBILITY BY HIS PAPER. FRIENDLY NOTES WITH SOME
BITTERNESS THAT ROBISON WAS HIRED BY LLOYD GARRISON FROM
PARIS OFFICE NYTIMES AFTER ROBISON HAD BEEN DROPPED BY
OBSERVER(LONDON) FOR HIGHLY COLORED AND INACCURATE REPORTING
FROM "BIAFRA".

2: FRIENDLY SAID HE HAD REPORTED HIS OWN TRIP TO ONITSHA
BY WHICH HE HAD PERSONALLY CONFIRMED THAT CITY IS FIRMLY IN
FEDERAL HANDS. HE HAS ALSO REPORTED TRIPS TO ASABA BY OTHER
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS AND BY DIPLOMATS IN RECENT WEEKS AND
SINCE "BIAFRAN" RAID INTO MIDWEST. NATURALLY HE WONDERS WHY

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 08865 041330Z

HIS STORIES HAVE BEEN CUT OR "HACKED UP" BY EDITORS IN NEW YORK.

3. ANOTHER AMERICAN HERE HAS RECEIVED LETTER FROM GROSSMAN, TIME MAGAZINE CORRESPONDENT WHO HAS SPENT MUCH TIME IN LAGOS AND WENT TO BIAFRA IN APRIL. GROSSMAN COMMENTED SARCASTICALLY THAT RORISON REPORTS THINGS WHICH OTHER REPORTERS HAVE NOT OBSERVED.

PAGE 3 RUTALS 8865CC C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
4. WITH RESPECT MAY 2 ARTICLE AND "SPECIAL" FROM LAGOS (PARA 3 REFTEL) SENTENCE QUOTING NIGERIAN ARMY OFFICER IN ASABA AS DENYING THAT BIAFRAN FORCES HELD ANY TERRITORY ON WEST BANK OF NIGER RIVER WAS ONLY FIRST SENTENCE OF FRIENDLY'S REPORT. HE DOES NOT KNOW YET IF REST OF HIS STORY WAS CARRIED. FULL TEXT OF WHAT HE SENT APRIL 30 FOLLOWS:

5. "A NIGERIAN ARMY OFFICER IN ASABA DENIED FLATLY TODAY THAT BIAFRAN FORCES HELD ANY TERRITORY ON WEST BANK OF NIGER RIVER. LIEUTENANT AHMEDIAOWARFDNHSPEAKING IN A LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE INTERVIEW, SAID "EVERYTHING IS BACK TO NORMAL HERE", AND CHARACTERIZED AS "A LOAD OF LIES" RECENT BIAFRAN CLAIMS TO HAVE ESTABLISHED A FOOTHOLD IN NIGERIA'S MIDWEST STATE. ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER, A MEMBER OF THE HEADQUARTERS STAFF OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY'S SEVENTH BRIGADE, SUPPLIES WERE CROSSING THE NIGERBORDER NORMALLY TO FEDERAL FORCES IN ONITSHA. WHEN THIS CORRESPONDENT VISITED ONITSHA APRIL & THERE WERE ROUGHLY 600#FEDERAL TROOPS OCCUPYING THE BUSINESS CENTER OF THE TOWN AND SLOWLY EXPANDING THEIR PERIMETER INTO THE HILLS EAST OF IT AND ALONG THE ROAD SOUTH.

PAGE 4 RUTALS 8865CC C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
A. "ACCORDING TO LIEUTENANT HOWARD, THE SITUATION IN ONITSHA HAS NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THEN. HE DECLINED, HOWEVER, TO SAY WHEN FEDERAL TROOPS ON THE ASABA SIDE HAD LAST HAD CONTACT WITH BIAFRAN INFILTRATORS WHO STAGED A BRIEF

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By MARIA Date 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 LAGOS 08865 041330Z

RAID ON THE TOWN UGWASHI-UKU, 19 MILES WEST OF THE RIVER
APRIL 16.

R. "AN AMERICAN MISSIONARY, BROTHER ROMAN WICINSKI,
WAS KILLED BY THE INFILTRATORS THAT DAY. AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT,
WHO WENT TO INVESTIGATE HIS DEATH, FOUND ASABA AND ALL THE
ROADS LEADING TO IT CLEAR OF INFILTRATORS ON APRIL 21. HE DID
NOTE THAT RUMORS OF BIAFRAN PRESENCE HAD LED TO THE EVACUATION
OF CIVILIANS FROM ASABA AND HAD GENERATED PANICKY BEHAVIOR
BY FEDERAL TROOPS STATIONED IN THE AREA".
OLSON

AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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Authority AND959503
By MARARA Date 10/5/05



Re 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 134

PAGE 01 041421Z

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ACTION AF 06

INFO SS 20, GPM 04, L 03, IO 03, INR 07, ACDA 07, AID 10, RSR 01, FILE 01,

/062 W

P R 041255Z MAY 68
FM USDAO/LAGOS NIGERIA
TO DIA PRIORITY
SECSTATE
CINCSTRIKE
CINCLANT
INFO RUE
H/CIA
DA
AMCO ONUWIBADAN
AMCONSL KADUNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L 0196 MAY 68. SGD HALLIGAN. COUNTRY: NIGERIA.
SUBJECT: UPDATE CURRENT FMG/EASTERN MILNWUGUATION. DIA FOR
DIACOS CINCSTRIKE FOR STRJ2-C DA FOR ACSI.

I - THIRD DIV. SOUTHEASTER, FRONT: SENIOR STAFF OFFICERS SUPREME
AND ARMY HQ CONTINUE INDICATE "ADEKUNLE DOINGHEERY WELL" IN DRIVE
ON HAROURT OBJECTIVES ALTHOUGH HE "MEETING SOME STIFFEST
RESISTANCE WAR SO FAR". IT PROBABLY THAT WITHIN HIS MAIN AREA
OPERATIONS (SOUTH AND WEST OF IMO RIVER) ADEKUNLE HAS BULK FIFTEEN,
SIXTEEN AND SEVENTEEN BRIGADES; FURTHER, IT APPEARS MOST SERIOUS

PAGE 2 RUTALS 8866CC C O N F I D E N T I A L .
POTENTIAL LIMITING FACTOR IS ABILITY FEDERAL LOGISTICAL CHANNELS
CONTINUE SUPPORT WHAT IS, FOR THEM, MOST SERIOUS AND CONTINUING
DEMANDS WAR SO FAR. (ON 03 MAY NIG PORTS AUTHORITY VESSEL "BODE
THOMAS" WHICH WAS LOADING PORTS AUTHORITY/HARBOR MASTER
PERSONNEL/
EQUIP, SUPPLIES AT LAGOS FOR BONNY (HARBOR MASTER INITIATING
ACTION GET PORT HAROURT HARBOR CONTROL FACILITIES BASED BONNY
BACK INTO BUSINESS) COMMANDERED BY NIG MILITARY WHICH DISPATCHED
HER BONNY MORNING 04 MAY WITH AMMOAND "CRITICAL SUPPLIES" FOR

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 041421Z

1. ASIRD DIV. INCLUDED AS DECK CARGO WERE FIVE THREE TON REDFORD LORRIES LOADED WITH 7x62MM SMALL ARMS AMMO). ALTHOUGH CAUTION PREVAILS, HOWEVER, IT OBVIOUS FROM ATTITUDES SENIOR MIL PERSONNEL THEY EXPECT ADEKUNLE TO "CONTROL HAROURT AIRPORT" VERY SHORTLY. (IN THIS RESPECT, DATT BELIEVES ADEKUNLE'S INITIAL OBJECTIVES CONTINUE BE AIRPORT AND REFINERY RATHER THAN CITY ITSELF).

2. MID-WEST: INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, HQ, NIGERIAN ARMY, INDICATES REBEL INFILTRATION INTO MID-WEST CONTINUES CREATE PROBLEMS FOR FED. FORCES WHICH, HOWEVER, NOW IN PROCESS "RELOCATING TO FACE NEW SITUATION". FORCES WHICH DATT REPORTED MOVING INTO WARRI EARLY IN WEEK NOW KNOWN TO BE SECOND BN (REINFORCED) FEDERAL GUARD WHICH RELIEVED 97 BN, NINE BRIGADE, TWO DIV WHICH HAD BEEN IN

PAGE 3 RUTALS 8866CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
AREA. 97 BN WILL MOVE UP "CLOSER TO NIGER RIVER FOR DEFENSIVE EMPLOYMENT".

3. NIGERIAN AIR FORCE. COMMANDER NAF TOLD DATT NITE 03 MAY:

- A. FOUR MOST RECENTLY ACQUIRED MIG 17S "JUST ABOUT READY TO GO".
- B. NAF HAD LOST TWO MIG 17S "EARLY IN WEEK" WHEN NIGERIAN PILOTS BRINGING TWO MIGS FROM KANO TO MAKURDI AFTER SCHEDULED PERIOD MAINTENANCE (OVERSHOT MAKURDI AND BENUE RIVER, GOT LOST OVER KATSINA ALA RIVER, AND RAN OUT OF GAS). SOURCE SAID ONE PILOT BAILED OUT AND LANDED SAFELY WHILE SECOND "RODE PLANE DOWN TO CRASH LANDING AND SURVIVED UNINJURED". BOTH PLANES, HOWEVER, "WRECKED". (THIS SHOULD LEAVE ELEVEN OPERATIONAL MIG 17S IN NAF INVENTORY. IN THIS REGARD, SOURCE TOLD DATT "ALL THREE IL-28S FULLY OPERATIONAL".
- C. HE HAS "TOTAL TWENTY CZECH TECHNICIANS IN COUNTRY AT PRESENT HANDLING IL-28S".
- D. MISCELLANEOUS:
 - A. NNS NIGERIA CURRENTLY UNDER FOURTEEN DAY QUARANTINE LAGOS HARBOR AS CASE SMALLPOX DISCOVERED ON BOARD WHILE VESSEL OPERATING IN SOUTHEASTERN WATERS. QUARANTINE ENDS 12 MAY. VESSEL WILL, HOWEVER, BE PERMITTED SAIL OPERATIONALLY IF

PAGE 4 RUTALS 8866CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
EMERGENCY ARISES WHICH REQUIRES HER PRESENCE. NNS OGOJA DEPARTED LAGOS 02 MAY TO RELIEVE NIGERIAN BONNY WATERS.

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PAGE #3 041421Z

B. REF PAR 2E, MY 0189 MAY 68. KNOWLEDGEABLE EXPAT SOURCE WHO
SAW VEHICLE DESCRIBED IT AS "GERMAN ARMY PFZ4, OPEN TOP, FOUR
WHEELED DRIVE, PERSONNEL CARRIER".
GP3

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POL 16 BIAFRA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL 527

PAGE 01 ABIDJA 02956 031736Z

49
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 28, NIC 01,
RSR 01, /141 W

R 031630Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2363
INFO AODIS ABABA 082
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
CINCMEA FSA
AMEMBASSY OAKAR
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 2956

SUBJ: BIAFRA RECOGNITION

REF: LAGOS 8828, ABIDJAN 2834

PAGE 2 RUTAIJ 2956 C O N F I D E N T I A L
1. FRENCH EMBOFF LE PAUDERT INFORMS US FRENCH BELIEVE HOUPNOUET
PREPARED ACCORD IVORY COAST RECOGNITION BIAFRA IN EVENT WAR
DRAGS ON MUCH LONGER. LE PAUDERT SAID HOUPNOUET AND NYERERE
DISCUSSED NIGERIAN SITUATION DURING LATTER'S STATE VISIT
HERE AND THAT HOUPNOUET AGREED SUPPORT SOME KIND INITIATIVE ON
PART ANGLPHONES TO ENCOURAGE END CIVIL WAR. NO RPT, NO COMMITMENT,
HOWEVER, MADE REGARDING RECOGNITION. NEVERTHELESS, HOUPNOUET
SYMPATHETIC BIAFRA, AND FRENCH BELIEVE HE READY FOLLOW
NYERERE EXAMPLE IF NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT RPT, NOT LEAD SOON

(2)


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PAGE(S) MISSING IN ORIGINAL

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POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA

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TELEGRAM

AR POL 16 BIAFRA

11

CONFIDENTIAL 499

PAGE 01 LAGOS 08843 031732Z

47
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, IO 13, AID 28, PC 04, RSR 01,

/144 W

R 031540Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4551
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 411
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
DIA
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFA

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 8843

SUBJ: NIGERIA AND "BIAFRA"

1. BRITISH HC HAS REPORT FROM DAR ES SALAAM MAY 2
THAT KATIKAZA, PRINCIPAL SEC MFA, SAID PRIVATELY THAT
"TANZANIA HAS RECOGNIZED BIAFRA IN THE HOPE THAT
THIS WOULD HELP ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE IN NIGERIA.
KATIKAZA ALSO REMARKED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 08843 031732Z

NOT BE WORRIED IF NO OTHER COUNTRIES RECOGNIZED BIAFRA, THOUGH THEY HAD IN FACT RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM NUMBER OF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND SOME QTE BIG POWERS UNQTE (OUTSIDE AFRICA) THAT IF A CEASE-FIRE DID NOT MATERIALIZE, THEY WOULD FOLLOW SUIT AND RECOGNIZE BIAFRA."

2. ANOTHER BRITISH REPORT FROM DAR QUOTED OKWU, BIAFRA'S REPRESENTATIVE, AS TELLING PRESS WHEN

PAGE3 RUTALS 8843CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
ASKED TO COMMENT ON REPORTS OF NAIROBI AS A POSSIBLE VENUE FOR PEACE TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND BIAFRA THAT BIAFRA WELCOMED ANY VENUE IN AFRICA FOR PEACE TALKS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS WITH NIGERIA "AS LONG AS SUCH A VENUE IS FREE FROM EXTERNAL INFLUENCES, PREJUDICES AND UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY WHICH MIGHT JEOPARDISE ANY CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF THE TALKS." OKWU ADDED THAT BIAFRA HAD CONFIDENCE IN AFRICA AND PREFERRED ANY VENUE TO LONDON WHICH WAS A QTE BELLIGERENT IN THE CONFLICT UNQTE.

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OLSON

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

To: [unclear]

AF
PC (1)

R/FILE

WH(Smith) approved NO REPLY NECESSARY 5/6/68
(Kay Birdsall to cspargo)

RSR FILES

AB

6895

Attention Mrs. [unclear]
Keep this study together.

MAY 3 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Message from Major General Yakubu Gowon, Head
of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria

POL 27 BIAFRA-
NIGERIA

Enclosed is the original of a note left on May 3, 1968, with
Assistant Secretary Palmer by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, Joe Iyalla. The note transmits the text of a message
from Major General Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian Head of State, to the
President. Also enclosed is a copy of the Department's acknowledgement
of the note.

The Department recommends that no further reply be made. General
Gowon and the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) are fully
aware that the United States is in favor of early negotiations leading
to a peaceful resolution of the Nigerian conflict. We are also informed
that General Gowon has sent the same message to a number of other heads
of state.

Jeanne W. Davis

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Message from General Gowon
2. Copy of Department's Acknowledgement

Microfilmed to
EDB Library

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OUT

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AF - Mr. Palmer

②
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BY S/S: CMS

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Authority 1(N)19501503
By MM-NARA Date 10/5/05

30

7/3/68

for

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his note of May 3, 1968, containing the text of a message from His Excellency, Major General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Nigeria Armed Forces, to the President of the United States of America. In accordance with the Ambassador's request, the Secretary of State has transmitted Major General Gowon's message to the President.

POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

1
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Department of State,

Washington

May 6, 1968

S/IS-S(C) 4/10
MAY 6 1968 AM

AF:AFW:AMHardy:ba 5/3/68

S/S-Mrs. Denham

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

① 7239
Mrs Derham

② RS/AN-C

Orig incoming note

Sent to WLT - 5/3/68

S/STE 6895

— CMS
Washg t

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By	MN
NARA Date	10/15/05

H 6895

5/3/68

The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to forward the text of a message, hereto subjoined, from Major-General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of Nigerian Armed Forces, to the Honourable Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America.

*Stamps init.
sent to White
House 5/3/68
6495*

"In view of your continued interest in the affairs of my country, I wish to keep Your Excellency informed of the present situation with regard to the prospects for peace talks.

"2. For some time, the rebels have been in contact with the Commonwealth Secretary General, Mr. Arnold Smith, to arrange peace talks in London. In October, 1967, when the first of such approaches was made, Mr. Arnold Smith contacted me and I sent high officials of my Government to London. Surprisingly, however, the rebels changed their minds and did not send their own representatives to London as agreed. This happened again in November.

"3. Lately, Mr. Arnold Smith has again been in contact with the rebels and they have assured him that they were ready to begin talks in London under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat. My Government agreed to meet the rebels, in keeping with my decision to explore all means of a peaceful solution. But to the surprise of both the Commonwealth Secretariat and my Government, the rebels suddenly and unilaterally overturned all the preliminary arrangements by announcing that the peace talks must be held in Africa and that they should be allowed to nominate one Head of State, from another country, to participate in the talks, while the Federal Government should also nominate one. Since then, the rebels have specifically proposed Dakar, Senegal, as the venue for the proposed talks just at a time when arrangements were almost completed for beginning the talks. Thus, they have again sabotaged all the preliminary efforts by their unilateral change of venue and by the imposition of pre-conditions.

"4. My Government has no objection for talks being held in Africa or in any particular African country. Nevertheless, I believe that such talks as we are going to have, are better held under the auspices of an international organisation. This was why we accepted London, the seat

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 By MMNARA Date 10/5/05

of the Commonwealth Secretariat, as an appropriate venue. In Africa, the Organization of African Unity which has been long involved in trying to help us resolve the crisis, is the obvious Organization under whose auspices such talks should take place. By the same token, Addis Ababa, the Headquarters of the O.A.U., should be the first choice as venue. If an African capital is picked at random, problems and complications will arise as, for instance, the part which the Head of State concerned will play in the proceedings. Is he to be the mediator or will he be expected merely to provide facilities?

"5. My fear is that the rebels are not genuinely interested in peace talks. They merely wish to exploit their supposed and well-advertised willingness to talk for propaganda advantage; otherwise they would not have substituted negotiation by radio for the confidential and more fruitful channel of secret contact, in the hope of giving the false impression that my Government is unwilling to talk peace.

"6. Even now that Federal forces have liberated about two-thirds of the area of the former Eastern Region originally held by them, leaving them with nothing worth recognising, I am still anxious to have talks started with them, but there appears to be a serious difference of opinion in the rebel camp. While one group is anxious for reconciliation, the other faction seems to prefer unmitigated dissemination of falsehood in the hope of acquiring recognition from inadequately informed and ill-intentioned States.

"7. Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem."

Major-General Yakubu Gowon is anxious to keep the President of the United States of America and the Heads of other friendly governments regularly and fully informed of developments in the Nigerian situation. The Nigerian Ambassador would, therefore, be most grateful if the Secretary of State would be so good as to transmit this message to the President of the United States of America as soon as possible.

The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration and esteem.



Washington, D.C.

3rd May, 1968.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONTROLLED DISSEM
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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*Intelligence
Note* - 321

- 321

May 3, 1968

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TM*

Meeting Now Seems Likely. After many failures the persistent efforts of Commonwealth Secretary General Arnold Smith to get talks going between Biafra and Lagos appear about to succeed. Smith announced in London on May 2 that high-level representatives from both sides would meet there for preliminary talks on May 5. So far, neither General Gowon nor Lt. Colonel Ojukwu has contradicted him.

Talks About Talks. At these first meetings the delegations will be seeking agreement on where to hold the negotiations, the level of representation, the presence of outsiders, and an agenda. The Biafrans have been insisting on an African venue, and the Nigerians will probably agree while citing the delays this may cause. The Biafrans may press for a direct confrontation between Ojukwu and Gowon, but the Nigerians are likely to refuse. The Biafrans will demand the presence, and even the participation, of other African chiefs of state, but Lagos will resist this idea on the grounds that the civil war is an internal matter. As for the agenda, the Biafrans will insist that the first item be a ceasefire. Lagos has already agreed to this. However, it is clear that the Biafrans will want mainly to discuss the formalities for an immediate ceasefire, while the Nigerians will insist on talking about the political concessions that Biafra must make first.

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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
Playing for the Gallery. Both sides are wooing world support.

Tanzania's recognition of Biafra on April 13 produced signs that a few other African states might soon follow suit, notably Ivory Coast, Zambia, Gabon, Senegal, and Congo-Brazzaville. To spur them to do so, Ojukwu will probably seek to turn any talks with Lagos into a forum for convincing the world of Gowon's intransigence and bloodthirstiness. This is why he would like the substantive talks to be as public and as high level as possible. Gowon is anxious to project an image of warm-hearted reasonableness in order to forestall further moves to recognize Biafra and to check the growing public concern in Europe over arms sales to Lagos. But he also wants to gain time in which his victory-hungry field commanders can deal further strong blows at Biafra. Thus he would prefer quiet talks, cautiously approached and with an elaborate agenda.

Biafra's Predicament. Ojukwu sees signs of quickening sympathies for Biafra in Africa and Europe as Federal troops gradually close in. He probably believes that if Biafra could achieve a military stalemate, these sympathies would help him to salvage at least some kind of Biafran autonomy from the conflict. This hope seems likely to dictate the Biafran position on the forthcoming talks. However, if convinced that the current Federal drive to cut off his contact with the outside world cannot be stopped, Ojukwu might conclude that a military stalemate is impossible. (Federal forces threaten Port Harcourt, whose airport is Biafra's chief link with other countries.) In that case, he might lower his sights and seek peace more nearly on Gowon's terms.

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POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 031635Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 08, SS 20, SP 01, SAH 03, GPM 04, INR 07, RSR 01, FILES 01, /060 W

P R 031525Z MAY 68
FM USDAO/LAGOS NIGERIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
SECDEF
SECDEF
DIA
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L 0192 MAY 68. SGD HALLIGAN, DATT, STATE FOR
AF; SECDEF FOR OASD/ISA; DIA FOR DIACO; LONDON FOR POL AND USDJD.
1. REF MY 0190 MAY 02.
2. DATT CALLED BY GOBIR AFTERNOON 03 MAY RELATIVE STATUS
REQUEST REF MSG IN VIEW FACT "EMBASSY WASHINGTON WOULD HAVE TO BE
NOTIFIED ON ARRANGEMENTS". DATT SAID ANSWER EXPECTED "SHORTLY"
AND INFO WOULD BE PASSED AT ONCE. GP3

Defense Dept.
5/16/68

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By	NARA Date
10/5/05	

OPTION/ACTION

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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA
	34	10
		NSC
		6

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POL 27 BIAFRA -
NIGERIA
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17

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
INFO : IBADAN, KADUNA, LONDON, YAOUNDE, US MISSION GENEVA,
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMIAFSA, DIA

MAY 5 2 53 PM '68

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS
SUBJECT : Conditions in the East Central State as of March, 1968

REF :

The following information has been extracted from a lengthy report made by a British surgeon (Gerald Holmes), who left a hospital (St. Luke's) at Anua near Uyo in the East Central State in late March 1968. His report was sent by the Commonwealth office to the British High Commission, Lagos, who have in turn made it available to the Embassy. British officials have characterized the report as having "strikingly little political bias or indeed interest," but worthwhile as a source of "factual and largely firsthand information" about conditions in an Ibibio section of "Biafra."

Holmes said the "casualties of this war were not too bad in numbers, though the loss of University graduates would be serious for the Ibos." (Embassy comment: Both of these points should be noted. Perhaps Holmes knows that many Ibo University graduates joined the army, probably as officers, and have been killed in the fighting.)

Holmes had the "strong impression that the (non-Ibo) minorities did not want a separate Biafra at all." On March 29, two Catholic priests saw an incident in which Ibo troops who thought they had been cut off near Uyo turned on the local Ibibios, "shooting 12 or more of them." Previously there had been individual incidents in which non-Ibos had been mistreated, but no large-scale atrocities.

Although Holmes himself had not seen any mercenaries, there were "fairly circumstantial accounts of mercenaries having been seen in Port Harcourt."

The hospital at which Holmes worked received about 100 air raid casualties in February and March. There were also about 100 casualties

Exempted from automatic decontrol

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:AEWellons (initials)

Clearances:

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Authority UND 950503
By M/NARA Date 10/5/03

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Lagos A- 586

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in the three days following the federal landings at Oron. The report indicates that FMG strafing and bombing is becoming more effective and is causing growing concern, particularly among the civilian population. (This Embassy has noted that Radio Biafra complains increasingly about the air raids.) Holmes had no knowledge of any hospitals in Biafra being "improperly" used by the rebel military, but he reported that schools were used by "Biafran" troops as a matter of course.

On the economic side, it was reported that there had been a sharp decline in prices received by farmers; e.g., before the war, a farmer received 15 shillings per gallon for palm oil; in March it was 2 shillings. On the other hand, the price of rice has gone from £9 per bag to £14; small fish from 6 pence to 2 shillings 6 pence; a Yam from 3 shillings to 7 shillings; an egg from 3 pence to 6 pence; and beans from 3 pence to 1 shilling. Garri, a staple in the Nigerian diet, has roughly doubled in price since the crisis began. Holmes found that malnutrition has become a serious health problem. Hospital attendance has declined both because patients are unable to meet transportation costs and because of a "genuine and understandable fear in minds of ordinary folk, that hospitals are targets for air attacks."


While powdered milk, antibiotics, antimalarial pills, and transport are high on the list of immediate relief requirements, "the chief need of any relief program would be honest and reliable people to administer it, which in practice means expatriates."

OLSON

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Action: Amembassy LAGOS
INFO : " LONDON

Origin

Info:

Subj: New York Times Stories Datelined Onitsha

1. April 30 NYTimes story datelined Onitsha as of April 27 (appearing AF Press Clips May 2) headlined 300 Biafrans die in Nigerian Raids. Contains sentence QTE A small group of Federal troops still occupies Onitsha along waterfront. Biafrans on opposite bank of Niger at ~~Asaba~~ Asaba have cut off their escape route across river UNQTE.

2. May 2 Times story datelined Onitsha, also as of April 27, special to the New York Times headlined Most of Onitsha Claimed by Biafra. QTE Secessionist forces now control nearly all of this key trading city on the east banks of the Niger River. UNQTE QTE An on-the-spot tour reveals that the Biafrans occupy about nine-tenths of the heavily bombarded city. The remnants of a Nigerian division, which broke through to Onitsha from the north more than a month ago, are now pocketed in three positions along the road ~~leading~~ leading to the mile-long Niger bridge. UNQTE QTE In a surprise raid several weeks ago a Biafran battalion crossed the Niger downstream in an effort to seize Asaba and cut the Nigerians' escape route from Onitsha. The Biafrans appear to control the other end of the ~~bridge~~ bridge and four positions in Asaba UNQTE.

(2)

Drafted by:
AF:AF/P:RLPerkins:ba 5/2/68

Tel. Ext.
2105

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: AFW - Robert P. Smith

Clearances:

USIA/IAA-Mr. Lewis (sub)

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By MMNARA Date 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to LAGOS, LONDON

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
3. Under May 2 article appears following QTE Special to the New York Times, Lagos, Nigeria, April 30. A Nigerian Army officer in Asaba denied Tuesday that Biafran forces held any territory on the west bank of the Niger UNQTE.

4. Suggest Embassy may wish call these articles to attention Al Friendly, Jr. FYI We have impression wildly exaggerated Biafran ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxfollowing Nigerian events xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxabettet byxxxproBiafraelementsxxxENDFYI~~ radio claim several weeks ago to have destroyed most of Second Division in Onitsha area has gained some degree credence among journalists and others following Nigerian events, doubtless abetted by output pro-Biafra elements in US. END FYI

RUSK

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
PR DEF 19-8 (UK) NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

7
May 26 1977

UNCLASSIFIED 207 POSS DUPE

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, MC 01, AID 28, IGA 02, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02,

INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12,

SAH 03, RSR 01, /159 W

R 021133Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 418
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USUN 282
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEA/AFSA
RUEPJS/DIA

UNCLAS LAGOS 8777

SUBJECT: BRITISH POSITION ON SUPPLYING ARMS TO NIGERIA.

1. NIGERIAN NEWS MEDIA HAVE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY TO STATEMENT BY LORD SHEPHERD, MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, IN HOUSE OF LORDS THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN NIGERIAN

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CRISIS, IT WOULD CONTINUE SUPPLY ARMS AND IT WOULD CONTINUE TO URGE BOTH SIDES IN CIVIL WAR TO NEGOTIATE RECONCILIATION. SUMMARY FOLLOWS OF NEWS REPORT IN LAGOS MORNING POST MAY 1 UNDER THE HEAD

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-LINE "OJUKWU REJECTED BRITAINS ADVICE."

2. THE MINISTER WHO WAS ANSWERING QUESTIONS ON THE NIGERIAN SITUATION POINTED OUT: "WE CAN HELP, WE CAN OFFER THE HAND OF FRIENDSHIP BUT WE MUST NOT INTERFERE." THE TASK OF HIS GOVERNMENT, HE EMPHASISED, WAS TO URGE BOTH SIDES IN THE CIVIL WAR "TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE AND SEEK TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARDS A RECONCILIATION OF THEIR DIFFICULTIES AND A SOLUTION WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF NIGERIA." HE WAS CONVINCED THAT WHATEVER SETTLEMENT MIGHT EMERGE FROM THE WAR MUST BE "A NIGERIAN SETTLEMENT WORKED OUT BY NIGERIANS" AND COMPATIBLE WITH NIGERIAN IDEAS AND ASPIRATIONS.

A) HE SAID ANY DECISION TAKEN BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO STOP SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE FMG WOULD CERTAINLY BE A BIASED ONE BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS IMBALANCE WHICH SUCH ACTION WOULD CREATE. HE SAID FMGS CASE WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF A COUNTRY FIGHTING WITH

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ANOTHER COUNTRY, POINTING OUT THAT SINCE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN RECOGNISED BY HIS GOVERNMENT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS SHOULD CONTINUE. "IF IT WERE TWO INDEPENDENT COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WHO WERE IN CONFLICT, THEN PERHAPS THERE MIGHT WELL BE A CASE FOR NOT SUPPLYING ARMS TO EITHER SIDE, BUT THIS WAS A CONFLICT WITHIN AN INDEPENDENT COMMONWEALTH COUNTRY," HE EXPLAINED.

B) GE ADDED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS DOING ITS BEST TO SEE THAT BOTH SIDES IN THE WAR ENGAGE IN PEACE TALKS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS. LORD SHEPHERD TOLD THE HOUSE: "WE REGRET THE SUFFERING PAST AND PRESENT OF THE IBOS, BUT IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THE "BIAFRAN" LEADERS REJECTED OUR ADVICE SOME 10 MONTHS AGO TO CONTINUE TO SEEK A PEACEFUL REDRESS OF THEIR GRIEVANCES. "THOSE WHO APPEAL TO FORCE EVEN UNDER PROVOCATION ASSUME A TERRIBLE RESPONSIBILITY. THE FACT THAT THE "BIAFRANS" HAVE CEDED FROM THE FEDERATION AGAINST OUR ADVICE DOES NOT ABSOLVE US FROM OUR OBLIGATIONS TO THE FEDERATION.

C) "NEVERTHELESS THERE MAY BE A CASE FOR CUTTING OFF BRITISH SUPPLIES IF IT COULD BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THIS COULD BRING PEACE CLOSER. BUT I BELIEVE THAT TO BE THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WOULD

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HAPPEN. THE "BIAFRANS" WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO GO ON FIGHTING RATHER THAN TO NEGOTIATE. "WE HAVE BEEN URGED TO USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE DECLARED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN PEACE TALKS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS. I AM AMAZED THAT IT SHOULD BE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD NOW REWARD THEM FOR THIS ACT OF MEDERATION AND STATEMENSHIP

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BY CUTTING OFF SUCH SUPPLIES AS WE HAVE HITHERTO PERMITTED TO GO TO THEM. "I SUSPECT THAT BOTH SIDES IN NIGERIA KNOW IN THEIR HEART OF HEARTS THAT THERE CAN BE NO MILITARY SOLUTION IN NIGERIA, AND INDEED THAT A MILITARY SOLUTION WOULD NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY THAT IT MUST BE A POLITICAL SOLUTION."
OLSON

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 28, IO 13, ACDA 16, SR 01,

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R 021136Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 419
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
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AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USUN 283
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
RUEBEEA/CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEA/AFSA
DIA

UNCLAS LAGOS 8778

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN REBEL ATROCITIES
1. NIGERIAN NEWS MEDIA HAVE BEEN PLAYING UP "EYE-WITNESS"
ACCOUNT OF MURDER OF ABOUT 200 MINORITY TRIBESMAN (IBIOBIOS) BY
"BIAFRANS" IN UMUAHIA ON APRIL 2. THIS ACCOUNT IS ONLY PART
OF A LONG ARTICLE IN LONDON TIMES OF APRIL 29 BY WILLIAM NORRIS,
WHO RETURNED RECENTLY FROM VISIT TO "BIAFRA." MOST OF ARTICLE
IS DEVOTED

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TO PROSPECTS AND NEED FOR NEGOTIATION OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR.

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BUT ONLY PART OF IT USED IN LOCAL NEWS MEDIA FOLLOWS:

2: "NOT ALL THE BARRARITY IN THIS WAR HAS BEEN ON ONE SIDE,

HOWEVER, WHILE IN BIAFRA I WAS GIVEN AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF 200 MINORITY TRIBESMEN--IBIOBIOS-- WHO WERE BEATEN TO DEATH OUTSIDE THE PROGRESS HOTEL IN UMUAHIA ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 2. THE IBIOBOS WHO INCLUDED SOME OLD MEN AND YOUNG WOMEN, WERE APPARENTLY SUSPECTED OF COLLABORATING WITH THE ADVANCING FEDERAL FORCES. THEY WERE FROG-MARCHED ACROSS AN OPEN SPACE WHILE THE LOCAL POPULATION ATTACKED THEM WITH STICKS AND CLUBS. THEN THE BODIES, THE STILL LIVING AS WELL AS THE DEAD, WERE THROWN INTO A DUMPER TRUCK AND TAKEN FOR BURIAL. THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF MINORITY TRIBES AND THEIR DIVIDED LOYALTY IS NOT ONE WHICH BIAFRANS CARE TO DISCUSS TOO FREELY. THEY ARE MUCH MORE VOLUBLE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE REFUGEES, WHO NOW NUMBER NEARLY 300,000 IN CAMPS AND SEVERAL TIMES THAT NUMBER ABSORBED INTO FAMILIES. DYSENTERY IS RWFE IN THE CAMPS AND CHILDREN ARE SUFFERING AND SOMETIMES DYING FROM MALNUTRITION."

OLSON

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0127 Biafra - Nigeria
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ACTION AF 15

INFO GPM 04, INR 07, RSR 01, FILE 01, E 04, SS 20, EUR 08, NEA 06, ACDA 07,
OPR 02, /075 W

P R 011555Z MAY 68
FM USDAO/LAGOS NIGERIA
TO DIA PRIORITY
SESTAT WASHDC
CINCSTRIKE
CINCLANT
INFO CIA
DA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

Defense Dept.
8/1/68

C O N F I D E N T I A L 0189 MAY 68. SGD HALLIGAN. COUNTRY: NIGERIA.
SUBJECT: UPDATE CURRENT FMG/EASTERN MIL SITUATION. DIA FOR
DIACO; CINCSTRIKE FOR STRJ2-C; DA FOR ACSI.
1. THIRD DIV/SOUTHEASTERN FRONT: AS OF 01 MAY, WELL PLACED/
USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCES SUPREME AND ARMY HQ SAY ADEKUNLE'S UNITS
DOING VERY WELL ON DRIVE PORT HARCOURT OBJECTIVES (SIC)". ALL
SOURCES PLAYING THIS ONE VERY LOW KEY IN LIGHT OBVIOUS POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS RESULTS THIS ACTION. SOURCES SAY ADEKUNLE HAD
"SUPPLY AND AMMO PROBLEMS FOR SEVERAL DAYS" AS HE MOVING FASTER

PAGE 2 RUTALS 8755CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
THAT "WE ABLE KEEP UP WITH HIM" AND THAT THIS HAD DELAYED HIS
PROGRESS, BUT "PROPER RESUPPLY NOW IN EFFECT AND HEMAKING
PROGRESS AGAIN". (DEP CHIEF NAVAL STAFF TOLD DATT NNS LOKOJA
WHICH DEPARTED LAGOS FOR "BONNY AREA" 291900ZAPRIL CARRIED "ONE
MILLION ROUNDS 7.62MM SMALL ARMS AND OTHER CRITICAL AMMO ITEMS FOR
THIRD DIV"). (ALTHOUGH HARD INFO SPECIFIC LOCATION ADEKUNLE'S
FORWARD UNITS NOT READILY AVAIL EVEN TO HQ HERE, SOURCES BELIEVE
HE "GENERALLY ALONG PIPE LINE (MAIN NORTH-SOUTH PETROLEUM PIPE
LINE RUNNING FROM NORTH OF IMO RIVER WEST OF UNUOSI (0451N0717E)
SOUTH TO BONNY TERMINAL VIA BOTEM (0444N0717E) AND BODO
(0437N0716E) FROM IMO RIVER ON NORTH TO CREEKS IN SOUTH". THIS

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APPROX SIX MILES WEST REFINERY OKRIKA AND NINE MILES WEST HAROURT AIRFIELD WHICH AMONG OBVIOUS OBJECTIVES THIS DRIVE. IF FORWARD LOCATIONS AS BELIEVED, IT POSSIBLE AFAM (0448N0719E) THERMAL ELECTRIC POWER PLANT-LARGEST IN NIGERIA-NOW IN FED HANDS. FURTHER CONSIDERATION ADEKUNLE'S CURRENT POSITION SHOWS HIS TWO BRIGADES THIS AREA IN FINE TACTICAL POSITION BEING ABLE DEFEND AGAINST LIKELY REBEL COUNTERATTACKS FROM NORTH WITH IMO RIVER TO THEIR FRONT}.

2. MISCELLANEOUS:

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A. REF MY 0174 APRIL 68: INFO AVAIL SAME SOURCE, SAME CHANNEL INDICATES STILL ANOTHER CONTRACT SIGNED APPROX 26 APRIL. THIS ONE WITH "EGYPTIAN ARMS DEALER (SI) FOR SOV MORTARS AND OTHER NATO COUNTRY WEAPONS TO INCLUDE CREW SERVED WEAPONS". NO FURTHER INFO THIS CONTRACT AVAILABLE.

B. REF MY 0173 APRIL 68: BASED INFO RELIABLE SOURCES IT BELIEVED GOBIR WENT ON FROM CAIRO TO "EUROPE ON ARMS BUSINESS". HE DUE BACK LAGOS EVENING 0 MAY. (IF THIS SO, THIS INCOMING FLIGHT FROM CAIRO, SO GOBIR MUST HAVE RETURNED CAIRO ON WAY BACK. IN RELATED INFO AVAILABLE, KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES SAY MURITALLE MUHAMMED ALSO DUE IN SAME FLIGHT. IF SO, INTERESTING SPECULATE WHETHER GOBIR DISPATCHED LONDON TO "FETCH" MUHAMMED BACK, OR GOBIR'S TRIP CONNECTED SOME WAY WITH MUHAMMEDS. MORE AS AVAIL.

C. FRESHLY RECOVERED FROM HERNIA OPERATION, MUHAMMED SHUWA HAS REASSUMED COMMAND FIRST DIV WITH HQ MAKURDI. DANJUMA REMAINS AS 2IC, MARTIN ADAMU RETAINS COMMAND FIRST BRIGADE EUGU.

D. HEAVY FED TROOPS MOVEMENTS NOTED LAGOS AREA LAST SEVERAL DAYS. RELIABLE OBSERVER SAW "TROOP TRAIN FROM NORTH" ARRIVE LAGOS TERMINAL 010915AMAY. TROOPS IN COMBAT GEAR WITH RIFLES; PRECISE ESTIMATE NUMBER NOT AVAILABLE, BUT OBSERVER SAID "PLENTY". (ESTIMATED

PAGE 4 RUTALS 8755CC C O N F I D E N T I A L

HERE APPROX ONE THOUSAND). AMCIT OBSERVER WARRI 30 APRIL SAID "APPROX TWO THOUSAND FED TROOPS ARRIVED WARRI BY ROAD" THAT DATE. (THIS COULD INDICATE BUILDING FED DEFENSES MID-WEST IN

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ANTICIPATION MORE REBEL RAIDS INTO DELTA AREA; COULD ALSO BE FORCES FOR MOVE INTO RIVERS STATE VIA YENAGOA ORHIHOADA. WILL ATTEMPT WATCH THIS ONE.

E. KEY MIL PERSONNEL LAGOS AREA OBSERVED IKEJA DEMONSTRATION 30 APRIL MIL COMBAT VEHICLE DESCRIBED "MODIFIED MERCEDES TRUCK CHASSIS WITH ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER BODY FOR TWELVE TROOPS". AGENT NIGERIA A.G. LEVENTIS COMPANY. REPORTS ARE FMG MIL PERSONNEL HIGHLY IMPRESSED CAPABILITIES VEHICLE AND "WISH PURCHASE APPROX ONE HUNDRED FIFTY".

F. NNS NIGERIA RETURNED LAGOS FROM BONNY AREA 011600AMAY.

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